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Abstract
As delegates gathered in Philadelphia in May 1775 for the start of the Second Continental
Congress, many of the men present understood that independence was one possible solution to
the growing problems with Parliament and King George III. Congressmen in the summer of
1775 created new revolutionary institutions to address the political crisis, and during those
turbulent times they turned to the eighteenth-century culture of honor to provide guidelines for
their conduct and decision-making. The legislative structure of the Continental Congress and the
hierarchy of the Continental Army were shaped by the honor code. The eighteenth-century
culture of honor constituted a system of defining cultural assumptions and behavior that helped
to create social identity, structure social interactions, and govern behavior in the political and
military spheres. Although in the 1770s there was no consensus on the exact definition of honor
and its role in American society, the idea of honor did provide the “social glue” that held the
colonists together as they contemplated and fought for independence. I argue that personal
constructions of honorable behavior caused many of the problems between Congress and the
army because gentlemen in those two institutions operated under different interpretations of the
honor code.
When difficulties arose between Congress and the army over promotions, pensions, or
congressional privilege, revolutionaries in both institutions turned to the guidelines of the honor
code to resolve the disputes. The honor culture provided three options to address the tensions
between the Continental Congress and the Continental army: meditation, resignation, or affairs
of honor. Mediation was the most commonly used option and reveals the large friendship
networks that developed between Congress and the army. A concern for honor helps to explain
why disputes involving people’s intentions and reputations occupy a significant proportion of the
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official records of the Continental Congress. Moreover, honor and its application by soldiers and
politicians had a profound influence on the course and ultimate success of the Revolution.
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Introduction:
“I don’t see how any Man of Feeling or Sentiment can continue in a public Department where
every measure is looked upon with a jaundiced Eye and of course all Mistakes are magnified into
Sins political and moral.”
Richard Peters, 1778 1
Standing on the muddy streets of York, Pennsylvania, in April 1778, Colonel Daniel
Morgan accused Richard Peters, secretary of the congressional Board of War, of plotting against
George Washington, the Continental Army’s commander-in-chief. Gossip exchanged in
personal letters between civilian and military officials during the winter months of 1777/78
speculated about the existence of a possible cabal to replace Washington. 2 Knowing that
Washington would never challenge a public official over words circulated in private letters,
Morgan confronted Peters, hoping to force him to confess to his participation in the cabal and
acknowledge his dishonorable behavior. Peters’s apology for duplicitous behavior would
preserve Washington’s and the Continental Army’s honor. Peters’s and Morgan’s altercation
exemplifies the problems and heated disagreements that developed among revolutionaries during
the war for American independence.3 This thesis analyzes the means by which revolutionaries
dealt with the tensions that plagued the Continental Congress and the Continental Army.
Although Americans felt the pressure of trying to defeat the British army to ensure a successful
1

Quoted in Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice,
1763-1789 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 220. I first came across this quote in Paul David Nelson,
General Horatio Gates: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 171. Peters sent this
statement to a friend in April 1778. The quote captures the difficulty of navigating the political and military sphere
in which politics were personal. Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an
American Icon (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 163, discusses the tense meeting between Peters and Morgan
in York.
2
The Conway Cabal began in December 1777, when Washington became convinced that factions in Congress were
pushing for Horatio Gates to replace him as commander-in-chief. Historians have decisively proven that the
congressional cabal never actually existed. I discuss it here because Washington and his junior officers clearly
believed that the threat was real. Most works that discuss the American Revolution allot several pages to disproving
the existence of the cabal and then address its impact on Washington and Congress. For example, see: Ferling, The
Ascent of George Washington, 155-171; Nelson, General Horatio Gates, 157-185; and Higginbotham, The War of
American Independence, 216-222.
3
I use the term “revolutionaries” to indicate gentlemen who served in either the Continental Army or the
Continental Congress.

1

rebellion, there was an underlying cause of the explosive problems between the two
revolutionary institutions. That deeper cause was the eighteenth-century culture of honor, a
system that dictated gentlemanly behavior and the options available to resolve disputes. The
culture of honor shaped the decisions made by eighteenth-century gentlemen, creating many of
the conflicts and compromises of the American Revolution.
If participation in politics at the most basic level required a good character and
reputation, then the culture of honor provided a set of rules to govern how a reputation was
maintained. Since gentility was a prerequisite for political status in the colonies, personal honor
served as a carefully guarded component of character. Because of honor’s critical importance,
politicians and military officers guarded against any possible stain on their characters. In the
eighteenth century, revolutionaries believed “honor was an all-or-nothing proposition.” 4
A leader, therefore, could not hope to lose his honor and maintain his public reputation.
That was why Colonel Morgan confronted Richard Peters in the muddy streets. In this face-toface encounter Morgan let Peters know that men were prepared to defend Washington’s honor
with their lives. Morgan also hoped to prove his loyalty to Washington. Any hint of a campaign
to replace the commander-in-chief challenged Washington’s honor and, consequently, the
integrity of the officers who pledged their loyalty to their commanding officer.
Historians who discuss the conflicts between civil and military authorities during the war
use three different analytical frameworks to explain how and why tensions developed and
eventually dissipated: (1) ideological differences; (2) civilian meddling; and (3) an egotistical
officer corps. In asserting the centrality of the culture of honor, this thesis proposes a new
analytical framework to supplement the existing Revolutionary War historiography. Reference

4

Andrew S. Trees, The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 52.

2

to the eighteenth-century culture of honor helps to explain some aspects of the continual conflicts
that developed between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army. By focusing on
analyzing and explaining the revolutionaries’ cultural worldview, I can explore how ideology
shaped their behavior and why politics were so personal during the war years. An emphasis on
the honor culture provides a more complete explanation of the problems that plagued the
revolutionary war effort.
H. James Henderson, in Party Politics in the Continental Congress, and Jonathan G.
Rossie, in The Politics of Command in the American Revolution, argue that ideological
differences in both Congress and the army caused friction throughout the war.5 Their analysis
examines the contentious debate over establishing a standing army or using state militias to fight
the British. This debate continued beyond 1775, as some delegates persisted in voting down any
act that would serve to strengthen the Continental Army. Army officers are depicted in these
texts as angry hotheads, resentful of congressional caution. Delegates also worried about the
balance between state power and national power in deciding how to prosecute and pay for the
war. 6 Historians portray the confrontations between officers and congressional delegates as the
result of a struggle between ideological groups for control over the future direction of the
American Revolution.
Though ideological differences were important reasons for tensions among
revolutionaries, an analysis that relies mainly on such differences fails to explain how social
connections shaped the delegates’ reactions to the ideological conflicts.7 The eighteenth-century

5

Hebert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1974) and Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1975).
6
Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, 218-245.
7
This critique is shaped by Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen
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culture of honor provided specific guidelines for political conflict and this aspect of analysis is
missing from Henderson’s and Rossie’s accounts. Ideology and behavior were both shaped by
the culture of the time.
The second analytical framework that most military historians prefer proposes that the
Continental Congress almost crippled the Continental Army’s ability to defeat the British
because of the ineptness of congressional representatives. The case for civilian meddling is
argued most persuasively in Richard H. Kohn’s essay, “American Generals of the Revolution:
Subordination and Restraint” and A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic,
1763-1789 by James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender.8 Some military historians
celebrate the steadfast group of army veterans who valiantly ignored congressional interference
and fought the British to the bargaining table. They present a heroic story of officers
overcoming congressional stumbling blocks to win the war and save the revolution. Most
historians who subscribe to this view describe the Revolution in terms of the development of a
nationalist movement in both Congress and the army, one that urged the creation of a strong
national government. They give little attention to delegates who wished to check the power of
Congress. This argument loses sight of the pressures facing the Continental Congress during the
war and fails to explain why Washington was willing to subordinate himself and his army to
congressional authority. Moreover, while the army’s resentment of Congress is readily apparent

(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010) and Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of
Reason (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987).
8
Richard H. Kohn, “American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint,” in Reconsiderations on the
Revolutionary War: Selected Essays, ed. Don Higginbotham (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) and James Kirby
Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington
Heights, Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982). Martin and Lender conclude A Respectable Army with this summation of the
behavior of the Continental army: “paradoxically this same hardcore group of regulars [the Continental Army], so
damned by so many patriots (and feared by ideologues as the antithesis of the republican ideal of the militia) set the
highest example of selfless behavior in Revolutionary America.” A Respectable Army, 194.
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in the officers’ personal letters, the relationship between the civil and military authorities was
more complicated than that.
Research in political history also contradicts the military historians’ indictment of
congressional ineptitude and deliberate neglect of the army. Jack N. Rakove and Calvin C.
Jillson and Rick K. Wilson rehabilitate the reputation of Congress, describing it as an extralegal
assembly that managed to win a war and keep the children of the revolution from devouring one
another. 9 While Congress and the army were not perfect institutions, the disputes that developed
between them were a consequence of more than the delegates’ ineptitude or their internecine
ideological battles.
The third analytical framework presents the officer corps as an egotistical group, focused
more on its personal grievances rather than on the larger issue of winning independence.
Although this argument does not dominate the literature, it runs as a subtext through many
discussions of the officer corps’ behavior. Some historians portray the officers’ behavior as
petty and irrational, without examining how their worldview and social rank shaped their
actions. 10 Though the litany of officers’ complaints and resentments can be overwhelming to
even the most tolerant researcher, they reveal the mentality of eighteenth-century American
revolutionaries.

9

Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretative History of the Continental Congress (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979) and Calvin C. Jillson and Rick K. Wilson, Congressional Dynamics: Coordination,
Structure & Choice in the First American Congress, 1774-1789 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994).
10
Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army & American Character, 1775-1783
(Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at University of North Carolina, 1979)
and John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007) See especially Royster’s chapter “Valley Forge” and pp. 200-213 where he discusses the
officers’ pretensions to gentility and how their growing professionalization worried ideologues in Congress.
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Colonial Americans’ actions are more easily analyzed when viewed through the
framework of the eighteenth-century culture of honor. 11 The culture of honor constituted a
system of defining assumptions that helped to create social identity, structure social interactions,
and govern behavior in eighteenth-century institutions. 12 Although there was no consensus in
the 1770s on the exact definition of honor and its role in American society, the idea of honor did
provide the “social glue” that held the colonists together as they contemplated independence.13
Honor was significant for many societies because, in a world with no police force and limited
access to law courts, “the willingness on the part of individuals to internalize standards of honor,
and on the part of the communities to enforce them, was often the best guarantee of keeping the
peace.” 14 I argue here that personal constructions of honorable behavior caused many of the
problems between Congress and the army because gentlemen in those two institutions operated
under different interpretations of the honor code. A concern for honor helps to explain why
disputes involving people’s intentions and reputations occupy a significant proportion of the
congressional record.
Several recent trends in historical analysis have shaped my use of the culture of honor
framework to analyze historical actors’ behavior during the American Revolution. The field of
emotional history offers constructive and critical ways to think about honor and resentment,
terms used frequently and forcefully in Americans’ letters during the late colonial period and
Revolution. Historians Peter Stearns and Jan Lewis have suggested that “emotional standards
(sometimes called emotional culture) play a distinct role in any society or group.” Emotional
11

See Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, Freedman, Affairs of Honor, Trees, The Politics of
Character, or Michal J. Rozbicki, The Complete Colonial Gentleman: Cultural Legitimacy in Plantation America
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998).
12
Brendan Kane, The Politics and Culture of Honour in Britain and Ireland, 1541-1641 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 8.
13
Ibid., 10.
14
Ibid., 10.
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standards influence a society’s public representations “including law as well as literature…and
they also affect personal judgments.”15 In the eighteenth century, anger and resentment were
proper emotions for a gentleman to display publicly when he felt insulted by a social equal.
Colonial society encouraged gentlemen to react with heightened sensitivity to any insult. In
responding gentlemen had three socially acceptable methods of resolving the dispute: mediation,
resignation, or affairs of honor. Etiquette books taught social leaders how to navigate the
complex social hierarchy.16
Without the context of the eighteenth-century honor culture, gentlemen’s reactions can
appear to be petty and irrational. The study of emotional history has demonstrated that people
were influenced by the social and emotional options available to them to express their feelings.17
These options also limited a person’s reactions to certain situations. Culture, to an extent, shapes
the behavior of those who are part of it. This thesis analyzes the new elite American political
and military culture developing during the Revolution. 18 Emotional history provides a useful
analytical vocabulary to examine the language and behavior of contentious politicians and
military officers.
The body of research on the political culture of the tumultuous 1790s is the most
influential area of current historiography that support my thesis. Several recent books, including

15

Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis, “Introduction,” in An Emotional History of the United States, Eds. Peter N.
Stearns and Jan Lewis (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 5.
16
John Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon (New York:
Bloomsbury Press, 2009). Ferling discusses how Washington copied maxims from etiquette books as a young man.
A good essay on the importance of etiquette books to colonial Americans is: C. Dallett Hemphill “Class, Gender,
and the Regulation of Emotional Expression in Revolutionary-Era Conduct Literature,” in An Emotional History of
the United States, 33-51.
17
Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (NewYork: Oxford University
Press, 1982).
18
See Nicole Eustace, Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution (Chapel
Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at University of North Carolina, 2008). Eustace
offers an insightful look into American emotional culture and how colonists acted out certain emotions. While I
disagree with some of the arguments made by Eustace on how emotions played into the push for independence, her
chapter on resentment was helpful in understanding the culture of honor in colonial Pennsylvania.
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Joanne B. Freeman’s Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic, James Roger
Sharp’s American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis, and Andrew S.
Trees’s The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character, discuss why politics were so
personal and fractious in the decade following ratification of the Constitution. These studies of
political culture use elements of emotional history and a focus on the development of political
ideology to analyze the fierce political combat of the 1790s. The company that politicians kept
influenced both their political ideology and national reputation. Analysis of the language and
behavior of historical actors in the late eighteenth century reveals how deeply intertwined
personal relationships and politics were on the national stage. A political disagreement could
very quickly turn into a character assassination because a gentleman’s political ideology was
linked to his personal identity. Political culture studies have uncovered the code of manners that
governed historical actors’ behavior in the 1790s, and this method of analysis may be applied to
the 1770s to gain a better understanding of the political and military culture of the American
Revolution. 19
For the eighteenth-century culture of honor to have existed, a particular social group, the
colonial elite, had to acknowledge and accept a standard set of norms that governed their
behavior. 20 In the thirteen colonies, socially prominent gentlemen were expected to participate
actively in the political sphere. As Richard R. Beeman stated in The Varieties of Political

19

Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor, Andrew S. Trees The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character, James
Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993)
20
Appiah, The Honor Code, 20. Appiah describes the social group as an “honor world,” where people acknowledge
a set of behaviors that apply specifically to their social group. Not all historians accept the existence of an elite
economic and social group in colonial America, especially in comparison with British society; some historians used
the term “self-proclaimed elite.” I believe that American colonists lived in a hierarchical world defined by
deferential and elitist social practices. Nicole Eustace used “self-proclaimed” in Passion is the Gale. For excellent
overviews of colonial society, see: Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York:
Knopf, 1992); Robert Olwell and Alan Tully, Eds., Cultures and Identities in Colonial British America (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 2006); and Michal J. Rozbicki, The Complete Colonial Gentleman.
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Experience in Eighteenth-Century America, colonists possessed an “instinctive assumption that
there was an integral relationship between social authority and political power.”21 The members
of the colonial elite who possessed political power came from the ranks of “gentlemen
freeholders, aspiring lawyers, and leisured merchants” and differed from their British
counterparts only because they did not belong to an established hereditary aristocracy.22
Otherwise, the colonial elite mimicked the British gentry in various ways, usually by reading the
same literature, studying law at the British courts, or adhering to the standards of the honor code
prized by the British ruling elite. Colonial elites patterned themselves after the British elites to
create an orderly and well-governed society “whose leaders possessed the appropriate traits of
wealth, education, gentility and liberality.”23 The creation of a deferential political system
allowed the gentry to preserve their political power. Elite leaders believed that their superior
education allowed them to legislate for the general good of society.
During the 1700s, all thirteen colonial legislatures practiced a form of deferential politics,
and recognition of hierarchy and deference shaped the worldview of all participants in the
American Revolution. Moreover, a political culture based on deference required knowledge of a
person’s character and friendships. “Character,” in the eighteenth-century world, referred to the
mix of traits, vices, and virtues that, together, determined a person’s social worth. Character was
perceived as an almost “tangible possession, something one fashioned, held and protected, so
that one could speak of acquiring character.”24 A colonial gentleman believed that his peers’
recognition of his good character determined his personal self-worth and social rank. Colonial
21

Richard R. Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 16.
22
Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics, 19.
23
Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience, 16.
24
Freeman, Affairs of Honor, xx. Freedman’s argument in Affairs of Honor influenced my analysis of the culture of
honor. Her preface was helpful in initiating me into the vocabulary and meaning of eighteenth-century political
disputes. The quote is from Trees, The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character, 2.
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society also held that education and moderation in behavior and speech were among the most
important qualities that a leader needed to warrant the loyalty and respect of followers.
When a gentleman pursued political office or a commission in the local militia, he knew
that his peers evaluated his character and reputation. Even a person’s political beliefs were
linked to his character. In his personal diary, John Adams described the typical colonial
legislature, in which everyone knew “a Man’s Pedigree and Biography, his Education,
Profession and Connections, as well as his fortune.”25 This knowledge allowed legislators “to
see what it is that governs a Man and determines him to his Party in Preference to that, to this
System of Politicks rather than another.”26 A person’s ideological principles determined his
political identity and group of friends. Politicians at the First Continental Congress in September
1774 suddenly had to “enquire and learn the Characters and Connections, the Interests and
Views of a Multitude of Strangers.”27 The Continental Congress stretched the boundaries of the
old deferential political system, causing character and honor to take on a more significant
meaning in the expanded political sphere.
Deferential politics has dominated these pages because a professional military class did
not exist in the colonies until the establishment of the Continental Army in June 1775. Although
many colonial gentlemen had served in gratis positions in their local militias, there was no corps
of retired professional soldiers. Some, such as George Washington, had gained military
experience during the French and Indian War, fighting alongside the British Regulars, but British
officials had always refused to allow colonial gentlemen to join the King’s officer ranks.28

25

Freeman, Affairs of Honor, 20.
Ibid., 20.
27
Ibid., 20.
28
The British officers’ refusal to acknowledge colonial elites’ attempts to establish social equality can be found in
Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 17541763 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), and John Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington, 27-45.
26
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British officers viewed colonial gentlemen as their social and cultural inferiors. Officers in the
colonial armies could only observe and mimic the British officers’ culture of honor from a
distance. British professionalism and elitist rituals had awed colonists during the French and
Indian War. From the beginning of the Revolution, the Continental Army adopted most of the
traditions of the British military’s culture, especially its honor code that encouraged a heightened
vigilance to discern any insult or slight. 29 Problems arose later in the war when officers began to
think of themselves as a distinct group of professionals who deserved to be treated with respect
by civilian officials.
The need for public recognition of a gentleman’s self-worth drove many revolutionaries
to become acutely sensitive to any criticism of their performance.30 The leaders of the war for
independence already believed that they stood on shaky ground in challenging the authority of
the British government and, because of those feelings of uncertainty, they avidly policed one
another, alert to any attempt to corrupt the fragile new republic.31 As Richard Peters declared
after listening to Morgan’s tirade, “I don’t see how any Man of Feeling or Sentiment can
continue in a public Department where every measure is looked upon with a jaundiced Eye and
of course all Mistakes are magnified into Sins political and moral.”32 The key point of Peters’s
complaint highlights how the culture of honor turned all personal decisions into honorable or
dishonorable behavior. Every decision reflected on a person’s character with no distinction
made between the private individual and his public actions. A revolutionary whose actions or

29

Michael Stephenson, Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2007), 63.
30
Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Army (Chapel Hill: Omohundro
Institute of Early American History and Culture by University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 38.
31
Michael A. McDonnell, “Popular Mobilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary Virginia: The Failure of the
Minutemen and the Revolution from Below,” The Journal of American History 85 (1998), 950.
32
Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, 220.
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decisions were questioned usually interpreted the objection as a challenge to his honor and,
which made the political very personal.
Though many twenty-first century individuals may view the culture of honor as a
concrete framework within which all controversies were settled by dueling. Most revolutionaries
actually preferred to use third-party mediation to resolve their grievances. The colonial elite’s
extensive friendship networks allowed individuals to use intermediaries to learn if their
reputation had been slandered. The intermediaries then determined if the gossip was a serious
threat or simply an innocuous misunderstanding. Mediation could be used to forestall the issuing
of a challenge to a duel or serve as the first step in an affair of honor.33
Often, when officers were unhappy about perceived congressional affronts to their honor,
they resigned. 34 Resignations usually occurred after officers were denied promotions to the rank
they felt they deserved or when congressional finances made it difficult to pay them on time.
Many historians have judged harshly the officers who resigned during the war, but most
revolutionaries believed that resignation was an honorable way to preserve their dignity.
Politicians also resigned or “retired” from situations that they felt might prove injurious to their
dignity. The culture of honor dictated the language used in the officers’ resignation letters.
Citing their personal resentment over congressional mismanagement of military affairs, officers
excused their impending absence by insisting they had to leave to preserve their honor and
reputation. Washington tried throughout the war to persuade officers not to take offense at
congressional actions, arguing repeatedly that Congress was not intentionally insulting the
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officer corps with its resolutions and proclamations. But many officers rejected Washington’s
assurances and began to demand respect in the form of guarantees of pensions from the civil
authority.
The revolutionaries’ ultimate dramatic recourse to preserve their honor was a physical
confrontation, usually in the form of a duel. 35 A duel was a highly ritualized encounter between
two social equals who were prepared to face death to prove that their actions were honorable.
Also, a physical confrontation demonstrated the seriousness of the issue. Morgan feared that
Peters might be a part of a conspiracy to dishonor Washington, and so, when Morgan confronted
Peters, he demonstrated his readiness to protect Washington and his personal honor. In this
instance, a face-to-face discussion resolved the conflict between Peters and Morgan. But other
revolutionaries believed that only dueling could salvage their reputations and honor. Duels
occurred with greater frequency among officers in the Continental Army but, as chapter four of
this thesis makes clear, several affairs of honor involved military officials and congressional
representatives. Such confrontations occurred because disputes over the policy of congressional
privilege between the two revolutionary institutions were not initially resolvable by mediation.
The four chapters of this thesis follow the chronological timeline of the American
Revolution and examine key issues that developed between the Continental Congress and the
Continental Army. Chapter one examines the initial congressional debates concerning the
establishment of the Continental Army. Delegates influenced by radical or conservative political
ideologies clashed over the new army’s structure and how much power should be granted to the
new officer class. The sensitivity to social rank and hierarchy made it difficult to appoint
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officers because some gentlemen felt slighted by their initial appointments. Resentments over
promotions and officers’ commissions caused many problems throughout the war.
Chapter two discusses the growing pains plaguing both revolutionary institutions at the
beginning of the rebellion. The Continental Congress and the army frequently disagreed over the
guidelines for promoting officers. Those differences reveal ideological groupings that
transcended institutional boundaries. The dispute between General Philip Schuyler and General
Horatio Gates over command of the northern army is a striking example of the way in which
third-party mediation worked during the war and illuminates the close friendship networks that
developed between the military and civilian institutions. Because of these colonial friendship
networks, congressional factions developed to support each general’s claim that he deserved sole
authority over the northern army. Numerous congressional resolutions resulted from third-party
negotiations and these allowed the controversy to drag on for over a year because all the
participants in it had to work within the boundaries of the honor code.
Chapter three presents the Continental Army’s attempts to push back against
congressional control. Toward the end of the war, officers assumed that the new resolutions
passed by Congress showed disrespect for their status as professional and honorable gentlemen.
During the winter seasons, officer resignations became an acute problem for Washington and
Congress. In 1777/78 officers began to demand half-pay pensions as a reward for their sacrifices
during the conflict. The heated dispute over half-pay pensions symbolized to many
revolutionaries problems within the culture of honor that dictated how gentlemen should react in
times of conflict and stress. Instead of realizing that Congress hovered on the brink of
insolvency, officers fixated on their need for public recognition of their sacrifice. If that
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recognition was not forthcoming, the code of honor demanded that they resign, a resolution that
was anything but desirable during the middle of a war.
Chapter four discusses the final resolution tool available to gentlemen to address insults
to their character. Revolutionaries turned to affairs of honor as a last resort because a duel
proved the seriousness of the insult. The policy of congressional privilege created several
problems between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army because military officers
believed that congressmen used privilege deliberately to injure their reputations. The issue of
freedom of debate raised the question of whether the honor code allowed any loopholes if they
aided in the prosecution of the war effort. Delegates wanted to be able to discuss openly whether
certain generals should be fired or moved elsewhere to make sure American forces won battles.
Officers who were discussed disparagingly on the congressional floor believed that they had the
right to challenge congressmen for their character assassinations.
Each chapter aims to understand how the culture of honor shaped the revolutionaries’
worldview and their decision-making processes. As political and military setbacks challenged
colonial leaders, they worried also about their honor and reputation. When feeling pressured,
these gentlemen knew that the culture of honor provided three viable methods by which to
address their personal grievances. Subscribing to a conception of society that was dominated by
a code of honor, these men of “Feeling and Sentiment” attempted to navigate the shifting ground
of a rebellion. Honor was a means to that end, but it was a controversial frame of reference to
guide the leaders of the Continental Army and the Continental Congress. All too often, they
sought to defend their actions even at the expense of efficiency in prosecuting the war effort.
And yet, while the code of honor caused many disputes, it did nevertheless, act as “social glue”
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to hold together revolutionaries from the thirteen colonies and created the hope of a new
American society and government.36
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Chapter 1:
Revolutionary Fervor in Philadelphia: Creating New Institutions
“Professional soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of Citizens.
They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit obedience to their
Commands. Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye.”
Samuel Adams, 1776 37
Hoping to forestall days of debate, John Adams rose in the Continental Congress in mid
June 1775 to propose elevating George Washington as commander-in-chief of the newly
established Continental Army. Adams described Washington as “a Gentleman whose Skill and
Experience as an Officer, whose independent fortune, great Talents and excellent universal
Character would command the Approbation of all America and unite the cordial Exertions of all
the Colonies.” 38 Faced with almost certain fighting against British troops in Boston, Congress
had agreed to create a military force under its control. The “cordial exertions of all the Colonies”
referred to the distinct state militia units already gathered in Cambridge as a makeshift army.
The appointment of a commander-in-chief signaled Congress’s intent to fight a defensive war
against the British with a continental army composed of volunteers from all the colonies.
Delegates wished to appoint a commander-in-chief who possessed military experience and who
also understood and reflected the attributes of a gentleman. Emphasizing Washington’s
independent fortune and “universal” character, Adams stressed his moral as well as social
reputation.
Discussion of military matters dominated the Second Continental Congress from the first
day of its legislative session. Revolutionaries found themselves making preparations for war
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even as they debated proposals for reconciliation with England. During its first few weeks,
Congress oversaw the establishment of military and legislative structures that would influence
how the war for American Independence was fought and understood by contemporaries. A letter
from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress declaring that “the sanguinary Zeal of the
ministerial Army, to ruin and destroy the Inhabitants of this colony [Massachusetts], hath
rendered the Establishment of an Army indispensably necessary,” demanded that the Continental
Congress grapple with an issue it had hoped to avoid at the beginning of the new legislative
session. 39 Should a continental army be raised to protect colonists from the British Army or
would this army interfere with redressing colonial grievances with Parliament? Intending to
prod Congress into action, the Provincial Council argued that current events in the aftermath of
Lexington and Concord dictated the creation of “a power full Army, on the side of America…to
stem the rapid Progress of a Tyrannical Ministry.”40
Members of the Second Continental Congress knew they faced several momentous
decisions in the summer of 1775. Congressmen differed over the question of declaring
independence and whether they should create a professional army to fight Great Britain. To deal
with these and other contentious matters, delegates clung to the culture of politeness that guided
colonial society. 41 They constructed their new national legislature to ensure that each gentleman
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would have an equal voice in debates. Well aware that they held opposing views on the question
of independence and how much power national legislature should exercise, delegates created an
institutional structure that allowed for the development and discussion of different political
policies. A major weakness of the Continental Congress and the social conventions by which it
operated was that there was no neutral forum for the expression of conflicting opinions without
delegates feeling personally insulted.
A culture of politeness and deference left room for interpretation, and this leeway
complicated Congress’s efforts to commission the major and brigadier generals for the
Continental Army. Several of the newly commissioned generals felt insulted by the seniority
system established by Congress and threatened to resign, feeling that they needed to leave the
Continental Army to preserve their honorable character. The institutional design of Congress
and the delegates’ political ideologies influenced how the national legislature handled this first
challenge to its authority by the Continental Army. Even at the start of the armed rebellion
against Great Britain, the culture of honor caused problems between the Continental Congress
and the Continental Army.
Many of the delegates in Philadelphia had served in the First Continental Congress in
September and October of 1774. Colonial leaders participating in the First Continental Congress
understood that they were creating an extralegal assembly. They believed that the First
Continental Congress had only the authority to address a petition of protest to Parliament and
encourage colonial legislatures to adopt trade embargos.42 The Continental Congress’s main
purpose was to allow elite leaders from all of the colonies to meet and exchange strategies on
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how to resolve the political problems with Parliament. They did not intend to create a new
national assembly that superseded the powers of each colony’s legislature.
With the First Continental Congress’s limited purpose in mind, politicians deliberately
created a weak legislative body that emphasized decision-making by consensus. Members of
Congress made decisions only after lengthy open-floor debate. The president of Congress had
almost no authority besides that of casting a vote to break a tie, though appointment to the
position was based on a gentleman’s social prominence and reputation.43 Each colonial
delegation voted as a single bloc in geographical order from the most northern colony, New
Hampshire, to South Carolina.44 By deliberately creating a weak institutional structure delegates
could prevent any colony from dominating the proceedings and stop political ideological factions
from controlling all the decisions. Delegates debated the institutional structure because they
wanted to dispel any rumors that they deliberately sought to usurp political power.
After agreeing to adopt new non-importation and non-exportation agreements in October
1774, Congress recessed. The representatives agreed to meet again in May 1775, should they
need to discuss Parliament’s reaction to their petitions. After receiving the news of Lexington
and Concord, delegates gathered in Philadelphia in a state of considerable agitation. Colonial
bloodshed was no longer just a theoretical consequence of challenging the Coercive Acts and
Parliament’s authority. When the Second Continental Congress began, the delegates
unanimously agreed to keep the same parliamentary procedures from the First Continental
Congress, a move that would profoundly shape Congress’s decision-making during the American
Revolution.
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Delegates approved of a weak institutional structure for two reasons. First, delegates had
no idea at the beginning of the new session, that events in the next few weeks would dramatically
alter Congress’s responsibilities. By June, they controlled an army and had the new financial
responsibility to pay for it. The siege of the British troops in Boston lent additional importance
to the delegates’ decisions. Growing numbers of Americans began to view Congress as the new
national legislative body in control of military decisions.45
The second reason delegates resolved to follow the rules adopted by the First Congress
was that they feared the rise of political factions. They accepted that there were different
political ideologies but believed that parties were bad for legislatures. Political parties could
destabilize the culture of politeness that preserved the political and social order. By allowing for
an open discussion of every issue, no single group could dominate proceedings because each
gentleman would have an opportunity to voice his opinion. The culture of honor dictated that
every politician be able to speak, so that no one would feel slighted or insulted. An undesirable
consequence of this policy was to make legislative business unwieldy and inefficient.46
Although delegates realized that debate was time-consuming, they hoped that it would
prevent the creation of factions. If all had the chance to speak, there would be no need to
organize special groups to manipulate politics. While the delegates expressed disapproval of
political factions, they knew that factions had long existed in colonial politics. Colonial leaders
had believed that political groupings arose when a temporary alliance among honorable men was
needed to institute proper reforms for the benefit of the legislature and society.47 With this
history in mind, delegates to the Second Continental Congress adopted an institutional structure
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that prevented any faction from dominating congressional business. That structure did not,
however, prevent delegates from banding together to gain preferment for their friends or
manipulate the outcome of a particular vote.48
The Second Continental Congress conducted most of its daily business through the
committee system and, from 1775 to 1789 it created 3,249 committees. 49 Delegates served on
dozens of committees throughout their legislative tenure. Some committees came into existence
solely to answer a single letter, while a few standing committees, such as the Board of War,
oversaw the Continental Army’s military affairs. Committees typically proposed solutions to the
issues they were asked to consider. The entire Congress then debated these proposals.50
Committee service took up a considerable amount of a delegate’s time. A few delegates served
on a disproportionately large number of committees, either because of their reputation as diligent
legislators or because they served multiple congressional terms.
The committee system’s handling of military affairs generally followed a set routine.
One example from October 1775 had delegates nominating by secret ballot, a three-man
committee to travel to Washington’s headquarters to determine what the army needed for winter
encampment. Then, a separate committee, consisting of another five delegates would draft the
specific instructions and questions to for the committee that traveled to Washington’s camp. The
committee of five would then read their proposed instructions aloud to all of the delegates.
Congress would then debate each paragraph point by point, until a final set of instructions was
passed. Then the committee of three who traveled to meet with Washington left Philadelphia
48
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and presented Washington with instructions that had been approved by all delegates after lengthy
debate. The entire process took four days.51
Decision-making by the committee system and open-floor debate made for slow progress.
That officers in the Continental Army never realized how slowly Congress operated would cause
problems later in the war. What officers attributed to intentional neglect was actually the result
of delegates attempting to solve a problem through the committee system and open-floor debate.
Legislators preferred this system because it was consistent with their understanding of the culture
of honor. Every opinion was heard and, ideally, consensus decision-making prevented a delegate
from feeling slighted or insulted during a debate. The debate over creating, for the first time, a
continental army lasted for a full month, as delegates discussed the army’s potential structure and
the qualifications necessary to become an officer.
Debate over the Continental Army exposed ideological differences among delegates.
Their competing ideologies shaped new interpretations of the eighteenth-century culture of honor
and influenced the course and conduct of the month-long debate over establishing a new military
force. New interpretations developed because many revolutionaries perceived that there was a
potential power vacuum in America in the event that Britain was thrown out. They thought that
they could re-fashion society into a new ideal form. Historians typically characterize
congressional delegates as having been either radicals or conservatives.52 All congressmen were
members of the colonial political elite, but they disagreed on the best solutions to the political
problems with Parliament. Both ideological groups hoped to use open-floor debate to persuade
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the opposing group into joining their side. Eighteenth century political institutions allowed for
the development of different political ideals, but it was difficult within the political culture to
express those conflicting viewpoints without unintentionally insulting a gentleman’s reputation.
Political beliefs supposedly revealed a person’s character.
Radical congressmen believed that, after years of repressive legislation, pursuit of
independence was the only reasonable course of action. While their political goal was
independence, they hoped that separation from England would permit a new elite social order to
develop in the colonies. This social order would reward patriots for their contributions to
achieving independence and establish a meritocracy in which citizens were judged according to
“actual specimens of their Conduct, not by Squireship or Cousinship.”53 Lacking the strict
hereditary aristocracy of England, social mobility had always been easier in the colonies, but this
quote written by Silas Deane to his wife expressed a new vision of society. Gentlemen gained
elite status by serving their country, jealously guarding the rights of citizens from the tyranny of
any oppressive government. Radicals challenged the traditional social hierarchy and the culture
of politeness. They hoped Parliament’s actions would soon push conservative Revolutionaries
into declaring independence.
Radical political ideology held that governments inevitably encroached upon the rights of
citizens and so principled political leaders had to stand watch to prevent any perversion of
political power. Influenced by the Whigs, then in the minority, colonists applied Whig political
ideology to the crisis with Great Britain. Radical members of Congress concluded that
independence was the solution to the problem of Anglo-American relations. They believed that
keeping a connection with the British Empire would eventually corrupt colonial politics and
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principles. But radicals were in the minority in the Second Continental Congress and recognized
that many conservatives were not ready to contemplate independence. Only in private letters did
radicals encourage each other to prepare for severing all ties with the King and Parliament.54
The majority of delegates were conservative and their political approach argued for a
slow, measured consideration of all the options available to resolve the crisis with Parliament.
They worried that the crisis would upset the social hierarchy by removing them from power.
Their traditional interpretation of the culture of honor also acknowledged merit, but they
believed that genteel birth and a superior education endowed political leaders with the proper
qualifications to make the best decisions. As pragmatists, conservatives realized independence
was an option. They, however, wanted to submit more petitions to the British political
authorities before consenting to a revolution that could end in failure.
In the first few weeks of the new session the Continental Army became a flashpoint for
both ideological groups. Radicals believed an army was necessary to gain independence from
England, but they harbored fears that the military could put an end to their republican dreams.
History taught the American revolutionaries that standing armies had destroyed many republics
and the specter of the English Civil War haunted the congressional chambers. Conservatives
read the same political literature as radicals and also worried about creating a professional,
standing army. Conservatives agreed to consider the establishment of a new military force so
they could control the volatile situation in Boston between the colonies’ militias and British
troops.
The English Civil War loomed large in the delegates’ minds warning against a
professional army. Radicals and conservatives repeatedly discussed the lessons learned from
54
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Cromwell’s rule in the 1650s.55 Puritan Roundheads raised the New Model Army to overthrow
King Charles I, and after several years, the army grew more loyal to Oliver Cromwell, one of the
generals, than the political movement. Eighteenth-century Americans believed Cromwell had
used the New Model Army to suppress critics of his reign. The English Revolution began with
the hope of securing more constitutional rights for citizens but ended with a dictator kept in
power by a professional army’s support.
In the decades after the civil war, political pamphleteers analyzed what had gone wrong
in the war against the monarchy. Many writers believed that the use of a professional army had
corrupted the revolutionary movement because soldiers became loyal to whoever paid them.56 A
new political ideology developed that asserted that citizens needed to protect their own rights by
becoming involved in politics and, if necessary, taking up weapons, to defend those rights.
These writers and their readers gradually formed the Opposition or Whig party in Britain. They
challenged the King and Parliament, demanding a more representative government—but only for
people who owned property and who therefore had a stake in society’s prosperity.57
Whigs also proposed reforming the local militia units to use in the war effort. Arguing
that vigilant civilians should not rely on an easily manipulated professional army to defend their
rights, instead all landowners should pledge to serve to protect their rights and property. Whig
pamphlets declared that local militia units should become the government’s standard means by
which to protect liberty. While Whigs preached this idealized vision of the militia, in reality, by
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the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain maintained a large standing army to expand and defend
the borders of its empire.
In the American colonies, prior to the 1750s, militia units were the only military forces
to defend territorial boundaries. High-ranking officers of colonial militias received their
appointments from royal governors, while the soldiers elected junior officers. All officers
typically came from the elite class and the militia rarely participated in military action until the
French and Indian War. 58
Whig ideology and the traditional use of colonial militias to defend territory influenced
the debate over the Continental Army. After Lexington and Concord, Congressmen knew they
needed an organized military force. They debated whether the army should be structured as a
professional, European army or a citizen-soldier force similar in form and function to the local
militia units. The debate over the army’s potential form illustrates the delegates’ competing
political and social ideologies. Conservatives preferred a professional army that relied on a rigid
social hierarchy to preserve discipline and order in the ranks. To radical delegates, colonial
militias represented the ideal of virtuous citizens who volunteered to serve and to protect their
rights and privileges against a “tyrannical Ministry.”
During the month-long congressional debate in June 1775 over creating an army, radicals
repeatedly invoked the memory of the English Civil War to argue against the establishment of a
professional, standing army. They argued that the use of paid professionals meant that
Americans were unwilling to sacrifice enough to defeat the British regulars. 59 In the radicals’
vision of a new republican society, a citizen’s actions determined if he was worthy of joining the
new elite class. Radicals convinced themselves that the sheer enthusiasm of the people would
58

Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000
(New York: Penguin Group, 2005).
59
Royster, A Revolutionary People at War, 35.

27

overwhelm and defeat the British Regulars in a few short military battles. This idealism was
influenced by a Whig political doctrine that argued that a people’s determination to protect their
rights imbued them with a righteousness (or virtue) that easily defeated corruption. American
radicals believed that the Revolution presented an opportunity for the “eyes of mankind” to judge
“whether the government [Continental Congress], will be productive of more Virtue moral and
political. We may look up to Armies for our Defence, but Virtue is our best Security.” 60
On a more practical level, voluntary participation in the state militias symbolized
American patriotism and proved that colonists supported the Continental Congress’s efforts. In
traditional Whig rhetoric, professional armies used coercion on multiple levels. Standing armies
recruited foot soldiers from the lowest levels of society, men who had no stake in society’s
welfare or interest in protecting civil liberties.61 Whigs believed that professional soldiers were
mercenaries sold to the highest bidder and they praised militiamen as free citizens who believed
in preserving the civil authority. Many radicals argued that if “the Militia is composd of free
Citizens. There is therefore no Danger of their making Use of their Power to the Destruction of
their own Rights, or suffering others to invade them.”62 Radical delegates proposed establishing
a Continental Army that was a loose collection of state militias under the control of Congress, in
which citizens volunteered when needed to fight the British. This military structure relied on
enthusiasm rather than harsh disciplinary measures to fight.
As radical delegates dreamed of a new republican society, conservative delegates in June
1775 still urged reconciliation with the king and Parliament. After Lexington and Concord,
conservatives agreed with the radicals about fighting a defensive war to prevent further British
attacks on colonial towns. But, they believed that only a professional army, instead of a
60
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volunteer militia, would impress King George III with the seriousness of their claims. Therefore,
in their desire to establish a professional army, conservatives had to undermine the radicals’
argument that professional soldiers “are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the
rest of Citizens. They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit
obedience to their Commands. Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye.”63
Conservatives understood the radicals’ fear of a standing army. They also worried about
creating a military force that could potentially challenge the power of the civil authority. All
members of Congress worried that the newly appointed generals might emulate Caesar and not
Cincinnatus. 64
Influenced by their interpretation of the culture of honor, conservatives insisted that the
British could only be honorably defeated by another professional military force, an army trained
to fight in the European military manner in open-field maneuvers. Colonists wanted to be
recognized as civilized, honorable gentlemen fighting oppressive British policies, not as
“savages leading savages in a howling wilderness.”65 Conservatives’ fears about losing their
social positions lead them to advocate a Continental army organized according to the strict
hierarchical structure of European armies. A traditional army would allow the gentry to maintain
control of the rebellion.66 James Duane asserted that “Licenciousness is the natural Effect of a
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civil discord and it can only be guarded against by placing the Command of the Troops in the
hands of Men of property and Rank.”67
After weeks of open-floor debate and a second frantic letter from Massachusetts that
stated, “We tremble at having an army (although consisting of our countrymen) established here
without a civil power to provide for and control them,” the delegates compromised on the
Continental Army’s structure. 68 The army created in the summer of 1775 consisted of volunteers
who had enlisted for one year of service in a traditionally structured army. In writing the
Articles of War for the new army, both ideological groups agreed to less severe disciplinary
measures than the British army. 69 Radicals supported one-year enlistments to prevent the growth
of a class of professional soldiers. Conservatives gained a hierarchical army composed of elite
officers with an emphasis on subordination and discipline. After Congress agreed to finance the
Continental Army, it turned to the necessity of commissioning the army’s officers. A matter of
paramount importance was determining the desirable qualities to be possessed by the office
corps.
When John Adams nominated Washington, he listed the qualities delegates believed
would best serve the new army and a united colonial effort. Members of Congress were nervous
about commissioning the officer corps, worried that the army might one day turn on its civilian
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masters. Washington’s reputation among his peers illuminates the characteristics that both
radical and conservative delegates desired in newly commissioned officers.
As commander-in-chief, Washington set the ethical and behavioral tone of the
Continental Army. 70 Officers patterned themselves after Washington’s example. In the
eighteenth century, military professionals believed that a general led by his personality and that
his character and reputation inspired men to victory. 71 Thus, the most successful and victorious
generals were born and not made. The colonies had no formal military training academies and
many officers in the Continental Army learned from reading military manuals.72 Since most
officers acquired training in the field, Washington and congressional delegates wanted to ensure
that they nominated men from the right social strata for the officer corps.73
Legislators also nominated Washington for three other reasons: he was a Southerner, he
had a legislative background, and he possessed an exemplary public demeanor. New Englanders
wanted a commander-in-chief appointed from the South, something which they thought would
incline other colonies outside New England to view the situation in Boston as a continental war
and not as a localized problem in Massachusetts. A Virginian general would tie the most
populous colony to New England for the duration of the war. A major issue complicating the
war effort arose from problems of regionalism and localism that made inter-colonial cooperation
difficult. Colonies, and later, states, jealously vied for positions of power during the American
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Revolution. 74 Officer appointments were a key means of controlling the army and winning
accolades for the bravery of a colony’s citizens.
Representative Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut recognized these sectional tensions when
he confided to his friend Joseph Trumbull, that Washington’s appointment “removes all
jealousies, more firmly Cements the Southern to the Northern.” He added, somewhat
facetiously, that his appointment took away the fear “that an Enterprising eastern New England
Genll proving Successfull, might with his Victorious Army give law to the Southern & Western
Gentry.” 75 New Englanders, recognizing the need for compromise, agreed to give up their hopes
for a Northern commander-in-chief, by supporting Washington.
Commenting in a letter to a close personal friend, Washington acknowledged the
sectional politics that led to his appointment, saying “It is an honour I wished to avoid…but the
partiality of Congress added to some political motives, left me without a choice.”76 Aside from
Washington’s conventionally modest assertion that he did not seek the appointment as
commander-in-chief, his statement indicates that he understood the sectional motivations that
influenced the congressional delegates. Radicals and conservatives knew that all colonists
needed to view the armed rebellion against England as a continental affair because, otherwise,
the British would exploit regional disagreements to end the conflict.
Washington’s years of service in the Virginia House of Burgesses comforted many of the
congressional representatives. As a politician, he understood that the military must be
subordinate to the civil authority at all times. This was one way to assuage delegates’ fears of a
standing army. In choosing Washington, they deliberately selected a commander-in-chief who
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had a martial reputation for his service during the French and Indian War. But they also chose
Washington because he had far more experience as a colonial legislator, even if he had not been
one of the more celebrated members in the House of Burgesses.77 Washington also possessed a
political advantage due to his presence at the First and Second Continental Congresses.
Delegates were comfortable with nominating him because he had witnessed the debates over
creating the Continental Army and they felt that they could trust him after socializing with him at
numerous dinners and gatherings in Philadelphia.
Public demeanor was a critically important component of the eighteenth-century culture
of honor. Gentlemen read etiquette books to learn how to comport themselves in public. Rituals
and words held significant meaning in the social and political spheres, and Washington proved to
be a master at crafting an honorable public demeanor in both. Delegates commented on his
“easy Soldier like Air, & gesture.”78 He impressed Eliphalet Dyer as “Clever, & if any thing too
modest.” Washington “seems discret & Virtuous, no harum Starum ranting Swearing fellow but
Sober, steady, & Calm.” 79 These were valuable attributes in a leader who controlled the
Continental Army. In fact, delegates were worried about volatile personalities in the army. An
ostentatious general could either bankrupt the cause or persuade soldiers to establish him as a
tyrant. Dyer believed that “his [Washington] modesty will Induce him I dare say to take & order
every step with the best advice possible.”80 That last statement reveals the key reason why New
Englanders agreed to Washington’s appointment: he would obey congressional commands.
Washington’s modesty was an integral component of his character and a trait that an elite
gentleman aspired to display in his public demeanor. A gentleman’s modesty showed that he
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was not driven by ambition to seek personal gain. Delegates worried that command of the
Continental Army might turn an unqualified colonist into a potential Caesar or Cromwell, but
Washington cultivated the public demeanor of a Cincinnatus. Even Washington’s acceptance
speech displayed his modesty: “I declare with the utmost sincerity, I do not think my self equal
to the Command I am honoured with.” 81 While reciting these conventionally modest words,
Washington secretly harbored fears that he was irrevocably tying his reputation to the
revolutionary cause and he knew that a failed rebellion would permanently damage his
reputation among his peers. But the chance for glory as commander-in-chief persuaded him to
accept command and take control of the disorganized troops surrounding Boston. In his private
correspondence, he echoed the modest phrasing of his congressional speech, telling friends that
he had not sought the appointment but had only agreed to take command because Congress
needed his abilities. 82
Washington refused to take a salary while serving as commander-in-chief, thereby
cementing his reputation for modesty.83 As a gentleman, he would serve for the benefit of his
country with no expectation of remuneration. His independent fortune allowed him to maintain
the public demeanor and life-style of a gentleman. Delegates appreciated this gesture because, as
legislators, they too, served the public without pay. They received only a stipend to help with the
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expense of living in Philadelphia. 84 Washington’s refusal to accept a salary therefore eased
many delegates’ minds and they told him “that a warm regard to the sacred rights of humanity
and sincere love to your country, solely induced you in the acceptance of [your] important
trust.” 85 Politicians hoped that Washington would serve as a model of decorum and selflessness
for the officer corps.
Washington adeptly crafted a public demeanor that appealed to radicals and
conservatives alike. Radicals believed that Washington’s refusal of a salary showed his zeal for
the patriotic cause. Conservatives were happy with a Southern commander-in-chief and they
hoped that Washington would serve as a conservative general fighting a defensive war, which
would check the radicals’ attempts to provoke independence.
Washington’s personality profoundly shaped the structure of the Continental Army
during the eight-year war for independence. By choosing Washington, delegates appointed a
military commander who desired a conservative, professional army and who believed that
officers should be recruited from the elite of every colony. In his first general orders to the camp
outside of Boston, Washington stressed that disciplinary measures and “due Subordination” were
necessary to prevent “extreme hazard, Disorder and Confusion.” Without these measures, the
army would perish in “shameful disappointment and disgrace.”86 He continually urged the
army’s ordinary soldiers and officers to think about the public’s judgment of their actions. Men
of honor cared about their peers’ opinions of them. A man was a gentleman only if society
recognized him as one.

84

Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics, 236-237. Delegates received stipends from their local legislatures
when it became clear that Congress was becoming a permanent institution.
85
Schwartz, George Washington, 126. The quote comes from a speech read to Washington, by the Massachusetts
Provincial Council, welcoming him to the Camp at Cambridge.
86
General Orders, July 3, 1775, The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary War Series, 1:54.

35

At the beginning of the war, the Continental Congress commissioned only major and
brigadier generals; all other officer appointments were the purview of the colonial legislatures.
Congressmen believed local politicians would nominate suitable “young Gentlemen of a military
genius.” 87 Officers obtained their commissions through friendship networks. That is, gentlemen
used influence and contacts to receive higher ranks in the officer corps.88 Washington received
hundreds of letters of recommendation from colonial leaders hoping to place family friends at his
headquarters or in illustrious regiments. This emphasis on obtaining letters of recommendation
meant that colonial legislatures and the Continental Congress were flooded with requests. Even
so, delegates were happy to write letters of introduction on behalf of family friends or prominent
young gentlemen from their colonies.
A typical letter of introduction followed the format used by Eliphalet Dyer writing on
behalf of Aaron Burr. First, he provided a brief overview of Burr’s family history and
connections to prove Burr’s claims to gentility. Then Dyer assured his correspondent, Joseph
Trumbull, the commissary general of the Continental Army, that Burr was a young gentleman of
“fortune & regulation.” 89 Dyer emphasized fortune and regulation because those terms
immediately signified an honorable character. Fortune meant that Burr could afford to look the
part of a gentleman. Regulation signified a respectable public demeanor because no rumors of
ungentlemanly conduct had reached Dyer’s ears. Dyer concluded his letter of introduction with
a request that Trumbull help Burr receive an officer’s commission by vouching for his
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gentlemanly reputation. John Hancock also wrote a letter of introduction for Aaron Burr.90 This
process was repeated thousands of times throughout all of the colonies.
During the American Revolution, officers depended on leaders in the civil sphere to
obtain commissions and promotions. This system, shaped by the eighteenth-century’s culture of
honor, ensured the military’s subordination to Congress. But, it also created many opportunities
for jealousy to ferment in the officer corps. Washington had no authority to set the guidelines for
personal advancement. Officers, instead, needed to court politicians for their commissions. The
process of appointing officers quickly assumed a personal dimension during the war because
officers had to rely on their reputations and friendships in seeking new commissions or
promotions. When for any of a number of reasons, politicians denied the officers’ requests most
believed that civil authorities were insulting their honor.
After establishing the Continental Army, Congress decided to appoint only generals. The
rationale for the appointment of the majority of officers by local legislatures was the belief by
congressmen that local politicians would be better able to verify the reputation of officer
applicants through friendship networks. But even commissioning new generals for the
Continental Army proved difficult for the congressmen. As John Adams stated, “nothing has
given me more Torment, than the Scuffle We have had in appointing the General Officers.”91
Washington arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in early July 1775, ready to create a
Continental Army with the help of his newly commissioned Council of War. He held the
appointments for several new major and brigadier generals who would help Washington
establish a new professional military force capable of meeting the British in open field combat.
But, before the commander-in-chief could begin training his troops, three of the newly appointed
90
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brigadier generals threatened to resign. It had taken several days of congressional debate to
agree on the gentlemen to be nominated for these positions and, now those generals rejected
Congress’s authority. John Thomas, Joseph Spencer, and David Wooster believed that their new
Continental Army appointments insulted their honor because they did not correlate with their
local legislature’s commissions.92 Each general had received a rank with higher seniority in his
local military forces than his new Continental Army commissions and he did not want serve
under his former military subordinates. In early July, the delegates felt the army was challenging
their authority.
After unanimously selecting George Washington, delegates disagreed over how to
apportion the commissions for major and brigadier generals between the twelve colonies
(Georgia’s delegation was not officially in attendance until after Congress had created the
Continental Army). 93 In the spring of 1775, the generalships represented an opportunity for a
colony to receive recognition for its military contributions. After receiving a generalship,
colonies then appointed a prominent local gentleman to a high military office. The appointments
opened up new avenues of patronage and a chance for a colony to gain a reputation for martial
excellence. Thus, George Washington’s battle successes, the few that occurred, enhanced
Virginia’s reputation for raising quality gentlemen ready to win the war for American
independence. 94
The stakes involved in these appointments were high and delegates used a complex
political calculus to dole out the generalships to the colonies that had raised troops in the spring
to fight the British. Originally, Congress anticipated commissioning two major generals and five
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brigadier generals. With, however, only seven positions to fill, delegates worried that some
colonies would feel slighted. Congressmen understood that each colonial legislature wanted at
least one generalship for its colony as recognition of their patriotic effort. Every colonist who
followed the battle reports would read about the generals and what colonies they represented.95
John Adams described the political negotiations over generalships in a personal letter to
Joseph Warren: “How many Brigadiers general we shall have,” Adams observed, “whether five,
Seven or Eight, is not determined, nor who they shall be. One from N. Hampshire, one from R.
Island, two from Connecticut, one from N. York, and three from Massachusetts, perhaps.”96
Adams’s letter mentioned the colonies that had rushed volunteer armies to Boston after the
skirmishes at Lexington and Concord. A week after commissioning George Washington,
Congress settled on appointing four major generals and eight brigadier generals. Soon, three
generals threatened to resign in accordance with the eighteenth-century honor code, thereby
wreaking havoc with Congress’s carefully considered political calculus.
When Congress commissioned the new generals on June 22, it also established their
respective seniority level. Seniority dictated each officer’s level of authority and place on the
line of promotion. A gentleman in the eighteenth century paid a significant amount of attention
to his position in the chain of command, because he believed his commission rewarded his good
character and reputation.97 Gentlemen insisted that they could not serve with honor under men
who had been their subordinates in the social hierarchy. The culture of honor stipulated that
resignation served as their only peaceable option to deal with this type of insult to their character.
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Conservatives understood the officers’ reactions, though they probably wished that they had not
decided to reject congressional authority at the beginning of the rebellion. Radicals, however,
hoped to create a new social order that would reward merit and not seniority. They wanted
generals who happily accepted their patriotic commissions without worrying about seniority.
Competing political ideologies shaped how delegates reacted to problems in the military sphere,
and the culture of honor was open to interpretation by both radicals and conservatives in the
Continental Congress and the Continental Army.
As the record of congressional proceedings makes clear, delegates deliberately listed the
new seniority rankings of the major and brigadier generals. Delegates ranked the officers based
upon their reputation and their respective colonies’ military efforts. Artemas Ward of
Massachusetts received the highest seniority of the major generals; he was placed second in
command to Washington. Ward was ranked so highly because, prior to the establishment of the
Continental Army, he had commanded the makeshift army surrounding the British troops in
Boston. By making Ward second in command, delegates wanted to ease the sting of not
appointing him commander-in-chief. Ward understood the political reasons for selecting
Washington and never resented his congressional appointment. Congress then appointed Charles
Lee, a former British officer, Philip Schuyler of New York, and Israel Putnam of Connecticut as
major generals.
Using the political arithmetic alluded to by John Adams, Congress appointed eight
brigadier generals. In order of seniority, from first to last, Congress commissioned Seth
Pomeroy of Massachusetts, Richard Montgomery of New York and a former British officer,
David Wooster of Connecticut, William Heath of Massachusetts, Joseph Spencer of Connecticut,
John Thomas of Massachusetts, John Sullivan of New Hampshire, and Nathanael Greene of
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Rhode Island. 98 Congress also appointed Horatio Gates, a former British officer, as adjutant
general to help Washington create a professional army from the amateur military force gathered
outside of Boston.
Congress awarded both Massachusetts and Connecticut three generalships each because
those states had contributed the most men and material to the war effort. Congress attempted to
commit New York fully to the war effort by commissioning two prominent New Yorkers.
Delegates feared that New York City might be the next target of British forces and they hoped
the commissions would prevent New York from declaring neutrality. These kinds of political
calculations influenced the nominations of the Continental Army’s generals and even the
structure of the army. Decisions were made after lengthy debate highlighting how the delegates
compromised their political ideologies to maintain the war effort. They also compromised on
many other matters to ensure a deferential atmosphere in Congress where every opinion was
heard to prevent injured feelings.
After the shots fired at Lexington and Concord, many colonial legislatures raised their
own military forces and commissioned their own locally prominent gentlemen for the officer
corps. Gentlemen received ranks of seniority in recognition of their reputation and political
and/or military experience, because many of the newly commissioned officers had served in the
French and Indian War. For example, when Congress appointed the new generals, it
inadvertently ignored the seniority established by Massachusetts’s local legislature. But in the
case of Connecticut’s generals, Congress intentionally disregarded the rankings to reward Israel
Putnam for his military exploits during the spring.99 Accordingly, when David Wooster, Joseph
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Spencer, and John Thomas received their new commissions from Washington, they threatened to
resign. 100
In Washington’s first official letter to Congress on July 10, 1775, he described the
difficulties with the new commissions. He also commented on the officers’ behavior when they
received the news. In Washington’s words, “the Appointments of the General Officers in the
Province of Massachusetts Bay—have by no Means corresponded with the Judgment & Wishes
of either the civil or Military.”101 John Thomas resented his new commission; in the
Massachusetts army he had ranked higher than Seth Pomeroy and William Heath. Now, he was
a subordinate to them, ranked six out of eight officers. Thomas believed that his new
commission insulted his character and reputation and that the Continental Congress had
deliberately refused to acknowledge his achievements. Washington understood his hurt feelings,
explaining to Congress that the situation “would make his Continuance very difficult, &
probably operate on his Mind.”102 Washington urged Congress to find a solution that would
preserve Thomas’s dignity and allow him to serve in the Continental Army.
When Abigail Adams heard about Thomas’s new commission, she told her husband, “I
fear General Thomas being overlooked and Heath placed over him will create much uneasiness.
If Thomas resigns all his officers resign; and Mr. Thomas cannot with honour hold under
Heath.” 103 Abigail Adams’s comments reflected her keen awareness of the culture of honor used
both in the military and in civil institutions. She understood that even if the commission was a
mistake by Congress, Thomas and his peers considered the commission to be a comment on his
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character. To support Thomas, his junior officers would have resigned in protest. Officers felt
that their regiment’s honor and their own personal honor depended on recognition of their
general’s military reputation. In most gentlemen’s minds the struggle over rank and promotion
correlated directly with how society and their peers valued their honor and reputations.
In fact, John Adams stated that a “Want of frequent Communication and particular
Intelligence led us into the unfortunate Arrangement of General Officers, which is likely to do so
much Hurt.” The Massachusetts delegates had ranked their quota of Continental generals
without realizing that their local legislature had already commissioned prominent local gentry.
Adams learned in early July that the Continental Congress had unwittingly demoted Thomas.
Adams reassured politicians in Massachusetts that “I have made it my Business ever since I
heard of this Error, to wait upon Gentn. of the Congress…and contrive a Way to get out of the
Difficulty, which I hope we shall effect.”104 Massachusetts delegates in Congress wrote
apologetic letters to Thomas to assure him that they had not meant to insult his honor. As a
measure of their seriousness in the matter, they proposed a plan to make Thomas the highestranking brigadier general.
Members of the Massachusetts state legislature and members of Congress worked
together to negotiate a solution to Thomas’s commission, they asked Seth Pomeroy to resign his
new commission, and then they would replace Pomeroy with Thomas. Plagued by health issues,
Pomeroy had already left the army encampment in Boston before the trouble with the
commissions. His resignation was a simple formality that allowed Thomas to outrank Heath and
coincided with the original rankings decided by the Massachusetts government.105
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Joseph Spencer’s and David Wooster’s unhappiness over the new commissions was not
so easily resolved. Congress commissioned Israel Putnam as a major general to reward his
martial zeal. In the spring, Putnam had engaged British forces in a minor skirmish, earning him
plaudits in Congress for his bold military manner. In a letter, one congressman praised Putnam,
who had served in French and Indian War, as a man “totally unfit for every thing, but only
fighting.” 106 Congress rewarded Putnam by deliberately ignoring the ranks established by the
Connecticut legislature. An infuriated Spencer and Wooster insisted that the Continental
Congress must conform to Connecticut’s decision.107
While Washington expressed sympathy for Thomas in his letter to Congress, he
disapproved of how Spencer handled the news about the commissions. Spencer had left the
army after threatening to resign and had then returned to Connecticut. Washington notified
Congress that Spencer “was so much disgusted at the Preference given to Gen. Putnam, that he
left the Army without visiting me, or making known his Intentions in any Respect.”108
Washington’s choice of words indicated his displeasure with Spencer’s actions and painted
Spencer as a petulant military officer and not a gentleman honorably protesting his unhappiness
with a congressional decision. Washington’s characterization of Thomas was in sharp contrast to
his view of Spencer: “I must join in the general Opinion that he [Thomas] is an able good Officer
& his Resignation would be a publick Loss.” 109 Besides notifying Congress that Spencer left
without his permission, Washington ignored Spencer in the rest of the letter. His silence about
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Spencer was an eloquent condemnation of Spencer’s behavior and perhaps reflected
Washington’s doubts about Spencer’s character. Washington was also silent about David
Wooster, who remained in camp but complained loudly about the injustices done to his
reputation. Such behavior likely lowered Wooster’s stock in Washington’s eyes.
Silas Deane and Eliphalet Dyer, congressional delegates from Connecticut, discussed the
behavior of Spencer and Wooster in their personal and political correspondence. They seemed
embarrassed by how petulantly Spencer and Wooster had acted. Deane wrote “that the late
Arrangement of Officers, is highly disagreeable to Worster [Wooster], and Spencer and that high
words have pass’d on the Occasion—that Worster talks high of his Thirty Years Service, and that
Spencer left his Forces.”110 Deane, a radical delegate, believed Wooster’ and Spencer’s behavior
insulted Putnam and he was happy that Congress had rewarded Putnam for his actions rather
than for his social reputation. Radicals championed a new interpretation of the culture of honor,
which emphasized the recognition of an individual’s actions and not his pedigree.
Condemning Spencer’s behavior, Deane argued that “he acted a part, inconsistent, with
the Character, either of a Soldier, a Patriot, or even of a Common Gentleman to desert his post in
an hour of Danger…and to turn his back sullenly on his General [Putnam].”111 Washington
undoubtedly agreed with Deane’s sentiment, but he could never have expressed that view in a
public letter to Congress. Washington had to choose his words carefully because his letters were
intended for a public audience. Deane, however, could indulge himself by using heated words in
a private letter to insult Spencer.
The culture of honor encouraged fine distinctions in the matter of socially acceptable
behavior. Thus, although Spencer could resign his commission, he could not honorably leave his
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troops without notifying the commander-in-chief. Resignation was an acceptable method of
protest, but leaving camp without notice was impetuous behavior unbecoming of a gentleman.
Eliphalet Dyer confided to a friend, “I have Indeavourd to make all the excuse for him [Spencer]
possible that as this Congress had Superseded him in Rank by Genll Putnam…they must make
some allowance for the first feelings up on such an Occasion. I hope he may return soon &
behave in Character.” 112 Dyer disapproved of Spencer’s behavior because it reflected poorly on
Connecticut’s gentry. He wanted Spencer to model his behavior after Washington’s public
demeanor. A gentleman never allowed his emotions to influence his public behavior. Men
should appear calm and rational at all times because only the lower social classes expressed their
feelings without any control.113 Spencer behaved poorly by leaving camp in high dudgeon. His
actions reflected poorly on his character and made him look petty.
Dyer’s comments were indicative of Congress’s growing frustration with Spencer’s,
Thomas’s, and Wooster’s behavior over the commissions. Many delegates thought that any
nomination was an honor and that the generals should ignore their disappointment with their new
rank and accept the commissions. Delegates could understand “the first feelings” of resentment
and injured pride but would not tolerate it as a challenge to congressional authority.
Congress was already worried about its authority to raise an army for a defensive war and
now it faced challenges from newly commissioned officers who preferred their local legislature’s
authority. Wooster returned his commission to Roger Sherman, asking Sherman to “deliver it to
Mr. Hancock with my best compliments, I desire him not to return it to me. I have already a
commission from the assembly of Connecticut.”114 Attachment to local authority complicated
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the Continental Congress’s attempt to gain recognition as the new authority superseding, on
certain matters, the colonial legislatures. 115 Delegates had two motives influencing their interest
in controlling the Continental Army: it would make prosecution of the war effort easier since all
decisions would be decided by one national legislature as opposed to thirteen legislatures; and it
presented the opportunity for Congress to gather more authority and cement its power as the
national legislature.
Congressional representatives resented Spencer’s and Wooster’s dismissal of their
authority to appoint, in any order they preferred, the new major and brigadier generals for the
Continental Army. John Adams believed that “Gentlemen here, had no private Friendships
Connections, or Interests, which prompted them to vote for the Arrangement they made, but
were influenced only by a Regard to the Service; and they are determined that their Commissions
shall not be despized.” 116 Adams was defending Congress’s decision-making process against the
resentful whispers of Spencer and Wooster. Some congressional delegates had come to resent
the behavior of all three generals for their complaints about their appointments. Adams was
convinced that “It will cost us, Pains to privent their being discarded from the service of the
Continent with Indignation.” 117 Fortunately, the delegates relented in their anger when Spencer
returned to Boston and accepted his brigadier general commission. Wooster also acknowledged
his Continental Army commission, though he still considered himself a major general in
Connecticut’s army.
Members of Congress allowed their anger towards the generals to dissipate because, in
the end, they had no alternative. The generals had, after all, eventually recognized congressional
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authority. Besides, another round of political calculus would have been necessary to replace
Connecticut’s quota of brigadier generals. Ultimately, though, what prevented Spencer’s and
Wooster’s dismissal was that the delegates understood their first feelings upon being demoted.
Congressmen may have disliked the generals’ personal behavior but they accepted that threats of
resignation were allowed and encouraged by the culture of honor. At the beginning of the
Second Continental Congress, delegates were hesitant over how much power they possessed
over the Continental Army’s affairs. They therefore worked to reach a compromise with these
generals. But, as the war dragged on, congressmen grew increasingly intolerant of the generals’
behavior.
The dispute over congressional commissions illuminates several key concerns for the
revolutionaries in both Congress and the army during the first two months of rebellion. Congress
worried about creating a professional army and having to trust military officers with any power.
The behavior of these three generals appeared to confirm all of the delegates’ suspicions that
military office transformed patriots into ambitious soldiers who sought greater power and
influence. Now congressmen would watch the Continental Army’s officers with an even more
“jealous eye” to determine if they would despise and flout congressional authority. Delegates
did, however, appreciate Washington’s handling of the tense situation because he left everything
in the hands of Congress (which he was probably very happy to do). Washington bowed to civil
authority in handling internal military matters.
The commissions reveal the complicated political calculations involved in appointing
officers who possessed military talent and experience while at the same time satisfying local
legislatures that wanted their prominent local gentry recognized. Congress wanted gentlemen to
fill the officer corps because such officers would be a part of the same culture of honor that
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governed the actions of the congressional delegates. They would therefore share a set of values
that shaped their public behavior and decision-making processes. But, at the same time, the
culture of honor proved increasingly troublesome because it demanded that gentlemen constantly
guard against threats to their character. To officers, commissions defined their social standing
among their peers. If they were not promoted or failed to receive a ranking as high as they
believed they deserved, then their character, which is to say, their honor, had been insulted. For
the delegates, the commissions represented Congress’s authority and control over the Continental
Army. They worried that officers were challenging their legitimacy as the civil authority.
The friction between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army only grew
worse as the army grew larger and added additional temperamental officers to the Continental
Line. During the first two years of the war, Congress took steps to increase its control over the
Continental Army. Congress, rather than Washington, established the guidelines for promotion.
Congress further asserted its supremacy by discharging a major general during an active
campaign season because political factions in both congress and the army had used open-floor
debate to mediate an affair of honor between two generals, Philip Schuyler and Horatio Gates.
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Chapter 2:
The Rank Business of Promotion
“I earnestly intreat you to make the most minute Enquiry, after every one of these [officer
appointments], and let me know his Character, for I am determined, I will know that Army, and
the Character of all its officers. I Swear, I will be a faithful Spy upon it for its good.”
John Adams, 1775 118
Major General Horatio Gates strode into the congressional chamber in June 1777, with
prepared speech in hand ready to defend his right to an independent command in New York
state. Struggling to control his temper, Gates confronted congressmen about their recent
decision to make him subordinate to Major General Philip Schuyler. Gates began by narrating
“his Birth, Parentage and Education, Life, Character and Behavior.”119 He outlined his claims to
gentility and his qualifications for service in the Continental Army, arguing that “My Rank, my
Station, my Services entitled me to more Regard than such unceremonious Treatment.”120 Gates
also asserted that New York representatives James Duane and William Duer had deliberately
insulted his reputation by gossiping about his military performance in an effort to gain
preferment for their close friend and fellow New Yorker, Philip Schuyler.
Gates’s accusations electrified Congress. Shouting down the allegations, James Duane
demanded that Gates withdraw from the congressional chamber. Other delegates called for the
general to continue. He eventually withdrew without finishing his speech and delegates grimly
muttered among themselves about the continual problem of Continental Army officers
challenging congressional authority.
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The shouting match between Gates and Duane in June 1777 reflected how over the past
two years tensions had increased between Congress and the Continental Army. Congress had
begun to exert more control over the army in October 1775 through various laws and regulations.
At times, the officer corps reacted to the congressional initiatives with resentment and anger, but
most officers followed Washington’s example of patient cooperation with Congress’s numerous
directives and interference with military protocol. During the war, the issue of rank and
promotion became a major point of contention and confrontation between the civil and military
authorities.
From the beginning, Congress decided to control promotions within the Continental
Army. Delegates wanted to ensure that the right gentlemen with the proper qualifications fought
for the correct political and social principles. Unfortunately, in Congress promoters of these
principles split along ideological lines between radical and conservative revolutionaries. As
discussed in chapter one, these factions held different opinions about the proper qualifications for
officers. Radicals hoped to reward patriotic fervor and action. They wanted to create a social
meritocracy introducing a new conception of the eighteenth-century culture of honor that valued
their political principles. In contrast, conservatives wanted to use the traditional eighteenthcentury culture of honor to preserve social stability. While they recognized merit as a crucial
component of honor, they believed that the rebellion was safest in the “hands of Men of property
and Rank.” 121
Ideological differences also existed in the military. Many army officers had held political
positions prior to assuming their new military commands and identified themselves as either
radical or conservative revolutionaries. Officers often communicated with politicians in
Congress or in their local legislatures to exchange news and to discuss their political principles.
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John Adams believed that “a free Correspondence between the Members of Congress and the
Officers of the Army, will probably be attended with Advantages to the public by improving
both the Councils and Arms of America.”122 What Adams was not so subtly encouraging was
close personal communication among all revolutionaries. Such exchanges with their political
allies and friends would, he hoped, prevent feelings of alienation within the officer corps.
Furthermore, many congressional delegates wanted to receive the army officers’ suggestions for
reorganizing the Continental Army into a military force capable of beating the British. While
delegates trusted Washington as commander-in-chief, they also wanted to know the opinions of
other officers so that no general had too much power or influence with Congress.123 Men in the
civil and military spheres exchanged thousands of letters in which they shared gossip and
political opinions during the rebellion.
As the war progressed, gentlemen moved fluidly in and out of both revolutionary
institutions. The rotation of officers and politicians allowed friendship and patronage networks
to expand beyond the scope of local connections. If congressmen failed to be reelected to the
Continental Congress, they might join the military or become wartime governors of their
colonies/states. Army officers followed a similar pattern: Philip Schuyler ran for gubernatorial
office in New York while fighting British General Burgoyne’s invasion from Canada; other
officers eventually won election to the Continental Congress or to their local legislatures. In
fact, many close relationships existed between politicians and military officers during the war.
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These friendships are important because they were channels for the flow of political gossip. In
the eighteenth century, patronage and close connections helped gentlemen gain political office or
a colonelcy in the state militia. Friendships provided an instant character reference because
gentlemen were only acquainted with people whose reputation and character they respected. In
this and in other ways, delegates of the Continental Congress used the guidelines for eighteenthcentury society to bring order to these turbulent times. Delegates paid close attention to their
fellow delegates’ friends believing they revealed people’s political allegiances.124
Friendships were a major factor in the dissatisfaction over ranks and promotions within
the Continental Army. Officers believed that their comrades gained preferment due to their
connections with political officials. Originally, Congress had only appointed generals leaving
the other officer appointments to local legislatures. By 1777, after two extensive debates the
Continental Congress commissioned all officers above the rank of captain. Continental Army
officers now looked to Congress and not their superior officers for promotions, a shift that
resulted in even more letters between the two revolutionary institutions.
When officers were unhappy with their ranks or lack of promotion, many threatened to
resign. As an eighteenth-century military manual warned, “[N]obles become extremely
disgusted with war when they do not receive promotion. They believe that an injury has been
done to their reputation unless, by suitable advancement, they are reassured that one is pleased
with their services.” 125 Of course, this suitable advancement was subjective, leaving room for
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interpretation in both Congress and the officer corps over when promotions were needed.
Officers of all ranks pushed for promotion writing to acquaintances and close friends to plead
their cases. In an officer’s mind a higher rank signified greater recognition of his reputation
among his peers. 126 This mindset made promotions personal during the war. Politicians
understood these feelings but grew frustrated with the ceaseless petitions from officers
threatening to resign if they did not receive a higher rank.
Friendship networks mediated the threat of resignation because friends and political allies
promised to put forward an aggrieved officer’s name for the next round of promotions.
Delegates offered to work on behalf of their friend’s interests in hopes of soothing the officer’s
temper and bruised ego. Mediation served as a critically important method for negotiating the
tension caused by the eighteenth-century culture of honor’s requirement that a gentleman
challenge any perceived insult to his character. Friends urged each other to calm down and think
through decisions before writing a letter of resignation or issuing a challenge to a duel. If a duel
was the only option in the participants’ minds, then mediators helped explain to the peer group
why such drastic action was necessary.
The importance of mediation to negotiating the tensions between the Continental
Congress and the Continental Army is revealed in the dispute between Major Generals Horatio
Gates and Philip Schuyler over who would command the northern army in upstate New York.
The controversy lasted for over a year and resulted in multiple congressional resolutions and
several threats of resignation. Schuyler and Gates each used his political allies and friends in
Congress to fight for him and these allies used mediation to maneuver on behalf of the generals.
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The Schuyler-Gates controversy exposes how the culture of honor complicated the interactions
between the military and civil authorities. The dispute was inherently dangerous and political
factions in Congress were determined to use mediation to resolve the disputes between the two
generals before it ended in an affair of honor.
From 1775 through 1777, Congress introduced new regulations for the military, exerting
more control over the Continental Army than perhaps delegates realized at the time. Congress
controlled promotions and in the fall of 1775 began to create a professional army by introducing
harsher disciplinary measures and longer terms of enlistment. 127 As Congress increased its
authority, it encountered problems rooted in the culture of honor, as officers resented
congressional control over military promotions.
Writing to Congress in late September, Washington worried that he would not have
enough soldiers during the winter to keep the British contained in Boston. Army enlistments
ended in early December and some soldiers were already deserting to return home for the
harvest. Washington’s concerns about expiring enlistments offered revolutionaries, in both the
army and Congress, an opportunity to contemplate a new organizational structure for the
colonies’ military forces. The original army created in June was a haphazard affair, and mainly a
reaction to the urgent situation in Massachusetts after Lexington and Concord. In the fall of
1775, delegates began thinking about the best way to conduct a defensive war in the following
year.
Conservatives and radicals differed, often sharply, over the future of the army and even
what constituted a desirable outcome of the war. Conservatives initially hoped that a few quick,
127

In the summer of 1775, delegates wrote the Articles of War allowing only 39 lashes to punish military
infractions. Enlistments were usually measured in terms of months because no revolutionary could imagine the war
lasting for longer than two years. In December 1776, delegates and army officers began discussing extending the
terms of enlistment for either three years or for the duration of the war. Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army,
69-76, and Rossie, The Politics of Command, 66- 74.

55

decisive military victories against the King’s troops would bring Parliament to the bargaining
table. Delegates avidly exchanged letters detailing the latest rumors from London about British
military strategies. Washington alerted Congress that the Continental Army was slowly melting
away, while hearing news that Britain was hiring mercenaries to fight in the colonies.128
Radical and conservative delegates in open-floor debate discussed “how, when, and
where the said Army may be best raised and levied.” Some politicians raised the question of “by
whom the Officers should be chosen and recommended.” 129 Both Washington and members of
Congress wanted to bring order to the haphazard American military forces. Unfortunately,
revolutionaries in both institutions disagreed on the best methods for restructuring the army.
John Adams’s notes about the debates in October 1775 revealed how radicals and
conservatives were still debating the army’s structure, a topic they had struggled with during the
summer months. The military stalemate in Boston between Washington and Howe, in the fall,
presented an opportunity for Congress to guide the Continental Army in either a politically
radical or conservative direction. Ultimately, the delegates compromised because they could not
imagine that the war would last beyond December 1776.
According to Adams’s notes, delegates debated whether the Continental Congress should
appoint all officers over the rank of captain. Adams listed each delegate and a short synopsis of
his argument. 130 The debate grew heated when delegates proposed enhancing Congress’s control
over the officer corps. Radical delegates, such as Roger Sherman, Samuel Ward, and Eliphalet
Dyer, urged Congress to leave officer appointments to the discretion of each colony’s legislature.
Conservative delegates, such as James Duane, Samuel Chase, and Edward Rutledge argued for
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increasing the Continental Congress’s control over its army. The debates in October 1775 reveal
the influence that radical and conservative interpretations of honor exerted on delegates’
decisions about the army’s structure.
Conservatives argued for increased control over the officer appointment process,
believing that vesting Congress with the power to appoint all officers would cause the military to
transfer its allegiance from units’ respective provinces to the national legislature. Delegates
wanted to prevent accidentally superseding a local legislature’s rankings, thereby avoiding a
situation similar to the problems that had arisen during the summer of 1775, when three brigadier
generals had threatened to resign. Arguing that “We are to form the grand Outlines of an
American Army-a general Regulation,” James Duane then asked his fellow congressmen: “If We
were to set out anew, would the same Plan be pursued?” He suggested that Congress appoint
officers in consultation with the generals, stating, “Schuyler and Montgomery would govern my
Judgment. I would rather take the opinion of Gen. Washington than of any Convention. We can
turn out the unworthy and reward Merit.”131 In referring to Schuyler and Montgomery, Duane
had deliberately called attention to two socially conservative generals, his close friends and
fellow New Yorkers. The conservatives’ final point stressed Congress’s fiscal control over the
army, arguing, “We pay. Cant We appoint with the Advice of our Generals.”132 Even in
Adams’s sparsely detailed notes, the radicals’ explosive reactions to the conservatives’
arguments is clear. John Langdon of New Hampshire warned that conservatives proposed “a
very extraordinary Motion” rife “with many Mischiefs.” 133
Radicals believed provincial conventions were better equipped to nominate officers for
the Continental Army because local social networks could uncover and report the character and
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personal history of each applicant. Dyer insisted, “we must derive all our Knowledge, from the
Delegates of that Colony. The Representatives at large are as good Judges and would give more
Satisfaction.” 134 Radicals wanted to select officers for their political principles creating an
officer corps filled with patriots who understood and recognized the dangers of a standing army.
Many New England congressmen worried that a conservative Continental Army would
upset the traditional structure of the local militia units, where foot soldiers elected their own
officers. Washington abhorred this traditional practice because he believed officer elections
encouraged too much familiarity between the ranks.135 In fact, radical delegates warned that
“You cant raise an Army if you put Officers over the Men whom they dont know. It requires
Time to bring People off from ancient Usage.”136 Radicals wanted an officer corps composed of
one-year volunteers, either elected by army privates or selected by local legislatures for their
ideological beliefs. Such arrangements would prevent the conservatives from enhancing
Congress’s power at the expense of the provincial legislatures.
After a heated discussion, Congress delayed issuing new guidelines until a congressional
committee had consulted with Washington at the army’s headquarters in Boston. Washington
then persuaded delegates to assume responsibility for all officer appointments above the rank of
captain. Congress’s final decision was a compromise between radical and conservative
delegates, who agreed that each colony’s delegation should consult with their local legislature
before endorsing the appointments.
Though Congress created a Continental Army, each regiment was comprised of soldiers
from a specific colony. Not even Washington ever considered blending the regiments because
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all revolutionaries agreed that men were more inclined to volunteer if they could serve with their
neighbors. By maintaining local distinctions in the regiments, officers then inundated their
specific colonial representatives with letters laying out their pleas for promotions or threats of
resignation if they were not granted.
The Continental Army suffered major military reverses during the 1776 campaign
season: an invasion of Canada failed spectacularly and Washington lost New York City and was
chased into Pennsylvania by Lord General Cornwallis. The Battle of Trenton, however, offered
a beacon of hope to war-weary Americans at the end of the year. After an arduous campaign
season, officers in their winter encampments began petitioning their congressional
representatives for promotions to recognize their dedicated service to the American cause. When
Congress did not respond quickly enough to suit the officers, they began grumbling and
threatening to resign en masse. During the war, officers never recognized how long the political
process took in the Continental Congress because of the committee system and open-floor
debate. Thomas Burke of North Carolina routinely observed that congressional debates were
“perplexed, inconclusive and irksome.”137
Facing threats of resignation en masse, Congress contemplated for the first time the
establishment of specific guidelines for standardizing officer promotions in the Continental
Army. Prior to February 1777, promotions were a haphazard affair and officers questioned
Congress’s motives for commissioning certain individuals. They grew resentful and exchanged
accusations about favoritism running rampant and corrupting Congress. Spurred by
Washington’s notification that three major and ten brigadier generals needed to be appointed,
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delegates spent a week discussing specific guidelines for promotions. 138 Delegates debated three
different options for promoting officers, eventually settling on a compromise that satisfied no
one.
The first proposal suggested that Congress promote officers according to seniority in the
ranks. Some delegates preferred this solution because it adhered to traditional military protocol.
It left no room for interpretation about the delegates’ motivations; instead promotions were
linked to seniority within each state’s regiments. Other delegates shouted down this idea,
arguing it left Congress without the ability to reward extraordinary battlefield exploits. By using
only seniority, the civil authority had no other incentive to offer that would inspire military
officers to work harder to gain advancement. Perhaps there was also a fear that this proposal
might establish a professional officer class similar to that in European armies.
Radicals proposed promoting heroic and brave officers according to merit. Merit was
however, a contested idea and had multiple meanings to revolutionaries in both institutions. Did
it consist of possessing excellent martial skills or the correct political principles? How could
members of Congress possibly agree on what merit meant in every officer’s promotion? Burke
was horrified at the idea of using merit as the sole basis for promotion and he warned that
Congress “ought to give no room for jealousy.”139 Specific guidelines, such as seniority, were
needed that offered no room for interpretation.
Burke proposed a third option, revealing his interest in maintaining civilian control over
the officer corps. He suggested that “each State should recommend officers in proportion to the
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men they furnish: three Battalions, one Brigadier, nine, one Major General.”140 Burke hoped his
proposal would allow members of Congress to control the politics within their own state
regiments while also encouraging states to raise more military forces for greater political cachet.
Francis Lewis of New York understood Burke’s motivations and urged his provincial legislature
to send more delegates to Philadelphia, writing, “notwithstanding many declarations to the
contrary, Colonial prejudices sway the minds of individuals, that each State appear interested in
the debates, for promotion in the line of their respective States.” 141 Two years into the war and a
year after signing the Declaration of Independence, states still competed with each other for
national recognition.
In his congressional speeches, Burke insisted that guidelines needed to be established.
He argued “that the Congress would be an object of very jealous apprehension, unchecked and
unlimited as it is, if the officers of the army held their honor at the precarious pleasure of a
majority.” 142 He understood that “Officers hold their honor the most dear of anything. Setting
them aside when they were entitled to promotion would wound that honor very sorely.”143
Burke’s statements captured the essence of why officers threatened to resign, because they
believed promotions were public recognition of their reputations. Burke knew that the culture of
honor shaped the interactions between civil and military authorities because every revolutionary
understood the honor code. He warned that officers believed delegates possessed the arbitrary
power to wound or to recognize the officers’ honor. Congressmen wanted to exert more control
over the armed forces, but there had to a clear line to that authority. Officers needed to know
that there were unambiguous, unbiased guidelines. That is why Burke argued against merit140
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based promotions and encouraged promotions calculated either by seniority or state contribution
quotas. He wanted to eliminate any room for interpretation to prevent officers from resenting
politicians and threatening resignation. The eighteenth-century culture of honor complicated the
business of promotion.
After a strenuous week of debate, delegates crafted a compromise. The final resolution
declared, “that in voting for general officers, a due regard shall be had to the line of succession,
the merit of the persons proposed, and the quota of troops raised, and to be raised, by each
State,” and gave officers three different options for petitioning for promotion.144 Ultimately, the
new guidelines proved disastrous for the Continental Congress and the Continental Army, a topic
discussed further in chapter three. Although Congress achieved its goal of exerting more control
over the military with the new guidelines, just as Burke warned, officers now jealously resented
Congress’s power over promotions and seethed over the delegates’ arbitrary power.
The Continental Army was shaped by the circumstances of the war. Initially created by
Congress to fight a defensive war against British troops in Boston, by the fall of 1775 the army
had been split into three different forces fighting throughout the United States.145 From the
beginning, Washington kept in close contact with the civil authority, notifying Congress when
the army needed new officers appointed, soldiers recruited, or money to procure supplies. His
letters prompted debates over different proposals to solve the army’s problems. Such debates
took time and the army began to grumble about its civilian masters and government inefficiency.
Even as Congress argued about solutions for the army, it hoped to prevent the military from
growing too professional and strong; for the delegates, civil liberties were more important than
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an efficient military machine. To deal with the growing problems between the Continental
Congress and the Continental Army, revolutionaries in both institutions turned to the resolution
process provided by the culture of honor. Mediation was the first step to reducing tensions.
Delegates built a mediation process into Congress’s institutional structure by using openfloor debates and the committee system. In 1777, mediation was needed to resolve escalating
tensions between the army and Congress and between two major generals, Schuyler and
Gates. 146 These generals were arguing over who actually commanded the northern army in
upstate New York and each attempted to use his friends and political connections in Congress to
decide the matter in his favor. Perhaps more clearly than any other situation that came before
Congress, the Schuyler-Gates controversy exposes how mediation worked in a dispute between
the two revolutionary institutions involving forceful personalities and basic political principles.
Congress actively participated in planning military campaigns for the Continental Army.
Delegates sent letters to Washington suggesting different locations for attacking British troops
and urged the construction of forts along the frontier. Though most conservative delegates had
initially supported a war for defensive purposes, by August 1775, Congress’s war goals had
changed dramatically. Caught up in a military fever and encouraged by delegates from New
England and New York, Congress planned an invasion of Canada for the fall of 1775. Several
delegates argued that Canada longed to be liberated from British control and that an invasion
would also secure New England’s northern borders against an attack from the British troops
stationed in Canada. Major General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier General Richard
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Montgomery, with advice from congressmen, planned the invasion of Canada against enormous
odds. 147
As the war expanded to new battlefronts, delegates created new departments and
committees to handle their increased correspondence.148 Congress appointed Schuyler
commander of the northern army in the newly formed Northern Department. Major generals
eagerly sought command of the new departments because the promotions denoted delegates’
confidence and approval and boosted the officers’ prestige.
Philip Schuyler of New York served simultaneously as a delegate in the Continental
Congress and as a major general in the Continental Army.149 The New York state legislature
approved of his dual role, reelecting Schuyler every year to his political post. Schuyler, a
wealthy landowner in New York, had strong political connections to many conservative
revolutionaries. His close family friends included the extended Livingston clan, John Jay, James
Duane and William Duer. These men kept him apprised of all the political gossip while he was
away on army service. Before receiving his officer’s commission in June 1775, Schuyler had
also developed friendships with conservative Southern congressmen, such as Samuel Chase and
Edward Rutledge. Schuyler would depend on the support of his friends and political allies when
he competed with Horatio Gates for control of the northern army.
A former British army officer, Gates possessed years of military experience and, in the
summer of 1775, he had eagerly volunteered for service in the Continental Army.150 Gates
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believed in radical Whig ideology, a major reason for his voluntary retirement from the British
army in the early 1770s. His political principles and common birth had stymied his advancement
in Britain’s peacetime army. After selling his commission, he immigrated to Virginia ready to
live the genteel existence of a planter. Congress took advantage of Gates’s military experience
and appointed him adjutant general, a key administrative position in the army. In Boston, Gates
helped Washington drill discipline into the unorganized American forces. Washington and
Gates, however, disagreed over the establishment of a conservative military hierarchy in the
Continental Army. Gates preferred a military meritocracy, a system rejected by the British
military. Gates forged a strong bond with Congress’s radical minority faction after receiving his
commission. Samuel Adams, Roger Sherman, and James Lovell became Gates’s close political
allies and friends and they suggested him for command of the American army in Canada in June
1776.
The invasion of Canada proved an utter disaster for the American troops. Montgomery
died storming the city gates of Quebec and thousands of soldiers perished either because of the
freezing temperatures or a smallpox outbreak. Congress heard throughout the spring of 1776
about the retreat of the American forces, and worried congressmen even sent a committee to
investigate the Canadian debacle to find out which general to blame for the army’s failure.151
Samuel Chase, a close friend of Schuyler, served on the committee and absolved
Schuyler of any guilt. Chase found Schuyler innocent for two reasons: he was a close friend and,
moreover, he had never traveled with the troops into Canada. Schuyler had remained in New
York to facilitate the transportation of supplies for the invasion and to negotiate neutrality
treaties with several Indian tribes. Fixing blame elsewhere, Chase declared in an open report that
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David Wooster and his Connecticut troops had hindered the American war effort.152 Chase
wrote: “General Wooster is in our opinion unfit, totally unfit, to Command your Army &
conduct the war; we have hitherto prevailed on him to remain in Montreal, his stay in this
Colony is unnecessary & even prejudicial to our Affairs, we would therefore humbly advise his
recall.” 153 Chase’s strongly worded appraisal was guaranteed to destroy a man’s public
reputation and Wooster was livid. He demanded a congressional inquiry to clear his name from
Schuyler’s whispering campaign and Chase’s public accusations. A congressional inquiry
cleared Wooster, but he missed his opportunity to command the American forces in Canada.
Instead, that honor would go to newly promoted Major General Horatio Gates.154
On June 17, 1776, Congress granted Gates an independent command in Canada, hoping
he could halt the army’s retreat. Gates’s congressional friends trusted him to prevent British
General Sir Guy Carleton from physically cutting off New England from the rest of the
American colonies. Delegates resolved “That General Washington be directed to send Major
General Gates into Canada, to take the command of the forces in that province.”155 John Adams
wrote Gates a giddy, congratulatory letter emphasizing his hopes that Gates would turn the
situation around quickly. “We have ordered you to the Post of Honour, and made you Dictator
in Canada for Six Months,” Adams remarked teasingly “or at least untill the first of October. —
152
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We dont choose to trust you Generals, with too much Power, for too long Time.”156 Even as
Adams celebrated Gates’s new opportunity, he issued a lighthearted but clear reminder that
military officials were subordinate to Congress. Much correspondence of congressmen with
officers demonstrated a balance between friendship and a clear warning to remember the
supremacy of the civil government.
Gates quickly set out for his new command but, before he arrived, the American forces
had abandoned Canada. Suddenly, Gates had an independent command but no army. At their
first meeting in Albany, New York, Schuyler’s and Gates’s tempers flared as they debated the
meaning of Gates’s new commission. Gates believed Congress would want a new army
recruited and trained to invade British territory. Schuyler disagreed with Gates’s interpretation
of the congressional resolution and was concerned that Gates thought that he now possessed total
control over the northern army. Both major generals agreed to write Washington and Congress
about their conflicting interpretations concerning Gates’s commission.157 Gates believed his new
independent command was an opportunity to earn a national reputation for military glory.
Schuyler, for his part, felt threatened by Gates and worried that Congress doubted his abilities
and that representatives were plotting to replace him as commander of the northern army and
Northern Department.
Composing a letter to notify Washington of the situation, Schuyler swore that he and
Gates “mean to be candid and wish to have the Matter settled without any of the Chicane, which
would disgrace us as Officers & Men.”158 They agreed to write separate letters explaining their
views of the situation and then “shew each other what we have written to you upon the
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Occasion.” 159 Each general wanted to present a calm public demeanor while Congress arbitrated
the dispute. A gentleman needed to appear composed and rational at all times, but both men felt
that their honor was at stake.
This was a difficult situation for Washington and Congress to negotiate. Schuyler made
it clear that he considered Gates’s interpretation of the congressional resolution to be a direct
insult to his character and reputation. He warned that “If Congress intended that General Gates
should command the Northern Army wherever it might be, as he assures me they did, it ought to
have been signified to me, and I should then have immediately resigned the Command to
him.” 160 But Schuyler insisted, “until such Intention is properly conveyed to me I never can.”
He told Washington “to lay this letter before Congress, that they may clearly & explicitly signify
their Intentions to avert the Dangers & Evils that may arise from a disputed Command for after
what General Gates has said the Line must be clearly drawn.”161 Though Schuyler and Gates
each tried to avoid appearing petty in his petition, each man was upset and wanted Congress to
declare that his interpretation of the dispute was correct. They only wrote to Washington to
follow traditional military protocol; all three officers knew that only Congress possessed the
authority to fix the misunderstanding.
On July 8, only days after declaring independence from Great Britain, Congress
addressed the conflict over command of the northern army. A new resolution stipulated “That
Major General Gates be informed, that it was the intention of Congress to give him the command
of the troops whilst in Canada, but had no design to vest him with a superior command to
159
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General Schuyler, whilst the troops should be on this side Canada.” John Hancock, in his role as
president, was then ordered to write both generals “recommending to them to carry on the
military operations with harmony, and in such manner as shall best promote the public
service.” 162 Members of Congress hoped that this resolution solved the conflict between the two
major generals, but Schuyler’s ruffled feathers did not settle so easily.
Every few months, over the next year, Schuyler or Gates wrote to Congress threatening to
resign unless his demands were granted. Each general and his friends in Congress began to see
control over the northern army as a contest between ideological groups and a referendum on
character. The competition over command thus became an affair of honor to both men, and so
they continually sought reassurance from Congress that it preferred one of them to the other.
Furthermore, Schuyler’s stubborn personality made it difficult for him to forgive any slight or
forget any insult. He continually pushed and prodded Congress into confirming its preference
for him over Gates. 163 However, Gates had political allies in Congress who worked on his behalf
to maintain his reputation. When a misunderstanding over a congressional resolution escalated
into an affair of honor between two major generals, the congressional floor became the only
location to mediate a feud that involved public reputations.
Mediation served as one of the few tools available to prevent an affair of honor from
reaching the dueling ground. In the Schuyler-Gates controversy, friendship networks in both the
Continental Army and the Continental Congress resolved the dispute to prevent the resignation
of either major general. Congressmen talked their friends in the army out of threatening to
resign while simultaneously promising to guard against evil designs that involved the officers.
Mediators soothed tempers, but they could also complicate the resolution process. Some
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gentlemen were quick to see elements of conspiracy in certain congressional resolutions as they
tried to protect their friend’s character.164 Though personality clashes could complicate the
mediation process, mediation helped dissipate some of the tensions that developed between the
Continental Congress and the Continental Army. It served as a valuable tool for both military
and civil personnel to resolve their differences.
Both generals wanted the civil authority to arbitrate their dispute because they needed to
have their reputations publicly validated. A gentleman’s character required public
acknowledgment from his peers; Schuyler and Gates understood this unwritten rule of
eighteenth-century society and used their friendships in Congress to secure an advantage over the
other general. 165 Mediation and the generals’ friends smoothed over the dispute and, after the
July 8 resolution, Gates took command of Fort Ticonderoga to start preparing soldiers for a new
invasion of Canada.
Schuyler continued to worry that Congress no longer appreciated his abilities, and so he
wrote to his friends asking for confirmation that Congress respected him. Otherwise, he warned,
he would resign. 166 In October, Edward Rutledge drafted a resolution refusing to accept
Schuyler’s resignation. Rutledge assured Schuyler “that the aspertions, which his enemies have
thrown out against his character, have had no influence upon the minds of the members of this
house, who are fully satisfied of his attachment to the cause of freedom.” 167 Rutledge’s
intentionally provocative language in the resolution revealed his firm allegiance to Schuyler. His
mention of aspersions and enemies fed into Schuyler’s worries instead of calming them. Radical
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delegates used the same warnings about conspiracy in their letters to Gates and Gates’s closest
friends in the army. Lovell warned Trumbull in dramatic terms to
Put on thy Sword; prepare thy Cuirass; the Beast [Schuyler] is in fierce Rage and Fury
against thee. The Breath of his Mouth is doubtless as the Flame of a Furnace. His Bile
overfloweth even to the End of his armed Paws, so that a Flood of it is before our Eyes
for Contemplation. How have thy Stars forsaken thee, my Friend! so that the baleful
Influence of High Gain hath Power over thy Fortune. 168
These allusions to conspiracies reflected and reinforced congressmen’s worries about
conspiracies and factions as the war dragged on. The harsh strain of fighting the British
increasingly wore away at the colonial unanimity that had marked the spirit of ’75. Debates in
Congress over the Schuyler-Gates controversy illustrate the delegates’ insecurity about winning
the rebellion.
During the winter of 1776, both Gates and Schuyler campaigned for complete control of
the northern army. Many of Schuyler’s conservative allies tried to overturn Gates’s independent
command within the Northern department. Gates visited Congress in Baltimore, to lobby in
person for a repeal of the July 8 resolution.169 Schuyler’s confidants kept him informed of
Gates’s lobbying and he worried that Gates would prove successful. In the early spring,
Schuyler demanded that Congress grant him complete control of the Northern Department and
northern army, including the ability to fire Joseph Trumbull, a key supporter of Gates.
Congressmen became frustrated with Schuyler’s increasingly truculent tone and his continual
demands for preference. Some members began to view Schuyler’s personality in a negative
light, worrying he was too petty and too focused on his reputation to prepare for the upcoming
military campaign. In fact, in March 1777, Congress issued a resolution chastising Schuyler,
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revealing the delegates’ growing impatience with the Schuyler-Gates controversy. They warned
Schuyler that his tone in several recent letters was “highly derogatory to the honour of
Congress;” and “it is expected his letters, for the future, be written in a stile more suitable to the
dignity of the representative body of these free and independent states, and to his own character
as their officer.” 170 A frustrated and offended Congress invoked the key terms of honor and
dignity to reprimand Schuyler. The resolution warned Schuyler that his language had become
increasingly petty and dictatorial and that, as an officer, he needed to remember that he was
subordinate to congressional authority. 171
Schuyler became livid upon receiving the congressional remonstrance. He left camp and
traveled to Philadelphia intent on tendering his resignation and forcing a congressional inquiry
into his management of the northern army.172 He wanted his character rehabilitated before the
public. Because Schuyler was technically a delegate to the Continental Congress, he was
officially able to participate in legislative business. His friends managed to soothe his temper,
convincing him to continue his service in the Continental Army. They even wrangled a public
vote of confidence for Schuyler in May 1777, through a new resolution that confirmed his
command of the northern army. John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress, wrote
a letter to General Gates “informing him, that Major General Schuyler is order'd to take upon
him the Command in the Northern Department.” Gates’s options were “either to continue in the
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Command in the Northern Department, under Major General Schuyler; or to take upon him the
Office of Adjutant General in the Grand Army immediately under the Commander in Chief.”173
Satisfied, Schuyler left to rejoin his forces in Albany.
Schuyler’s friends happily informed the New York legislature about their victory over
Gates and his radical friends. William Duer confided to Robert R. Livingston, “I have now the
Pleasure to inform you that in Spite of all the Arts and Influence made use of by the Eastern
Delegates in conjunction with the Members from New Jersey-we have got Genl. Schuyler's
Conduct fully justified, and himself reinstated in his Command in the Northern Department.”
Duer’s letter revealed the politics involved in Congress’s decision, declaring that “his
[Schuyler’s] own merit… and the all powerful Influence of Truth assisted with Management at
length effected all our wishes and we carried the Question.”174 Duer’s honest comment about the
“Truth assisted with Management” referred to the politicking that influenced the delegates’
votes. Schuyler’s friends fought for him for both personal and political reasons, and they wanted
a New Yorker in charge of the northern army defending upstate New York. Duer’s reference to
the management alluded to the intimation by the New York delegates that their support of the
war effort hinged upon Schuyler’s continued service in the army.175
Bad news traveled swiftly and Gates was furious with Congress’s decision. His son
stoked his anger, asking him: “What fault have you committed that you should be thus disgraced
before all America?” He went on to urge Gates to hit back: “I conjure you…to resent this
ignominious treatment by leaving the service of the Congress, a body that neither rewards
officers according to their merit or has firmness to stand by even its own decrees.” Gates agreed
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and traveled to Philadelphia to argue for his honor.176 Gates’s prepared speech defending his
reputation electrified the delegates when he accused Schuyler’s friends of deliberately spreading
lies about him and his reputation. Gates voiced serious accusations and, because of them, he was
forced to withdraw from the congressional chamber when congressmen concluded that he was
challenging civil authority and congressional privilege.177 Gates had the unfortunate luck to
arrive in Philadelphia only four days after Congress had censured Muster Master General
Gunning Bedford for challenging Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant to a duel for words spoken
during debate. 178 Members of Congress were sensitive about belligerent generals who contested
their authority and they quickly shouted down Gates’s speech.
Duer and Duane, then, wrote Schuyler detailed letters describing Gates’s appearance
before Congress. Duer described “the tenor of his Discourse [as] a Compound of Vanity, Folly
and Rudeness.” Both Duane and Duer openly acknowledged to Schuyler that they had
campaigned on his behalf and felt no remorse if they had injured Gates’s character in front of
other revolutionaries. 179 Knowing the consequences of deliberately injuring a person’s
reputation, Duer blustered, “Perhaps he may take it into his head to call me out….Should this be
the case I am determin'd not to She[l]ter myself under Priviledge, being convinced of the
Necessity there is to act with Spirit, to enable me to discharge with Fidelity the Trust reposed in
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me.” 180 While Gates never issued a challenge to a congressional delegate over the situation,
Duer probably proudly patted himself on the back for his bravado and loyal defense of
Schuyler’s honor. 181 Duer’s comments offer an insight into how congressmen and soldiers were
renegotiating the rules of the honor culture as the fighting dragged on. Did congressional
privilege shelter politicians from affairs of honor when they questioned the fighting abilities of
military officers? For many officers, their martial skill was synonymous with their character, an
identification that perhaps explains why Gates and Schuyler became offended whenever a new
congressional resolution was issued that supported one general at the expense of the other.
While they used Congress to publicly defend their reputation, they also wanted their friends to
help mediate their dispute and support their efforts. Most likely, their friends talked them out of
taking drastic action because neither general resigned during the year long controversy. After
Gates indignantly withdrew from Congress in late June, he returned to his Virginia farm
contemplating if he would return to the army as adjutant general or perhaps petition for an
independent command on another battlefront. 182
Major military setbacks plagued the northern army under Schuyler’s command during the
summer of 1777, as Burgoyne overwhelmed the Continental Army in upstate New York. The
final blow to American morale was the evacuation of Fort Ticonderoga. Ethan Allen’s Green
Mountain Boys and Benedict Arnold had captured the fort in May 1775; now it returned to
British hands. When news about the fall of Fort Ticonderoga reached Philadelphia, delegates
from New England demanded that Schuyler be replaced. In late July, members of Congress
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spent two days debating the overturning of their mid-May resolution that had reaffirmed
Schuyler’s independent command.183
Allegiances to Gates and Schuyler shaped the debate, with both sides advocating its
friend’s military ability and popularity. Delegates discussed the issue of popularity many times
because they believed men would only fight for officers who inspired them. This common
eighteenth-century assumption shaped Washington’s public behavior and influenced the
selection of officers. Many of Gates’s friends argued that Schuyler was too aristocratic and
unpopular to inspire the militia to defeat Burgoyne. If Gates were reappointed, then soldiers
would flock to serve under his command. William Williams of Connecticut defended his desire
to promote Gates by confirming Schuyler’s lack of popularity, “in Conn.: mentions the joy of the
people on Gates appmt., their apprehensions when Sch came to Cong., their grief when
replaced.” 184
Attacking the radicals’ arguments, Schuyler’s friends insisted that any general would face
military setbacks when substantially outnumbered by the enemy. Schuyler simply needed time
to recruit more militiamen to resist Burgoyne’s invasion. Other delegates demanded a
congressional inquiry of Schuyler’s management of the army before publicly replacing him with
another officer. An inquiry provided Schuyler the opportunity to explain his actions and to
defend his character. 185 Otherwise, Schuyler might have had genuine grounds for accusing
Congress of insulting his honor.
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The debates ended in a compromise, by which the delegates resolved to conduct an
inquiry into Schuyler’s management of the northern army before replacing him with Gates.186
Two days later, however, as more bad news arrived, Congress ordered that another general of
Washington’s choice replace Schuyler. While a radical departure from the typical congressional
policy of controlling all officer promotions, no delegate wanted to be responsible for earning
Schuyler’s ire by promptly promoting Gates to replace him. They passed the decision on to
Washington so that it seemed professional instead of personal. Washington, however, refused to
become involved in the last act of the Schuyler-Gates saga, declaring that he was happy to work
with the general preferred by Congress. 187
Schuyler’s friends had warned other New York politicians about the growing momentum
in late July to replace Schuyler as commander of the northern army. While they always wanted
to defend Schuyler’s reputation against his political enemies, they worried about losing political
leverage if they continued to support him. In stark terms they told New York’s Council of Safety
of the “Delicacy of our Situation. If the Eastern Delegates carry their point the World is left to
conclude not only that General Schuyler is unworthy of the Command; but that if the late
changes had not taken place, Ticonderoga, by the abilities of Genl Gates, might still have been
preserved.” 188 If, however, they continued to argue on Schuyler’s behalf “and the Eastern States
be backward in supplying their militia, and the calamities of the Country in that Quarter
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encrease, Would there under these circumstances, be any End to Clamour and Reproach?”189
They hoped the congressional inquiry would clear Schuyler’s reputation but, by late July 1777,
they were unwilling to spend any more political capital to prevent Gates’s promotion. They
halted their efforts on Schuyler’s behalf for continued command because they believed a
congressional inquiry would exonerate his character. Gates’s allies rejoiced at their victory over
Schuyler. It had taken a year, but they finally had the major general they preferred ready to
engage and defeat Burgoyne’s invading army. The Schuyler-Gates controversy reveals the
friendships that developed between officers and congressmen during the war, but it also exposes
how the friendships could create some of the problems that developed between the Continental
Army and the Continental Congress.
Friendship networks proved valuable to revolutionaries in both institutions because they
allowed mediation to help ease tensions. When the culture of honor created conflicts, such as the
Schuyler-Gates controversy, most gentlemen turned to mediation before issuing a challenge to a
duel or submitting their resignation. Because Schuyler and Gates were high-ranking officers,
they used Congress to arbitrate their conflicting claims to command of the northern army. Both
officers had the support of strong political factions in Congress, which allowed their dispute to
last for over a year. Their constant negotiations over the details of their command showcase how
important rank and promotion were to most military officers.
The Continental Army and the Continental Congress experienced significant growing
pains from the fall of 1775 through 1777 because both institutions were changing and adapting to
the exigencies of a protracted war. Through numerous new rules and regulations, Congress
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increased its control over the military. Delegates used these regulations to prevent the growth of
a strong, professional military corps. Congressmen worried that officers might decide to become
kingmakers, should they become dissatisfied with the national legislature. Hoping to cement the
officers’ loyalty to the civil authority, Congress decided to control all officer appointments above
the rank of captain. But, as Burke had warned, the military soon began to resent Congress’s
power over rank and promotions, the more so because the official guidelines established in
February 1777 offered too much room for interpretation.
The eighteenth-century culture of honor encouraged gentlemen to be sensitive to any
perceived insult to their character. Moreover, officers believed that promotions were linked to
their peers’ evaluation of their character. Most officers would have agreed with Schuyler, who
insisted that “[a] Man’s Character ought not to be sported with and he that suffers Stains to lay
on it with Impunity really deserves none nor will he long enjoy one.” 190 Officers continually
petitioned Congress, hoping to gain public recognition either through a promotion or a pay raise.
They used friendship networks to plead their cases. Not surprisingly, many congressional
representatives became resentful over the numerous petitions for promotions. Soon, legislators
refused to put forward petitioners’ names thereby, creating even more resentment in the officer
corps. As John Adams dismissively confided to his wife, “I am wearied to Death with the
Wrangles between military officers, high and low. They Quarrell like Cats and Dogs. They
worry one another like Mastiffs. Scrambling for Rank and Pay like Apes for Nutts.”191 Even
after the Schuyler-Gates controversy proved how seriously officers took the matter of
promotions, Adams and a majority of congressmen refused to acknowledge the officers’
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sensitivity. In the winter of 1777/78, the army began pushing back against congressional
authority, demanding new guidelines for promotions and pensions for life. The army wanted
more respect from the civil authority; they were tired of being “spied upon,” presumably for their
own good; and they wanted their fellow revolutionaries in Congress to trust them by granting
them more autonomy.
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Chapter 3:
These Winters of Our Discontent
“The spirit of resigning, which is now become almost epidemical is truly painful and alarming—
This spirit, prevailing among many of the best Officers, from various inducements, if persisted
in, must deeply wound the common cause…”
George Washington, February 1778 192
Stealing a moment to write a letter, Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston described to his
brother the events of the last few hectic months. In a tone of utter exhaustion, Livingston
detailed the army’s condition at Valley Forge, stating sarcastically, we “are now Building Huts
for our winter Quarters without Nails or Tools so that I suppose we may possibly render
ourselves very Comfortable by the Time winter is Over.”193 Still feeling the sting of the defeat
of Washington’s army twice by Sir William Howe in September and October of 1777,
Livingston resented that “the Enemy are rolling in the Fat of the Land having played the Soldier
sufficiently to secure them the Best of Quarters,” while “all my men except 18 are unfit for duty
for want of Shoes Stockings and Shirts.”194 Washington established his army’s winter
headquarters at Valley Forge, after negotiating a compromise with the Continental Congress and
Pennsylvania’s legislature. With Howe’s army firmly ensconced in Philadelphia, politicians
insisted that the Continental Army maintain a strong presence in the Pennsylvania countryside to
help bolster public morale. These political considerations contradicted Washington’s original
plan of dividing his forces into several small winter camps, spread throughout the countryside, to
make it easier to supply the army.
The legacy of Valley Forge dominates the narrative of the American Revolution, but the
reality of that winter offers an opportunity to examine the military’s growing resentment of
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congressional authority and how officers began to demand respect as fellow gentlemen and
revolutionaries. As the military pushed back against congressional authority, tensions between
the two institutions went beyond the point of compromise. Instead, revolutionaries turned to
resignation as a conflict resolution measure to preserve their honor and reputation.
Winter always aggravated the problems between the Continental Army and the
Continental Congress because officers had more time to mull over real or imagined slights to
their dignity in their quarters. Having no immediate military campaigns to plan, officers
typically focused on complaining about their lack of pay, lack of promotions, and lack of
supplies. At Valley Forge, they added a new item to the list of complaints: pensions. Pensions
were a divisive issue within the officer corps and a controversial proposal on the legislative
agenda. For officers, pensions came to symbolize respect and honor and therefore made
pensions an emotionally charged issue for congressional debate. Many delegates in Congress
felt pressured by the military to vote in favor of granting pensions. When tensions escalated over
establishing them, revolutionaries in both institutions resigned to protest injuries to their
character that occurred during the debates.
In A Revolutionary People at War, Charles Royster emphasized that Valley Forge was a
turning point in the Continental Army’s institutional history. After Washington appointed Baron
von Steuben to mold his army into a force of European quality, soldiers spent months learning
traditional battlefield tactics and drills to instill new professional discipline. Royster argues that
Valley Forge is where the army began to believe they were the embodiment of revolutionary
virtue. Soldiers thought of themselves as distinct from the public because they were sacrificing
their fortunes and oftentimes their lives to fight for independence.195 The civil authority grew
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concerned over the army’s growing resentment and anger, but congressmen were divided
ideologically over solutions to placate the military.
The fall of 1777 to the spring of 1781 were years that represented the nadir of America’s
military and political fortunes, as the revolutionaries struggled to fight a war for independence
with no money and a frustrated and tired public. So, why in the midst of these terrible times did
congressmen and officers resign from service? Royster argues that most officers resigned when
the reality of war did not mesh with their romantic notions of military glory. Upon that
realization, they returned their commissions to escape the hardships of active military duty, a
decision that was probably for the best because they were too interested in cutting a dashing
figure than successfully fighting the enemy in battle.196 There was, however, more to the
resignations than disillusionment with the war.
After fleeing Philadelphia just hours ahead of Howe’s invading army, Congress settled in
York, Pennsylvania, for the winter months. The drama of retreating from the temporary capital
of the United States for the second year in a row frustrated many of the delegates, and they grew
impatient with Washington’s leadership. While Horatio Gates had conquered Burgoyne’s large
army in upstate New York, Washington had lost a series of battles, forcing the national
legislature to abandon its capital. 197 In the fall of 1777, delegates struggled with their own
growing irritation with the army and with the management of the war for independence.
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The war had already lasted far longer than any revolutionary had anticipated in the
summer of 1775 and delegate absenteeism began to interfere with congressional productivity.
As delegates fled Philadelphia, some continued on the road until they reached home instead of
stopping in York, Pennsylvania. The average workload of a congressional delegate consisted of
ten-to-twelve-hour days filled with committee meetings and long open-floor debates. If a
delegate did not surreptitiously leave Congress, then he might write to his state legislature asking
to resign his position due to pressing family matters or because he resented the political
compromises necessitated by congressional factions. Congressmen believed that politics and
votes were personal and, by 1777, some of them were tired of public service. Delegate turnover
became a larger issue in the winter months when Congress had difficulty reaching a quorum to
conduct business. 198 Elbridge Gerry humorously notified Samuel Adams that he needed to
return to Congress and help with congressional business since “few can stand it as well as our
Friend Mr. Lovell; he writes Morning Noon and Night, Sickens once a Fortnight, and devotes a
Day to Sleep, after which, like the Sun from behind a Cloud, he makes his Appearance with his
usual Splendor.” 199 Still, the work never stopped. During the winter, delegates debated the
Articles of Confederation, fiscal policy, officers tendering their resignations, new guidelines for
officer promotions, army pensions, and how to supply an army that was in an “Almost Naked &
very often in a Starveing Condition.”200 The problems plaguing the war effort made the civil and
military authorities sensitive to any gossip about their performance. The winter months of
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1777/78 were filled with accusations and innuendos about the merits of Continental Army
officers and congressional delegates.
By the fall of 1777, the pressures and problems of the war stretched the revolutionaries’
patience, leaving many gentlemen feeling that resignation was the only way for them to preserve
their dignity. 201 Resignation served as a form of protest when there was no direct opponent to
challenge to a duel or when officers could not find a specific delegate in Congress to blame for
their woes. The winter months allowed officers and politicians plenty of time to become
disgruntled at their treatment by the public.
Officers’ pay continued to be a thorny issue between the army and Congress. Wanting to
be frugal, congressmen from the beginning, in June 1775, had stipulated a low salary for officers,
believing men should volunteer for patriotic rather than pecuniary reasons.202 In the fall of 1775,
Washington had petitioned Congress for an increase in the officers’ pay, arguing that the current
allowance was “inadequate to their Rank, & Service; & is one great Source of that Familiarity
between the Officers & Men, which is so incompatible with Subordination & Discipline.” The
low pay, he added, did not allow subalterns “to support the Character & Appearance of
Officers.” 203 While Congress provided the uniforms for enlisted men (that is, when supplies
existed,) officers paid for their own uniforms. In the eighteenth century, clothing signaled rank
and character. 204 Officers were expected to maintain a neat and genteel appearance to inspire
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their soldiers’ obedience and awe. Even eighteenth-century military manuals encouraged this
practice, stating that “these pleasant externals [uniforms] are not combat weapons, to be sure, but
they are a perpetual reminder to the officer of his status and distinction, and by impressing his
superiority on his soldiers they incline the men to consideration, respect, and obedience.”205
Money helped codify social distinction and Washington knew that his junior officers were going
into debt trying to maintain the lifestyle expected of an officer.206 To retain officers, Washington
successfully persuaded Congress in November 1775 to increase officers’ salaries, even as radical
congressmen grumbled about the lack of patriotic virtue in the officer corps.
By November 1777, officers were again focused on their salaries as they settled into
winter quarters. Pay, promotions, pensions, and food became the major topics for discussion in
Washington’s dissatisfied army. Officers blamed their problems on an apathetic public and a
callous national legislature. As a camp doctor recorded in his journal, “the officers look upon
Congress with an evil eye, as men who are jealous of the army, who mean them no good, but
mean to divide and distress them.”207
Currency inflation and squabbles over promotions exacerbated the officers’ feelings of
resentment. The issue of pay grew more significant as officers received letters from their
families describing the escalating prices of everyday items. Officers knew their salaries could not
cope with the inflation. Many families actively encouraged their loved ones to return home to
help out with the family finances because a soldier’s pay was inadequate. Even when families
did not complain about money, some officers were tired of continually reaching into their own
pockets to provide themselves and sometimes their men with food and clothing when army

205

Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 86.
Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 47.
207
Kohn, “American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint,” in Reconsiderations on the
Revolutionary War: Selected Essays, 108.
206

86

supplies failed to materialize. Officers in debt or inadequately supplied blamed Congress and the
Commissary Department for their woes, and many at Valley Forge probably would have secretly
sympathized with Private Dennis Kennedy’s threat to desert “as soon as he got shoes” while
“cursing Congress.” 208
Pay helped officers provide for their families, but it also symbolized the civil authority’s
respect. Officers believed that Congress must pay them at a level commensurate with their
personal sacrifice for the war effort and that, by refusing to grant this idealized amount, Congress
purposefully injured the dignity of the officer corps.209 With prices continuing their climb, most
officers realized that an increase in their salary would not necessarily end their financial troubles.
They then discussed the possibility of receiving postbellum pensions, which would help them
pay off any debt incurred during the war. Pensions would signal civilian respect, while also
offering an opportunity for families to be financially secure if employment opportunities were
scarce after the war.
As usual, Congress used the winter months to analyze what had gone wrong during the
previous military campaigns and contemplate strategies for the upcoming season. After losing
the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, Washington wanted to institute new reforms in the
Continental Army. Congress also wanted an army that would be able to defeat British troops,
and they commissioned a committee to meet with Washington at Valley Forge to discuss
institutional change. Before the committee arrived, Washington asked his senior officers to
submit in writing their proposals and opinions for plans to solve the problems plaguing the
army. 210 A majority of the officers urged Washington to advocate half-pay pensions, reforms in
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the Quartermaster Department, and new rules for promotions because the February 1777
guidelines had left too much room for interpretation. Each senior officer warned Washington of
the dissatisfaction in the officer corps, where gentlemen of all ranks were threatening to resign if
conditions did not improve. Officers were frustrated with civilian authority at the local and
national levels; they wanted immediate action but had no idea that Congress was struggling on
some days just to reach a quorum so that it could conduct legislative business.211
Officers tended to resign in larger numbers during the winter months: the result of
dwelling on the miserable conditions of army life. Although the ordeal of Valley Forge marked
the increasing professionalization of the Continental Army, creating a unique martial pride
among soldiers and officers, there were nevertheless, a larger number of officer resignations that
winter than in any previous winter. 212 Officers cited various reasons for leaving the army,
including injuries sustained during the previous campaign, supply shortages, inflation, and the
length of the war. Some officers were tired of fighting for independence; others did not want to
train to become professional officers. Officers in both groups left the army.
Most of the letters of resignation submitted to Washington were shaped by the
eighteenth-century culture of honor. Officers deliberately styled their letters to highlight their
gentlemanly status, using key terms to explain why they needed to leave the army. They usually
gave one of three reasons for returning their commissions: personal health; no money to provide
for their family; or to protest injuries to their reputation. Officers were intent on explaining to
Washington why they had to resign, and they sought his approval by appealing to him as
gentlemen. Though the officers understood that they were fighting for independence, many still
pensions and the purchasing of commissions. On page 102, note 1, the editors of The Papers of George
Washington. Revolutionary War Series provide a list of officers who recommended reforms to Washington to
propose to the congressional committee.
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believed that they needed to protect their reputations at all cost. Cultural norms about the
importance of character and reputation triumphed over patriotic virtue in the army, but it did so,
as well, in the Continental Congress. Most of the letters of resignation tended to follow a similar
format, and Washington’s patience was stretched to its limit during the winter of 1777/78, when
hundreds of officers submitted their resignations.213
An officer’s letter of resignation did more than return a commission. Such a letter also
served as a conflict resolution tool for easing tensions. Many officers intended their letters to be
received as a formal notification of protest and a validation of their gentlemanly status in the
public sphere. The honor code encouraged gentlemen to resign when situations threatened their
gentility, and their letters of resignation reveal some of the hidden rules of the code. Historians
have tended to judge officers harshly for abandoning the army because of seemingly petty
grievances, but to the officers it was a matter of character and reputation, crucial elements in
their social standing.
Junior officers cared about how their letters of resignation were perceived by their
superior officers. They carefully analyzed the language used in their discharge papers and they
could read between the lines of Washington’s pen, understanding which of his words meant an
honorable discharge and which ones indicated merely a routine discharge. Lieutenant Colonel
Lott Brewster requested an honorable discharge in January 1778 because “he lacked the
Constitution to stand the fatigue of another Campaign.”214 Washington approved his request, but
Brewster complained to Washington’s aide-de-camp Richard Kidder Meade, who had written the
213
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letter accepting Brewster’s resignation, that “the Discharge does not mention that my Reasons
are thought Sufficient but that on my insisting for it as my Right it was Granted.”215 Brewster
was protesting to Meade about the treatment of his character in the discharge papers because he
was not granted an honorable discharge. In Brewster’s formal discharge papers he was merely
given a routine discharge from the army, and he was upset with Washington’s word choice.
Washington’s aide-de-camp added insult to injury with his final reply to Brewster’s protest about
the language of the discharge papers. Meade notified him that, “the Genl was by no means
satisfied with your reasons for leaving the Army, but as he knew of no power that he had to keep
an officer contrary to his will, that a discharge should be granted to you” but “had that discharge
expressed his approbation,” there would be “an inconsistency in his conduct.”216
Occasionally, Washington overtly expressed his disapproval in his replies to resignation
letters. Those replies reflected his frustration with the officer corps and how the culture of honor
complicated military affairs. Hoping to shame a colonel into staying with the army, Washington
wrote:
Officers wishing to retire have frequently observed, that there would be enough left, and
therefore that the want of their services could not be material. Those who reason thus
pay themselves but an ill compliment, as they evidently confess, that others posses more
virtue—more attachment to the great and common cause than they themselves do. If
there are hardships attending the service, why should not all equally share in them?217
Washington’s choice of words deliberately questioned the resigning officer’s character and
attempted to manipulate him into remaining with his troops. Washington also reiterated the
importance of patriotic virtue in coping with the hardships of military service. However, the
hardships of service were unequally distributed depending on the state regiment. Some
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Continental Army regiments suffered major difficulties due to problems encountered by their
local legislatures in pulling together supplies and shipping them to Valley Forge.218 While
Washington could become peevish on occasion after receiving multiple resignations in a day, he
grudgingly accepted that, according to society’s rules his officers had a right to resign their
commissions. He wanted gentlemen to serve in the officer corps and had to deal with the
consequences of the gentlemen’s code of honor.
The majority of the officers’ resignation letters in 1777/78 addressed the negative impact
of the war on their “private Affairs.” 219 As an officer explained to Washington, “I am not
possessed of an independent fortune & what little I have is much impair’d by my Continuance in
the Army.” 220 Officers complained that their “pay on the present establishment when compared
to the advanced prices of every Article of Life…is by no means adequate to support them in a
Character suitable to their Rank.”221 Most soldiers, particularly officers, in the Continental
Army struggled to maintain financial solvency because they were paid in a new currency that
depreciated rapidly.
Officers also frequently cited their health and constitution when resigning their
commission. Washington quickly granted honorable discharges to officers seriously wounded in
battle but was frustrated with other officers who sought to retire when they were not physically
harmed. Many complained about the hardships of camp and simply wished to be home with
their families. Senior generals had little patience with officers who were obviously resigning

218

Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 33-52. In an attempt to reform the Continental Army supply system,
Congress had made it the responsibility of state legislatures to provide for their own state regiments.
219
Edward Stevens to George Washington, January 24, 1778, The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary
War Series, 13:335. In, Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army, 103-110, and Kohn, “American Generals of the
Revolution: Subordination and Restraint” in Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War, 107-108, the authors
discuss how the resentment towards Congress always grew worse during the winter seasons.
220
Peter Scull to George Washington, January 7, 1778, The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary War
Series, 13:167
221
Ibid., 13:167, and Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 41-47.

91

because they were homesick. As the winter dragged on at Valley Forge, Washington became
increasingly reluctant to grant furloughs to junior officers because, once at home, many were
likely not to return to camp. Unfortunately, the policy of refusing furloughs created a backlash
when officers started resigning because they were not allowed to leave camp.222
Washington felt health was the least honorable reason for officers to return their
commissions. When officers resigned due to their unhappiness with camp conditions, it set a bad
precedent among their junior officers and the foot soldiers, who usually suffered even more
extreme hardships in winter quarters. But Washington realized it was better to discharge officers
than force them to remain in service when they were clearly unhappy.223 Though he let officers
resign, by March 1778 he was again frustrated enough with the proffered excuses to write
disparagingly to Major Isaac Beall: “I am at a loss to account how Gentlemen can reconcile such
an abandonment of the Public Interest, at this crisis of our Affairs, either with the principles of
honor or their duty to themselves and their Country.” 224 Washington pointedly condemned
Beall’s behavior, notifying the major that Washington did not think he had acted in a
gentlemanly manner. During the war, Washington attempted to broaden the meaning of the
traditional culture of honor to include patriotism in order to shame officers who were resigning.
Nevertheless, he knew he could not prevent them from using resignation to protest injuries to
their reputation or to leave the hardships of military service.
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Officers usually threatened to resign after being passed over for a promotion or because
of personality problems within the different states’ officer corps. Selfish though such reasons
may seem, they were hardly that. Promotions equaled public recognition of a gentleman’s
character in the eighteenth-century military. 225 Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston is the
perfect example of an officer who knows that he should not resign during the war because of
dissatisfaction over promotion, but who insists that it would be a grievous mortification to be
“commanded by those Formerly my Inferiors in Rank.” Livingston began his letter to
Washington by stating:
Could I at any Time have embraced an Opinion prevalent in the Army, That the Indignity
with which an Officer is treated, when by an Act of the Legislature or Ruling Power he is
superseded in Rank renders him justifiable in withdrawing himself from the Service of his
Country, I should have long since have followed the Example of Many others and
resigned my Commission.226
Livingston protested that he did not want to pursue that course of action but, should such a
situation arise, he would have no choice but to resign in order to protect his reputation.
Problems with promotions fueled Washington’s frustration with Congress because he
understood his officers’ sensitivity over rank. In December and early January, he fell victim to
speculation (known as the Conway Cabal) that Horatio Gates might replace him as commander
in chief. Historians agree that the Conway Cabal never existed in the minds of anyone but
Washington and his staff officers, though some congressmen were frustrated with Washington’s
demands for military reform in 1777.227 Studying the Conway Cabal reveals the flow of gossip
in the personal letters that passed between officers and politicians. News about the Cabal
225
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reached Congress when John Laurens, Washington’s aide-de-camp, wrote to his father, Henry
Laurens, president of the Continental Congress, asking if radical delegates were plotting to
replace Washington with Gates. Speculation about a cabal reveals Washington’s own sensitivity
concerning his reputation as a general. Lord Stirling started the controversy by passing along a
comment in a letter to Washington, allegedly written by Brigadier General Thomas Conway to
Horatio Gates, stating: “Heaven has been determined to save your Country; or a weak General
and bad Councellors would have ruind it.”228 Sensitivity to how others perceived one’s character
influenced most of the revolutionaries’ decision-making process during the war.
Officers warned Washington that “we are exceeding sorry to say that in this army no
regular Line of promotion has ever been observed. Promotions without any apparent reason
have taken place, which reflect disgrace & dishonor upon us.”229 For these officers, the 1777
guidelines had left too much room for interpretation and recent promotions had upset several
brigadier generals. They felt “unprecedented & surprising promotions are frequently taking
place in favour of persons who have never distinguished themselves as soldiers, and who have
nothing more to boast of it in the present contest, than that they have modestly trumpeted their
own praise to Congress.” 230 To eliminate their grievances they proposed that Congress create a
special commission “to fix the rank of the officer upon a proper footing, and to settle a regular
line of promotion, not to be departed from, but in cases of extraordinary merit, or upon great
political principles.” 231 By mentioning political principles they acknowledged that congressmen
felt pressured to commission foreign officers, such as Thomas Conway and the Marquis de
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Lafayette, to please potential foreign allies. Some senior American generals believed that French
officers received preference in promotions because they were not subject to the state quota
problems. Resentment plagued every congressional decision to promote officers. As Elbridge
Gerry complained, “[B]ut what has been the consequence of every appointment of generals
officers made by Congress? If it did not suit the whole army, opposition has taken place, and
reduced Congress to the necessity of asserting the rights of themselves and their constituents.”232
Though some members of Congress may have grown frustrated with the problems relating to
promotions, others understood the officers’ sensitivity about rank.
Officers attempted to portray their resentment over promotions as a reasonable response
to slights injuring their character. “Resentment,” as Nicole Eustace explains in Passion is the
Gale, “resulted from a man’s rational appraisal that the words or actions of another menaced his
honor and social standing.” 233 A gentleman should always maintain control over his feelings and
passions, which is why it is rare to read a letter in which Washington loses his temper.
Brigadier General George Weedon’s letter of resignation used carefully selected language
to highlight his resolute and gentlemanly resentment of another general’s promotion. He
maintained that he had “coolly and impartially considered every Circumstance attending this
extraordinary change. I have advised with many friends on the Subject.” Weedon wants
Washington to know that his feelings are tempered by reason and that he was not jealous, which
was a petty emotion, but, rather, rightly resentful.234 Weedon had also reached out to other
revolutionaries for the purpose of mediation, hoping to see if there was any chance for him to
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receive a promotion. But, after learning that there would be no possibility of promotion, he had
decided “with the Coroberating Opinion of many of your friends, as well as my own,” that it
would be inconsistent “with my honor [other] than to refuse Service under those that have been
so long my Junior Officers.”235 Weedon’s letter echoed the language and logic used by Colonel
Henry Beekman Livingston and numerous other officers.
In an effort to staunch the flow of resignations, Washington met with a congressional
committee in mid-January to urge reforms that directly addressed officers’ complaints about
indebtedness, health, and injustices in the granting of promotions. Prior to meeting with
congressional delegates, Washington solicited the opinion of many senior officers about how to
repair the problems in the Continental Army. He compiled their suggestions into a long letter to
be submitted to a small congressional committee visiting Valley Forge, detailing military issues
that needed to be addressed and offered a few potential remedies.236 Washington was focused on
keeping the officers happy and in the army. He hoped the new congressional resolutions would
ease some of the complaints in the officer corps by showing that congressmen valued the
officers’ service. In the opening paragraph Washington explicitly states that the officers’
grievances need to be resolved first “since without officers no army can exist.” As a
conservative gentleman, Washington wanted to use the months at Valley Forge to create a truly
professional army capable of defeating the British army in set battles, and this meant new
standards of discipline and drill would be implemented. Influenced by his conservative social
principles, Washington believed that officers inspired soldiers to perform better through their

235

Ibid., 14:503.
George Washington to A Continental Congress Camp Committee, January 29, 1778, The Papers of George
Washington. Revolutionary War Series, 13:376-404. For more information on the committee at camp during the
winter of 1777/78, see: Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington, 165-168; and Burnett, The Continental
Congress, 298-316.
236

96

own valorous conduct. 237 He wanted officers to stop fixating on their petty complaints about
rank and pay and make inculcating discipline in the troops their priority. Understanding that the
code of honor made it difficult to ignore the perceived slights, Washington repeatedly
highlighted in his letter the importance of creating new measures to placate the officers. In
hopes of preventing congressional delegates from lightly dismissing his opinions, he carefully
explained his reasoning behind all the suggested reforms.
The first proposed reform advocated establishing a half-pay and “pensionary” plan for
officers and their families. The prominence given to half-pay suggests that Washington believed
that this was the crucial reform in preventing more resignations. He understood that some
delegates in Congress opposed half-pay plans. In mid-January, Elbridge Gerry notified
Washington that “there are many weighty Arguments against” half-pay, “such as the Infant State
of the Country, it’s Aversion to placemen & pensioners.”238 Gerry’s stated opposition to halfpay shaped Washington’s argument to the Committee at Camp. He knew he had to convince
Congress that the officers were not being petty but behaving according to the rules of eighteenthcentury society. He described the reality of human nature with startling insight:
Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or
advantage, to the common good. It is in vain to exclaim against the depravity of human
nature on this account—the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved
it, and we must, in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make
it otherwise. 239
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Washington’s candid analysis of the human psyche would have upset many of the radical
delegates, who believed that public virtue by itself was sufficient to ensure the stability of a
republican society.
Washington continually emphasized that officers wanted and needed public recognition
of their wartime sacrifice. If officers believed the public appreciated them, then they would be
willing for fight harder and they would be proud of and satisfied with their current rank, and not
petition so frequently for a promotion. Washington argued that half-pay provided that
recognition and respect because it meant that Congress and the general public appreciated the
officers’ sacrifice and would reward them with pensions for their service in the Continental
Army. Washington never suggested a pay raise for the soldiers because the continental currency
was depreciating so rapidly that inflation would have nullified any increase in pay. But a
pension could be used to assure officers’ creditors that they would eventually receive payment
after the war. 240 Still striving to be the model revolutionary, Washington proclaimed that he
urged the adoption of this measure only to retain officers, since he would not “receive the small
benefit from the establishment, and can have no other inducement for proposing it, than a full
conviction of its utility and propriety.”241 Pensions proved to be a major source of contention
between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army until the end of the war. Officers
insisted on their rights to receive pensions, while Congress worried about creating a professional
military social class after the war. By arguing for pensions, officers made half-pay a personal
issue and grew resentful when Congress debated the half-pay proposal for several months.
Having addressed the question of pensions, Washington turned to the touchy matters of
rank and promotion. He warned the congressional committee “that irregular promotions have
240
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also been a pregnant source of uneasiness, discord and perplexity in this army. They have been
the cause of numerous bickerings and resignations among the officers, and have occasioned
infinite trouble.” 242 But, while Washington knew that new rules were needed, he still faced the
same problems that had plagued Congress in February 1777. Officers wanted simple guidelines
established, with no room for interpretation, a position that left seniority as the best option for
determining the recipients and timing of promotions. Washington thought otherwise, believing
that, should seniority be the only rule for promotion, officers would be left in “listless security,
certain of enjoying the honors and emoluments of progressive rank, let their conduct be ever so
undeserving.” 243 He wanted regulations that emphasized seniority while allowing merit to factor
into some extraordinary cases. Moreover, he insisted that state quotas should no longer influence
congressional decisions in promoting senior generals. His recommendation was quite specific:
“[T]hat promotion should be regimental to the rank of Captain inclusively, and from that, in the
line of the state to the rank of Brigadier inclusively; proceeding, from that, in the line of the army
at large.” 244 Ultimately the new congressional guidelines for promotions were shaped by the
military’s preferences. But, the amorphous concept of “merit,” still unresolved, would continue
to provoke discontentment among officers.
Washington’s letter to the congressional committee presented the problems plaguing the
army in 1777/78 and emphasized key solutions to reduce the officers’ resentment against the
national legislature. Having received the army’s demands, delegates fretted about implementing
a half-pay pension. The emphasis on public virtue, candidly discussed by Washington in his
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letters and analyzed by Royster in A Revolutionary People at War, was fading as the reality of a
protracted war settled in at both Valley Forge, and York, Pennsylvania, during winter quarters.
Thomas McKean, a representative from Delaware, arrived in York in late January and
was disgruntled to find the town an expensive place in which to live. Attending Congress, he
found “only nine States represented, and, including myself, but eighteen members, though five
now at the camp, and some others are expected in a few days.”245 When Congress
ignominiously fled Philadelphia just ahead of advancing British troops in late September, many
delegates had seized the opportunity to return home, granting themselves a furlough from the
national legislature. Henry Laurens, president of the Continental Congress, during the winter
and spring months of 1777/78, believed fear “had operated upon many minds.”246 Delegates
who served that winter in York were worried about “the excessive expence attending very bad
fare in this Town and partly of a sudden surprize by the Enemy, and certainly had Sir William
Howe been a man of enterprize he might have possessed himself of Congress.”247 Fear blinded
some of the delegates from realizing that they shared the same grievances as the officer corps.
Many of them also cited health and their personal financial affairs as their reasons for leaving
Congress.
Congressional resignations share many similarities with officer resignations, but
historians have rarely discussed how often congressmen resigned during the war. Jack Rakove
in The Beginnings of National Politics argues that historians have focused on discussing
delegates who served multiple terms in Congress because they left a long paper trail of their
participation and do not challenge the image of patriotic congressmen. 248 Historians ignore the
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problems of explaining why the Continental Congress experienced a high rate of delegate
turnover. As Richard Henry Lee observed to his brother, “[T]he members of Congress are so
perpetually changing that it is of little use to give you their Names.” 249 Rakove asserts that
serving in the national legislature placed a burden on married gentlemen with families to support
since their salary did not stretch very far when inflation struck in 1777. Also, many delegates
did not want to live in Philadelphia, which was far away from their families and careers.
Congressional resignations occurred more sporadically than officer resignations, and so
resigning congressmen did not draw as much attention as officers, who resigned en masse, apart
from a few disdainful comments in their colleagues’ personal letters. Officers tended to resign
during the winter when not on active campaign, but congressmen resigned from legislative duty
at any time of the year, whether Congress was in or out of session. Some legislators did not even
write official notices but simply indicated their resignation by their absence from the
congressional floor. Then they would notify their state legislatures that new candidates were
needed to fill their seat. The problems of absenteeism and unofficial resignations were so serious
in May 1778 that Congress attempted to establish “rules for the better conducting business” and
resolved that “[N]o member shall leave Congress without permission of Congress or of his
constituents.” 250 Perhaps frustration with their own absent colleagues influenced delegates to
harshly condemn officers for wanting to resign their commissions. Although Congress passed
new legislation stipulating that at least nine states had to be represented to conduct business,
delegates could do nothing to physically prevent their fellow revolutionaries from resigning.
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In resigning, congressmen cited the same concerns about their health and private affairs
that the officers offered to justify their resignations.251 William Ellery of Rhode Island, after
voting repeatedly against establishing a half-pay pension for officers, wrote to his governor to
request that his replacement be sent to York as quickly as possible. Ellery refused to stand for
re-election, arguing that his health “and the unhappy situation of my family require that I should
be at home as soon as possible.”252 In citing pecuniary reasons for his resignation, Ellery was no
different from many officers who attempted to leave the army. Nonetheless, Ellery condemned
the measure that would have provided an incentive for officers to continue serving.
Other delegates resigned to preserve their legal or business careers, some simply grew
frustrated with the congressional workload and the political maneuverings at the national
level. 253 As Congress grew smaller, personality clashes among its members became more
frequent and rancorous. Moreover, many congressmen disliked the reality of political bargaining
and the difficulty of getting thirteen state legislatures to agree on important issues.254 Because
Congress relied on committees to conduct legislative business, each of the few delegates present
in York found himself assigned to more committees thereby fraying already strained tempers.
John Mathews of South Carolina, vented his frustration with Congress to Thomas Bee, the
speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, writing, “I have wrote to you for leave
to come home in December; for God's sake procure it for me, & I'll be dam'd if ever you catch
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me here again.” 255 He continued his complaint, stating that “those who have dispositions for
Jangling, & are fond of displaying their Rhetorical abilities, let them come. I never was so sick
of any thing in my life.” 256 Although his characterization was perhaps a bit overdramatic, many
delegates shared Mathews’s frustration with the structure of Congress. Gouverneur Morris
apologized to Washington for the delay in passing all of his suggested reforms for the army by
explaining that “had the several Members which compose our multifarious Body only been wise
enough Our Business would long since have been compleated.”257 He sarcastically observed that
“our superior Abilities or the Desire of appearing to possess them lead us to such exquisite
Tediousness of Debate that the most precious Moments pass unheeded away like vulgar
Things.” 258 Tempers also flared in Congress when major issues were debated. In the winter of
1777/78, representatives of nine states discussed the guidelines for promotions, rules for
exchanging prisoners, and the half-pay pension for officers.
The debate over establishing half-pay pensions lasted for two months, aggravating
congressmen and frustrating the army. The debate was drawn out because it touched on an
ideological nerve in the delegates. The half-pay pension was a practical proposal by Washington
to help retain elite gentlemen in the army. But the proposal forced all delegates to confront the
possibility that patriotism might not be enough to win the war.
For many radical delegates, the half-pay petition raised the specter of a permanent
standing army because officers would receive a government stipend for perhaps the rest of their
life. The creation of a separate and distinct group of citizens trained in military drills could
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threaten the government, should they become displeased with its policies. The histories of Rome
and seventeenth-century England haunted the radical delegates from New England, who were the
most outspoken opponents of the measure. Henry Laurens of South Carolina, president of
Congress, joined the radicals in their voluble opposition to half-pay pensions and wrote many
letters during the two-month debate, sharing his opinion about why the pensions could set a
dangerous precedent. Radicals worried that, if they gave in to the military’s pressure this time,
then what would happen when the next contested issue arose? Laurens wrote to Washington that
“Tis an unhappy dilemma to which we seem to be reduced—provide for your Officers in terms
dictated to you or lose all the valuable Soldiers among them.”259 Laurens used “dictated” to
emphasize his belief that officers were deliberately and unduly influencing the legislative
process. He, however, had appointed himself defender of congressional prerogative. He even
warned Washington, that “Republicans will at a proper time withdraw a Grant which shall
appear to have been extorted.”260 Such stinging words of criticism provided officers with plenty
to complain about and more officers resigned when they realized that Congress was resistant to
granting pensions.
Because emotions were running high among the few delegates in York and the vote was
evenly split between conservative and radical delegates, conservatives drafted specific legislative
rules for their consideration of half-pay pensions. 261 Conservatives wrote the special rules to
prevent radicals from killing the measure with every parliamentary tool at their disposal.
Radicals hoped to send the proposal to the individual state legislatures, where other politicians
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upset with the military’s threatening behavior would surely defeat it. Conservatives hoped to
keep the proposal in Congress, but they agreed to the special rules as a compromise to keep halfpay on the legislative docket. Congress conducted multiple votes on the half-pay measure as
delegates built coalitions to carry and bury the measure.
Thomas Burke of North Carolina provided a succinct description of the ideological divide
between delegates over the pension plan.262 According to him, conservative delegates agreed
with Washington’s proposal and argued, “[T]hat it is unjust to sacrifice the time and property of
the men whose lives are every day exposed for us without any prospect of compensation, while
so many who are protected by their valor and exertions are amassing princely fortunes.”263
Conservatives worried that the army was rapidly disbanding because officers felt insulted by
congressional policies. Also, conservatives wanted to preserve the elite officer corps and they
believed half-pay pensions would provide officers with an “interest” in their commissions. That
is, to retain officers, they were willing to provide them with financial benefits after the war,
thereby giving them a tangible reason for continuing their military service. For radical delegates,
though, to provide any revolutionary with an “interest” perverted the spirit of ’75 because
“Officers in the Army are and ought to be actuated by the principles of patriotism and public
spirit, and ought to disdain motives of private interest.” 264
Radical delegates worried precedents would be set if they approved the half-pay pension
plan. Burke recorded that radicals questioned whether Congress even possessed the power to
grant pensions without permission of the states. Many delegates believed that Congress only had
the authority to prosecute the war and that pensions for life were beyond the bounds of national
authority. Conservatives retorted that the “want of power” was no better an argument against
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half-pay “than against borrowing money which must be paid and its interest in the mean time
kept up by revenues which must continue long beyond the War.”265 They insisted that Congress
had already seized the authority to borrow money on behalf of the United States so the limits on
congressional power could be stretched again. They concluded that pensions were necessary to
win the war and were willing to pay officers a small stipend for life to achieve independence.
The issue of half-pay actually brought to light the problem of what to do with the army
after the end of the war. Delegates had not discussed the situation before because they had been
concerned with recruiting more soldiers for the half-filled battalions. In Washington’s half-pay
proposal to the congressional committee, he suggested that the officer corps serve as a reserve
military guard, allowing officers potentially to supplant the militia system. Radicals became
immediately suspicious that the Continental Army wanted to remain a standing army in
peacetime. Fear of professional soldiers prevented most of the radicals from realizing that few
officers wished to interfere or participate in politics and that most wanted to return home. The
pensions would simply allow them to pay off their wartime debts.
Radicals argued that enough officers “will always be found to command our Troops who
will deem the service of their Country and its gratitude a very ample compensation.”266 In
saying so, radicals essentially told the officers that they were not behaving honorably and that
Congress accepted their resignations. Laurens offered an even harsher evaluation of the officers’
conduct in a letter to Washington:
How superior are many of the Gentlemen now in my contemplation, to the acceptance of
an half pay, contributed to by Widows & Orphans of Soldiers who had bled & died by
their sides, shackled with a condition of being excluded from the Privilege of serving in
Offices in common with their fellow Citizens, bated in every House of Assembly as the
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Drones & incumbrances of Society, pointed at by Boys & Girls- there goes a Man who
robs me every Year of part of my pittance.267
Laurens’s vivid description was designed to shame the officers by painting them as leeches on
republican society. Laurens had excused Washington from this behavior but Washington must
have had to maintain tight control over his temper when he read this description of his
subordinates. Laurens’s letter was a part of his private correspondence with Washington but it
was shaped by his conversations with other radical delegates who resented the army’s insistence
on passing the pension measure.
Congressional condemnations would have infuriated the officer corps if they had heard
the debate, but conservative delegates counseled patience to their friends in the military as they
tried to gather enough votes to establish lifetime half-pay pensions. Gouverneur Morris
apologetically wrote to Washington that “I expected before this to have written to you ‘Provision
is made for the American Officers’ but that Thief of Time Procrastination hath kept it off from
Time to Time.” 268 He subtly criticized the fears of the radical delegates, saying that “it is
astonishing that Congress who certainly are not without sufficient Apprehension should at so
critical a Moment as the present be so supine but this is human Nature and we must bear it.”269
Sanguine though Morris tried to appear in his letter, conservatives were in fact, scrounging for
every vote in favor of half-pay at York. In fact, four days prior to writing his placating letter to
Washington, Morris had been out of town. William Duer had pleaded with Morris to return
because “from a want of Representation in the State of New York, and several other
Embarrassments we cannot bring as many members absolutely essential to our Safety, without
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you, especially the Establishment for the Army.”270 Emotions were running so high over
establishing pensions and guidelines for exchanging prisoners of war, that on April 12 members
drafted a signed statement promising “to meet punctually at the hour of adjournment, to support
order and preserve decency and politeness.”271 They also agreed to speak only twice and not for
more than ten minutes during a debate, unless Congress was convened as a committee of the
whole house. Sixteen members signed the document but Samuel Chase later struck out his name
because he felt that several signers had violated the contract.272
On March 26, conservatives had introduced the first official resolution for half-pay
pensions and, a month later, Washington still waited to hear if the resolution had passed.
Writing to Gouverneur Morris, he pleaded for congressional action: “I wish you could announce
the provision for Officers concluded. It seems to me the basis, of all our operations. Resignation
after resignation is taking place.” 273 Using the guidelines established early during the debate,
congressmen argued about congressional authority and whether the idea of pensions was just and
constitutional. Half-pay contradicted the radicals’ reliance on public virtue to win the war, and
their insistence on that point made the legislative battle bitter and emotional. With the coming of
spring, travel became easier and delegates regularly postponed votes on the half-pay resolution,
hoping to earn support (and votes) from returning delegates. On May 11, Gouverneur Morris
confided to Robert Morris that “half Pay cannot be postponed (for now we are the Postponers)
beyond to Morrow morning,” meaning Robert Morris needed to return to Congress before 11:00
that morning to help swing the vote in the conservatives’ favor.274
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The official May 15 resolution that granted half-pay to the officers was a compromise
between conservatives and radicals. Henry Laurens described the negotiating process to a close
friend, stating that “I was Witness to many excellent and some violent strokes in parliamentary
Manuevre a long Report of a Committee, ridden by amendments and new Resolves.”275 The
amendments and new resolves stipulated that officers would receive half-pay for a period of
seven years, instead of for life. Conservatives agreed to this modification to prevent the
resolution from being sent for ratification to the individual states where it would never pass.
Radicals compromised on seven years, knowing that Congress possessed the authority to amend
any law it passed. Delegates could rescind half-pay pensions in a few years when the threat of
mass resignations no longer pressured the civil authority.276 The seven-year limit also chastised
the officers. Delegates wanted to ensure that the military understood that they still possessed the
power to limit the military’s demands. The resolution’s language grudgingly bestowed a
pension. Also, the infantry were offered a bounty of eighty dollars for serving for the duration of
the war. 277 The pension probably did prevent some resignations within the officer corps, but the
underlying problem of officers’ desire for public recognition was not resolved. Officers still
resented congressional suspicion of their patriotism and their efforts to inculcate institutional
pride in the Continental Army.
The procedural odyssey of half-pay did not end in May 1778. The issue was reintroduced in the summer and fall of 1780 after the continental currency collapsed completely.278
Officers again threatened to resign unless Congress extended the half-pay pensions for life.
Washington supported their demands because of the financial strain and anger expressed by the
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officers in their petitions. Delegates prepared to settle in for another long debate over submitting
to pressure from the officer corps when word reached them of Benedict Arnold’s treachery.
Arnold’s betrayal shocked both the Congress and the army, spurring Congress to quickly grant
officers half-pay for life on October 21, 1780. The legislators wanted to prevent other officers
from becoming susceptible to British bribes. By acceding to half-pay for life, Congress gave
officers the public recognition and reward that they had been demanding since July 1775. Of
course, half-pay was not permanently settled in 1780. Instead it was a major irritant in promoting
the Newburgh conspiracy in 1783.
The debate over pensions revealed how officers and congressmen used resignations as a
tool to resolve conflicts over honor during the war. Resignations allowed gentlemen to walk
away honorably from a situation that challenged their reputation. Revolutionaries in the army
and Congress used resignation to signal a protest or to escape the hardships of service. The
culture of honor shaped a revolutionary’s decision-making process, and historians should
recognize that resignations were a socially sanctioned practice. The winter of 1777/78 exposed
anew the deep ideological divide between radical and conservative revolutionaries’ visions for an
independent United States and the best methods for winning the war. Radicals resented patriots
who resigned for pecuniary reasons, and that was why they disliked the half-pay pension
measure. They believed patriotism and a willingness to sacrifice all provided Americans with a
unique passion that made them capable of defeating the British army. Conservatives would have
preferred that patriotism win the day, but they also accepted the fact that military officers wanted
public recognition and the promise of future financial stability in return for their service in the
army. The code of honor provided guidelines for a revolutionary’s conduct during these
turbulent times, and a gentleman had three tools at his disposal to deal with affronts to his
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character: mediation; resignation; and affairs of honor. When mediation and resignation failed to
resolve an issue, some revolutionaries turned to affairs of honor to preserve their reputations.
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Chapter 4:
Are you sir, a gentleman?
“It is the dignity of America, not the dignity of Congress, we [officers] are fighting to support.
Treat us justly, reward us for our services, and don’t let our characters suffer from every idle
report.”
John Sullivan, 1777 279
In June 1777, frustrated by rumors that certain congressional delegates were slandering
his name during debate, Muster Master Gunning Bedford sent a note to New Jersey
Congressman Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant initiating an affair of honor. Bedford used formulaic
wording in his text to emphasize the seriousness of his deep resentment of Sergeant’s behavior.
He stated that Sergeant was guilty of reflecting “illiberally” on his character in a public forum
“& refusing to give me that satisfaction, which a gentleman is intitled to; without further
ceremony I beg you will meet me at 6 o'clock on Friday morning at the Center-House, armed
with a Pair of Pistols.”280 Bedford believed that the only way to rehabilitate his reputation and
prove his honor was to challenge Sergeant to a duel. Sergeant, however, did not accept
Bedford’s request for a dawn appointment and instead offered a very different interpretation of
the culture of honor. Sergeant believed that congressional privilege protected any words he
might have spoken concerning Bedford’s character. The exigencies of a war forced genteel
Americans to negotiate changing interpretations of the traditional culture of honor. Were affairs
of honor a permissible means of gaining satisfaction from an insult to a gentleman’s reputation,
and what words or actions could be construed as insults on the new national stage?
The term affair of honor describes the rituals and negotiations that accompanied a
challenge to a duel. 281 Most challenges were resolved before the participants met at dawn,
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especially during the American Revolution, but every participant knew that death was a potential
consequence of defending his character. While most revolutionaries would have agreed that
“honor was an all-or-nothing proposition,” they disagreed about what constituted an injury to a
person’s reputation. 282 The honor culture became subject to new social and political
considerations. 283 Peers began negotiating the new codes and, not surprisingly, radical and
conservative revolutionaries offered conflicting interpretations that revealed the wide gulf
between officers’ and congressional delegates’ views on the honor code.
The negotiation process centered on a new discussion concerning public versus private
character and raised an important question: did politics have to be personal? Could
revolutionaries question the performance of their peers without insulting a gentleman’s
character? The traditional interpretation of the culture of honor held that a man’s public
behavior and private behavior were inseparable and that every action was a demonstration of
gentility. Following the complex honor code proved that the elite were the best social and
political leaders. Thus, adhering to the code conferred legitimacy on them. As battles were lost
during the war and patriots resigned, revolutionaries struggled with how to question the decisions
of individuals without insulting their honor. Some revolutionaries believed that, instead of
honorable behavior being the key characteristic by which to measure a gentleman’s status, it
should be patriotic fervor, competence, or an adherence to the concept of republican virtue.
Radicals believed that the war offered an opportunity to distance American society from
aristocratic and corrupt British customs. Instead, patriots should attempt to live virtuously for
the new republic. Honor would be calculated by one’s devotion to a free government, instead of
282
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wearing the proper clothing or displaying good manners. Radical reasoning rankled
conservatives, who believed that the combination of the culture of honor and elite authority
would provide stability during a time of tumult and transition. Conservatives felt that even
though honor disputes provoked many tensions during the war, the code provided a common
social language that cut through regional differences and set a communal standard for the future
leaders of America. It was expected that the young gentlemen serving in the Continental Army
would eventually become politicians and civic leaders.
Delegates used the guidelines of the honor code as a foundation for the legislative
structure of the Continental Congress. The emphasis on committee systems and open-floor
debate allowed every gentleman’s voice to be heard in order to prevent injured feelings.
Delegates also hoped to use committees and debate to combat the growth of factions which they
believed were detrimental to the political system. In 1774 and 1775, the new national legislature
brought together different ideological perspectives and congressmen split into radical and
conservative groupings based on their different views about the importance of the honor code
and of declaring independence from Great Britain. Legislators acknowledged the diversity of
opinions in Philadelphia by instituting and revering congressional privilege. Legislative
privilege protected freedom of speech during debates. Politicians thought that they should be
allowed to express any opinion during the course of debate and not fear prosecution.284
Congressional privilege was a controversial issue in the eighteenth-century honor culture
because words could easily damage a gentleman’s reputation. Politicians wanted the legislative
floor to be an exception to the code, but many challenges were nevertheless issued because of
opinions expressed in that public forum. Supposedly, Congress had sworn its members to
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secrecy by having delegates promise not to repeat any comments made during open debate. But
the pull of colonial gossip and friendship networks proved too strong. Gentlemen were
frequently informed when congressmen criticized their actions or decisions, a violation of the
promise of secrecy and congressional privilege. This flow of information created many of the
initial problems in the Schuyler-Gates controversy and was the reason Gunning Bedford issued a
challenge to Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant for words spoken by the latter in Congress.
As congressmen tried to negotiate congressional privilege and the demands of
reputational politics, the military defended the strict guidelines of genteel honor to prove their
elite status and bring order to the chaos of military camps. The difference in interpretation
between the civil authority and military officials of the stringent requirements of honor created a
volatile combination. 285 While some radical revolutionaries were trying to fashion a new
American culture, most officers clung ever more tightly to the strictures of an honor code
influenced by their reading of eighteenth-century military manuals. These manuals implicitly
encouraged duels as a way for officers to prove their elite status and character. Officers’
conception of the culture of honor inculcated sensitivity over rank and promotion.
Revolutionaries believed public recognition equated with respectability. State legislatures
conferred recognition and respect on civilians by electing them to serve as congressional
delegates in Philadelphia. Officers craved national renown, as well. When officers were denied
promotions or were notified that their reputations were being disparaged on the congressional
floor, they grew upset and spoke to their friends about the options available to them to preserve
their honor. Communication with friends was a key component of the mediation process, usually
the first step in resolving an honor dispute. General Weedon’s letter to George Washington in
the spring of 1778 highlights how military officers reached out to their friendship networks.
285

Carp, To Starve an Army at Pleasure, 155-165.

115

Weedon informed Washington that, because he felt he had been dishonored by a congressional
decision, he had “advised with many friends on the Subject.”286 After conferring with them to
discuss his options, Weedon resigned his commission to protest the injury to his reputation.
Weedon chose resignation because he had no direct outlet for his anger; there was no specific
congressional delegate to challenge to a duel. If, however, an officer did decide that a duel was
the only appropriate action to preserve his reputation, then an affair of honor began.
Duels were a controversial element of the culture of honor and many gentlemen
disagreed over whether duels were the apotheosis of elite status or a foolhardy ritual that cut
short too many lives. Historians have discussed the divergent views of northern and southern
colonists about the supremacy of the duel in resolving disputes. 287 But, as Joanne Freeman in
Affairs of Honor argues, though many gentlemen may have condemned dueling in the abstract,
when faced with a direct challenge, they participated in the ritual to save their public
character. 288 Delegates banned the practice of dueling in the original Articles of War to prevent
unnecessary casualties. They knew that the close confines of camp could provoke many petty
disputes. A year later, Edward Rutledge of South Carolina proposed altering the Articles of War
to allow for duels. He wrote, “I proposed to strike out that Article which prevents the sending of
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Challenges, and pressed it as a Measure that would tend to make their officers Gentlemen, or at
least induce them to act as such, whilst in Company with Gentlemen.”289 Consistent with
eighteenth-century mores, Rutledge believed that knowing a duel was the ultimate outcome of
disparaging a person’s reputation forced men to act more genteelly.
While dueling was technically illegal in the Continental Army, many junior officers
engaged in affairs of honor throughout the course of the war. Small glimpses of officers dueling
can be gathered from Washington’s General Orders in which he either discussed the courtsmartial convened to punish duelers or reiterated that the Articles of War prohibited dueling.290
Major factors that increased the number of duels were soldiers living in close quarters and
engaging in heavy drinking. Lieutenant James McMichael recorded in his diary that “our
soldiers drank freely of spirituous liquors. They have chiefly got a disorder, which at camp is
called the Barrel Fever, which differs in its effects from any other fever—its concomitants are
black eyes and bloody noses.” 291 Hard liquor filled soldiers with liquid courage for the
battlefield as well as for the dueling grounds. But, many soldiers, after they sobered up, offered
the proper apologies to end an affair of honor before shots were exchanged.
The culture of honor stipulated strict guidelines for conducting affairs of honor and
gentlemen fought duels to prove that they were worthy of their elite status. Gentlemen believed
honor was worth their lives. According to the rules, challenges should never be offered in the
heat of the moment but instead reflect a calm, rational consideration fueled by resolute
resentment. The eighteenth-century code dictated that a gentleman should never want to kill his
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opponent. Killing in a duel was not murder but, rather, a rarefied ritual highlighting the social
superiority of the gentry. 292 In fact, an army court dropped the charges of dueling against
Captain Silleron because he had issued his challenge “immediately, as it proceeded from the
instantaneous Resentment of an incensed Gentleman and was not sent on cool reflection,” which
the code of honor demanded. The court-martial was therefore of the “opinion that Captain
Silleron has not been guilty of a breach of the Article of War which prohibits sending challenges
and do determine that he does not merit Censure.” 293 In other words, senior officers believed
Silleron had not issued a true challenge since he had not followed the proper protocol of an affair
of honor. The officers of the court understood the technical details of a formal challenge and
believed that Silleron had not acted in the proper spirit of a gentleman. In deciding as they did,
however, they denied him his genteel status.
Though Congress had declared dueling illegal, officers found loopholes by which to
escape prosecution. Toleration of the loopholes indicated the army’s willingness to abide by the
terms of the honor code in spite of legal sanctions. Washington, as commander-in-chief, tacitly
encouraged the use of duels by rarely punishing officers for affairs of honor.294 Custom dictated
that duels should be carried out discreetly to avoid the attention of others until the conflict was
resolved. Officers were only prosecuted if caught flagrantly violating the Articles of War or if a
duelist died. Patrick Henry interceded on behalf of a family friend who had killed his opponent
in a duel, asking Washington if the junior officer would face prosecution upon returning to the
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army. Rather than condemning the duel, Washington replied that, “If Mr White returns to the
Army I must be under the necessity of taking notice of his unhappy Affair with Mr Greene—I
cannot say whether the friends of the deceased will appear to prosecute, if they do not, I shall
have discharged my duty and the thing will pass off.” 295 Occasionally Washington publicly
denounced dueling in his general orders, most likely because dueling depleted the officer corps.
In January 1778, he worried that granting pardons to duelists condoned their behavior and he
reiterated in official orders that affairs of honor were “directly repugnant to our own Articles of
War but discouraged by all Military Nations as subversive of good order, discipline and
harmony.” 296
Even as Washington proclaimed dueling illegal, several of his aides-de-camp engaged in
affairs of honor to preserve Washington’s public reputation. As commander-in-chief,
Washington presented a façade that adhered to the Articles of War crafted by congressional
committee, but privately he accepted that challenges were necessary to protect a man’s
reputation. Washington’s aides-de-camp and junior officers actually engaged in duels on his
behalf. While the aides-de-camp most likely hero-worshipped Washington and were willing to
sacrifice their lives for him, Washington also represented their opportunity for power and
prestige. 297 Their military fortunes were tied to Washington’s success. If he had been replaced
as commander-in-chief, they would have lost access to power because Gates already had his
coterie of officers to whom he gave preference and promotion. Colonel John Laurens, the son of
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Henry Laurens, a former president of the Continental Congress, fought a duel with Major
General Charles Lee over Lee speaking about “General Washington in the grossest and most
opprobrious terms of personal abuse.” 298 Brigadier General John Cadwalader also initiated an
affair of honor with Major General Thomas Conway because of remarks that Conway had made
about Washington to Gates in a private letter. Cadwalader shot Conway through the mouth and
bragged that, although the duel did not end in death, he had “stopped the damned rascal’s lying
tongue at any rate.”299
The confrontation between Colonel Daniel Morgan and Richard Peters, the secretary of
the Board of War, discussed earlier, is another example of officers’ loyalty to Washington, their
commander-in-chief. To Colonel Morgan, Peters was the symbol of the Conway Cabal and one
of the sources of the rumors that Congress was attempting to replace Washington with Horatio
Gates. After that confrontation with Morgan, Peters, exasperated, fumed that “I don’t see how
any Man of Feeling or Sentiment can continue in a public Department where every measure is
looked upon with a jaundiced Eye and of course all Mistakes are magnified into Sins political
and moral.” 300 Peters’s complaint reflected a growing problem in Congress because delegates
who wished to discuss openly why the war was going so poorly, found it difficult to do so
without stirring up resentment in the military. Of course, trying to divorce a gentleman’s public
reputation from his private character was not something every delegate wished to see
accomplished.
Proposals to replace the honor code with the principles of republican virtue as the key
guideline for conduct prompted considerable debate in both Congress and the army. Should the
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military be disciplined for challenging congressmen over words spoken in debate? Did
congressional privilege create a loophole in the culture of honor under the guise of protecting
freedom of speech? Legislators argued that congressional privilege promoted a code of behavior
that allowed for open discussion.301 True gentlemen would not abuse congressional privilege to
harm their opponents’ reputations, but as always, there was room for interpretation of what
specifically, constituted an insult to a man’s character. Gentlemen brought with them to
Congress and the army their own notions about congressional privilege and the honor code. The
premium placed on freedom of debate clashed with the military’s increasing sensitivity over their
underwhelming wartime performance. This situation was a recipe for trouble and affairs of
honor appealed to officers who believed that certain delegates had stretched the boundaries of
congressional privilege with an aim to harm their reputations.
When Gunning Bedford wrote his initial challenge to Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, he
emphasized that Sergeant had refused to give him the satisfaction “which a gentleman is intitled
to.” 302 Sergeant’s response to Bedford’s initial letter seemed calculated to add insult to
Bedford’s injury because, instead of apologizing, he wrote “I do not recollect mentioning your
Character or Name on any Occasion unless in Congress in the Course of Business. For my
Conduct there, I conceive I am answerable only to that Body & to my Constituents.”303 He then
offered a brief, apologetic statement, saying that “I flatter myself however that no illiberal
Expressions have escaped me there respecting either You or any other subject.” By most
standards, Sergeant’s words would not have been considered a thorough enough apology to end
the affair of honor. In fact, it seems that Bedford did not want an apology to end the crisis.
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Instead, he wanted a duel to prove his honor to all of his opponents in Congress. Unfortunately,
the words that actually provoked Bedford’s challenge have not been preserved for the historical
record. Bedford, however, had written Washington six months before his problems with
Sergeant and discussed his unhappiness with his job in the Muster Master Department. He
believed that “the Congress, from their little attention to the department, I am convinced, must in
a great measure be ignorant of the nature & importance of it.”304 His complaint about
congressional inattention was the result of his opinion that “the pay annexed to the office, is by
no means such as will support the dignity of it, or even the character of a gentleman; & what is
more mortifying, every Deputy in the Department, receives the same, down to Deputies of
Deputy; they make no distinction.”305 Clearly a conservative gentleman, Bedford wanted a
promotion to the rank of colonel to enhance his social status and receive a pay raise. Perhaps a
debate in Congress over Bedford’s performance in the Muster Master Department or a comment
questioning his petition for promotion triggered his resentment against Sergeant.306
After receiving Sergeant’s reply, Bedford wrote another letter in even harsher terms to his
opponent. Bedford’s letter merits careful examination because it combines the traditional,
ritualistic language of a challenge to a duel with an expression of the military’s resentment of
congressional privilege. He began by reiterating that “[T]he reputation of a gentleman is not to
be trifled with; you have attempted to injure mine, for which I expect the satisfaction of a man of
honor.” 307 He then explained his resentment against Congress and the delegates’ behavior. He
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believed that Sergeant’s letter was a “mean & pittiful” evasion and “so far from being an
extenuation of the insult, the place where the aspertion was made rather heightens it. I have been
much abused & illtreated by the arbitrary & ungenerous conduct of that house.”308 Bedford
confessed that he had “long wished to lay my hands on some one particular member, whome I
could prove had traduced my character; I am at length so happy as to have fixed on one; & could
only wish he was an object more worthy of resentment.” Although he focused on deliberately
insulting Sergeant, Bedford was also attacking the civil authority. He was clearly looking for an
opportunity to challenge any delegate to avenge his honor, behavior that bent the rules of the
honor code. Sergeant eventually became the target of his anger but, really, Bedford was already
predisposed to dislike Congress because of his dissatisfaction in the Muster Master Department.
He ended his letter by insisting:
I am by no means satisfied, Sir, with your answer. I will accept of no excuse whatever, &
shall expect no further trouble in the matter. If you refuse to make me the satisfaction I
ask, or to meet me at the place appointed, remember I shall treat you as a scoundrel
wherever I meet you, & publish you to the world as a person destitute of every spark of
honor, a poltroon & a coward. 309
The last paragraph of the letter was meant to impress Sergeant with Bedford’s resolute
resentment, by demanding that Sergeant acknowledge that this was an affair of honor between
gentlemen. The threat of publishing Sergeant as a person devoid of honor was the ultimate insult
in the eighteenth century. If he published an account of the disagreement, Bedford would have
been publicly defending his honor and would have destroyed Sergeant’s reputation.310 Sergeant
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had probably always intended to submit Bedford’s first letter to Congress to ask how to deal with
the situation because it involved a challenge to the sanctity of congressional privilege. But, after
the second letter threatened to charge him publicly with cowardice, he eagerly brought Bedford’s
letters to the attention of other congressmen.
Bedford’s challenge sparked a horrified and explosive reaction among Sergeant’s
congressional colleagues on June 12, 1777. Members drafted several resolves to express their
anger at Bedford’s conduct and that reiterate the importance of congressional privilege. That
day, passions grew so heated that Thomas Burke had to propose a motion to prevent Congress
from voting on any of the resolutions until the next day, to prevent overly harsh action against
Bedford. 311 One of the resolves proposed that “the said Gunning Bedford Esqr. be taken into
Custody of the Door keeper of this Congress, and committed to the Prison in this City, for his
Contempt and Breach of Priviledge aforesaid, untill the further order of Congress.”312 Although
that proposal was voted down, it reflected congressmen’s hostility toward the officer corps’
continual complaints. 313 Delegates commended Sergeant’s actions for refusing to participate in
an affair of honor, and offered a resolution that “the said Member, in laying the said Letters
before Congress, did what his Duty to this House and the State he represents required of him.”314
They voted to denounce publicly Bedford’s behavior, agreeing that “the Letter…contains false,
and scandalous Imputations against this House, unbecoming the Character of a Person who
would wish to be considered as a Friend to the Liberties of America.” Clearly, delegates were
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incensed that military officers were not recognizing and respecting congressional privilege and
were challenging the civil authority. Bedford, for his part, argued that freedom of debate did not
allow congressmen to question an officer’s reputation and that such behavior was not protected
by legislative privilege.
On June 13, Congress officially resolved to summon Bedford the next day to appear
before Congress and explain his conduct.315 When Bedford arrived, Congress was ready and
eager to defend its honor. In this tense atmosphere, Bedford tried to explain his reasons for the
challenge. Congressmen then vigorously debated the appropriate disciplinary measures to
impose on him for his challenge to the civil authority. The official resolution declared that
“Bedford has been guilty of a high breach of the privileges of this house, in sending a challenge
to one of the members of this house, for words spoken by him in this house, in the course of
debate: Ordered, That Mr. G. Bedford…is expected he will ask pardon of the house, and of the
member challenged.” 316 Bedford offered his apologies to Congress and Sergeant, probably still
furious that he would not receive the traditional satisfaction accorded to gentlemen by the honor
code.
The lengthy war for independence created circumstances that encouraged the military to
develop an understanding of honor that differed markedly from that of Congress. These
divergent conceptions of the culture of honor exacerbated the tensions between officers and
delegates. Congress had just defended its authority to protect “members from insult for any
thing by them said or done in Congress, in the exercise of their duty, which is a privilege
essential to the freedom of debate, and to the faithful discharge of the great trust reposed in them
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by their constituents.” But, the matter was not settled, and shortly after the end of the BedfordSergeant affair, a new dispute broke out between another military officer and a congressman.
In the fall of 1777, Thomas Burke expressed his doubts in Congress about Major General
John Sullivan’s ability to lead troops, doubts that sprang from Burke’s having witnessed him in
action at the battle of Brandywine. 317 Burke’s comments started a three-year affair of honor
between him and Sullivan. Sullivan adhered to the traditional culture of honor and believed that
the code provided guidelines and stability for the officer corps. His adherence to the traditional
guidelines got him into trouble several times, first while he served first as a major general in the
Continental Army and then as a congressman from New Hampshire. As he once told
Washington, “I am by no means an Enemy to Duels & most Sincerely wish that Congress had
Incouraged Instead of prohibiting them.”318 His belief in using affairs of honor to resolve
disputes actually caused him trouble early in his career because he ignored or was ignorant of the
rules that dictated who was a proper opponent to challenge to a duel. At the start of his military
service he had “agreed to meet an officer of Inferiour Rank at a Time & place he was pleased to
appoint for doing what he upon the Spot Acknowledged was Strictly my Duty for this I was
Blamed by officers of my own Rank.”319 Senior officers chastised Sullivan because they
worried that his behavior established “a precedent in our Army unknown in others & which
would Effectually destroy all Distinction of Rank & Superiority in Commission.”320 The senior
officers were not worried that his conduct violated the Articles of War; instead, they were
concerned that his conduct ignored the rules of the honor code. Affairs of honor were reserved
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for gentlemen of equal rank to prove their elite status, and junior officers needed to earn the
privilege and a promotion to participate. Sullivan discussed this particular story with
Washington to explain why he needed Washington’s approval in his dispute with a staff
surgeon. 321 Sullivan wanted Washington to validate his actions, as proof that he had acted
honorably and within the guidelines of the military, because he could not challenge the irksome
doctor, his social inferior. 322 Sullivan’s sensitivity to slights against his character was shaped by
his belief that his decisions and actions as a major general were inextricably linked to his public
reputation. His temper, then, exploded when he began to receive reports from his friends in
Congress that Burke was publicly questioning his military ability.
Burke argued that Sullivan’s tactical mistakes during the battle had “snatched from my
Hopes the Glory of a Compleat Victory which was certainly in our Power if Sullivan had not by
his Folly and misconduct ruined the Fortune of the Day.”323 Burke witnessed Sullivan’s troops
being outflanked and overrun by the enemy. He attributed Sullivan’s “[M]iscarriages” to a “total
want of Military Genius, and to One of that sort of understandings which is unable to take a full
comprehensive view of an object, but employs it's Activity in Subtle Senseless refinement.”324
After criticizing Sullivan’s military performance, Burke proposed a formal resolution recalling
Sullivan “from the army, until the enquiry, heretofore ordered into his conduct, shall be duly
made.” 325 Burke’s proposal was drastic because it would order the recall of a major general
during the fight to save Philadelphia. Although Burke was frustrated with Sullivan’s leadership
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at Brandywine, delegates decided that the formal military inquiry would investigate his decisions
at the Battle of Staten Island in August 1776.326 Delegates may have believed that Brandywine
was too recent and confusing to discuss rationally. They also may have wanted to establish a
record of Sullivan’s incompetence before dismissing him from military service.327 Many
delegates and military officers believed that Burke was guilty of character assassination because
he leveled serious charges against Sullivan’s reputation without proof from an inquiry. Because
delegates were unsure about the validity of Burke’s accusations, they agreed to Washington’s
request that Sullivan’s recall be left to his discretion and judgment.328 Sullivan pushed for an
inquiry at the earliest possible date to clear his reputation. He also threatened to resign, in order
to announce publicly his frustration and unhappiness with Congress.
News spread quickly of Sullivan’s struggle to protect his reputation. He wrote letters to
friends, asking for their support in his battle against Congress. Other frustrated officers willingly
pledged to support him because they were also dissatisfied with Congress’s treatment of the
military. As Major William Willcocks promised, “I had determined, so far as my influence, and
knowledge of the facts enabled me, to rescue your reputation, from the undeserved calumny
thrown upon it by the captious and ungenerous multitude.”329 To fight Burke’s accusations,
Sullivan collected letters that testified to his gentlemanly character and military ability. He
sought to save his reputation with the dedication of a lawyer (which was his occupation before
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the war), compiling a legal brief for court. In a lengthy public letter to John Hancock, president
of the Continental Congress, Sullivan explained his military decisions at both Brandywine and
Staten Island. In the letter, his frustration and resentment are palpable as he struggled to
acknowledge the civil authority’s right to investigate the military while still protecting his honor
from what he considered unwarranted slander. He warned Hancock and other delegates that, “if
the Reputation of General officers is thus to be sported with upon Every vague & Idle Report
Those who set Less by their Reputation than myself must Continue in the Service.”330 He
portrayed Burke as a troublemaker, who “Don Quixot Like pranced at a Distance from the fight
& felt as Little of the Severity of the Engagement as he knows about the Disposition of our
Troops or that of the Enemy.” 331 By linking Burke to Don Quixote, Sullivan suggested that
Congress was currently acting upon the words of a delusional delegate who was unable to
comprehend the reality of war and the imperatives of honor.
After finishing the public letter to Congress, Sullivan also wrote to John Adams, begging
him to make sure that his letter was, indeed, read aloud to all the delegates. Sullivan relied on
his friendship network in Congress to keep him informed and to help him in his fight against
Burke’s accusations. Sullivan asked Adams to “call upon Congress to do me justice, and restore
me that reputation which they have in some degree deprived me of.”332 Sullivan was so resentful
that he threatened that, if he failed to redeem his character at the inquiry, he would “quit the
service, and employ my tongue, my pen, and every other engine that may be found necessary, to
save my reputation.” 333 He even warned Adams that other officers were frustrated with recent
congressional policies and actions because they worried that their reputations, too, could be
330
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damaged without proof. Sullivan and his fellow officers believed that congressmen were
violating the culture of honor and that there should be consequences for these offenses. Sullivan
ended with a personal appeal: “I know that, as a friend, you will make the proper allowances for
my feelings. I rely upon your exertions to bring Congress to do justice to your much injured
friend and humble servant.”334 Sullivan’s letter is an example of a gentleman asking a friend to
engage in mediation on his behalf. The mediator could help resolve an affair of honor before a
challenge to a duel became the only outcome of the dispute. Sullivan most likely knew that
Gunning Bedford had been severely chastised only a few months before for challenging Jonathan
Dickinson Sergeant and that therefore a duel was not an option in September 1777. He could
only fight Burke with words and the support of his friends in Congress.
Sullivan’s military inquiry was held on October 10, 1777, several days after the battle of
Germantown. After two days of testimony, the court acquitted Sullivan “of any unsoldier like
Conduct in the expedition to Staten Island”.335 After the military court cleared his reputation,
Sullivan’s friends in Congress also denied Burke’s charges of incompetence. Elbridge Gerry
then encouraged Sullivan to retract his threat of resignation. Gerry, a supporter of congressional
privilege and a more ideologically radical delegate, disliked the military’s reliance on resignation
as a form of protest. He valued republican virtue over honor as a measure of a gentleman’s
status, and equated resigning with cowardice. He wrote to Sullivan that he would “prove a
Coward” if he “sank under unjust reproach” and submitted “to the servile humiliating Terms of
your Cruel foes, who have Attacked you with the poisonous darts of Calumny in order to effect
the very purpose of your quitting the Army which in the close of your letter you tamely yield to
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them.” 336 Gerry and Sullivan possessed two different understandings of the culture of honor, but
they both acknowledged the importance of public reputation. They disagreed, though, on how
men earned and protected their reputations.
On October 12, the same day the military court acquitted Sullivan, Burke wrote to him to
explain why he believed Sullivan was an incompetent officer. In his letter, Burke tried to
divorce the personal from the professional. He argued that his critique of Sullivan was not a
character assassination but a rational and logical attempt to weed out bad generals to help the war
effort. Burke considered “it as one Essential part of my duty to Attend to the Appointments of
the Army, and where I perceive that any person so unqualified as I deem you to be has got into a
Command, where Incompetence may be productive of disasters and disgrace, it is my duty to
Endeavour at removing him.”337 In language guaranteed to infuriate an already sensitive military
officer, Burke reiterated that he had not attacked Sullivan’s personal courage because “I had no
knowledge of it, and I was Cautious to Say nothing unjust or unnecessary.”338 He insisted that
his primary objection to Sullivan was his “want of Sufficient Tallents, and I consider it as your
misfortune, not fault. It is my Duty, as far as I can, to prevent its being the Misfortune of my
Country.” 339 Burke concluded by warning Sullivan that he had not appreciated his words about
Burke’s behavior at Brandywine. He felt Sullivan’s Don Quixote comparison had attacked his
private character and made insinuations about his honor.340 He further asserted that “the manner
of those Expressions which I suppose you meant for Wit and Sarcasm are as unbecoming the
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Soldier as the Gentleman, and Inconsistent with that plain and dignified Simplicity which ought
to be the Stile of persons in either rank.”341 With Sullivan offended and Burke resentful of his
words, their lengthy affair of honor began.342 Even though Burke believed that a man’s personal
and public characters should be kept separate, he was unable to practice his own advice.
Sullivan never accepted the notion of the sanctity of congressional privilege because it
violated his understanding of the culture of honor. As a military officer and social conservative,
he believed that there should be no distinction between one’s private and public reputations. As
he complained to Alexander McDougall, another major general in the Continental Army,
I am not Clearly convinced that a member of Congress has a right to
Take…Liberties…with the Character of an officer and I think I can never be brought to
believe that he can have a Privilidge of writing to any Gentleman Accusing him of want
of Capacity & Every thing that would make him contemptible in the Eyes of the World &
the other be Barred from replying with Spirit because his Accuser was a member of
Congress…I therefore considered myself at full Liberty at Least to return Acrimony for
Acrimony.” 343
Sullivan rejected the delegates’ claims that congressional privilege was necessary to protect their
freedom of debate, arguing that they were abusing the system deliberately to attack the honor of
military officers. After the Bedford affair, Sullivan knew that he could not directly challenge
Burke to a duel, but he did not hesitate to say that, when the war was over or when he was no
longer an officer, he would be glad to meet him on the field of honor. 344 In his response to
Burke’s letter, Sullivan deliberately insulted him by claiming “as to your opinion of my Military
abilities, it can give me no uneasiness untill you give me better evidence of your Capacity to
judge in matters of this nature.” As Sullivan had warned his friend, he would gladly exchange
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acrimony for acrimony with Burke. 345
In April 1778, Sullivan attacked Burke’s personal character again, this time by
emphasizing that he was not a gentleman of “[C]andor Honor or veracity.” 346 This was a direct
insult, calculated to fuel the fires of their mutual resentment. He ended his letter ominously,
hoping “that Some Fortunate Event may bring us within Reach of Each other when I Shall Take
Those measures which appear to me most proper for the person who has so maliciously
Endeavoured to injure the Reputation of Sir your most obedient servant.”347 When Burke finally
responded to Sullivan’s provocative letter in the early fall of 1780, he detailed how long they had
been taunting each other with insults and pledged to end the resentment with a dawn
appointment. Burke, true to form, could not resist taunting Sullivan with even more pointed
commentary about their respective levels of gentlemanly conduct: “I hope you will perceive that,
if I exceed you in nothing else, I do in temper and the manners of a Gentleman.”348 He
concluded by taunting Sullivan that he understood that “the Idea of your own Eminence is very
pleasing to you; I wish not to deprive you of it. Enjoy it, Sir with my hearty good will.” 349
Then, as coincidence and state legislatures would have it, Burke and Sullivan were
elected to serve in the Continental Congress at the same time in late 1780 and early 1781,
respectively. After meeting in the chamber, they appointed seconds to negotiate the details of
their affair of honor, taking a further step closer to exchanging fire. Hugh Shiell acted as
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Burke’s second and Alexander McDougall served as Sullivan’s second.350 Burke and Sullivan
asked their close friends to serve as seconds to keep the affair of honor a secret because dueling
was illegal. According to the code duello, seconds acted as mediators and tried to negotiate an
apology to end the dispute between the two angered parties. If affairs of honor reached the
dueling ground, then mediation had failed, usually because one participant was determined to
fight to prove his honor or because the insult was so severe that not even an apology would
suffice. Seconds also served as witnesses to testify to each participant’s honorable or
dishonorable conduct. 351
Sullivan and Burke left all matters of mediating their affair in the hands of their seconds.
The only hint of these negotiations is a single letter from Burke to Shiell, in which he discussed
why he was angry with Sullivan and explained on what terms Sullivan must apologize to prevent
the duel. Burke insisted that “[T]o prevent, also, all pretence for refinements in future, I will
here state the Questions which alone I will agree to submit. Was my Conduct as a member of
Congress sufficient provocation for the affront given by General Sullivan in his letter to
Congress” and “[W]ere any Asperities in my letters sufficient to Justify the reproachful language
in General Sullivan's answers?”352 Fortunately, the mediators successfully negotiated apologies
that were acceptable to both participants, which precluded a dawn appointment.353
Burke’s and Sullivan’s three-year dispute yielded to mediation, but the protracted length
of their affair of honor reveals the difficulties that revolutionaries faced in defining public and
private characters. Did politicians have the right to declare the privilege of congressional speech
350
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when they criticized the efforts of patriotic gentlemen in uniform? Burke, who clearly prized
freedom of debate, could not forgive Sullivan for his rude comments in public letters and that
was why he agreed to meet Sullivan to defend his reputation with pistols. The importance of
public reputation drove many of the seemingly irrational decisions of military and civil
authorities during the war. 354 The culture of honor constrained the ability of revolutionaries to
question incompetent officers and politicians because every critique ultimately devolved into a
matter of character.355
Still another clash between an officer and a congressman began with a loud altercation in
a coffee house between Brigadier General William Thompson and Representative Thomas
McKean. Their affair of honor highlights again the importance of congressional privilege, but
also addresses the question of whether there could be a distinction between a public and a private
quarrel. One evening in November 1778, Thompson deliberately set out to find McKean, intent
on confronting him about recent developments concerning prisoner exchange. Thompson’s and
McKean’s verbal exchange has been preserved in the historical record because delegates
investigated, for over a month, the words shouted during the altercation. Members of Congress
wanted to know if Thompson had deliberately insulted their honor and challenged congressional
privilege when he yelled at McKean in the public sphere. Congress interviewed seventeen
witnesses to try and reconcile Thompson’s and McKean’s different memories about what each
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man had said. 356 Witnesses’ memories and testimony were, of course, heavily influenced by
their friendships with the men involved.
Brigadier General William Thompson stormed into the coffeehouse intent on picking a
fight with McKean if for no other reason than that they had a history of conflict. Thompson
resented McKean for two reasons: he had once publicly accused Thompson of harboring a
deserter from the army (the Carlisle Affair) and McKean had prevented Thompson’s exchange as
a prisoner of war in September 1778.357 On November 18, Thompson had just received word
that the British army had revoked all Continental Army officers’ parole and the officers had to
return to New York City. Upon hearing the news, Thompson blamed McKean for his continued
prisoner of war status and he began a search for him at coffeehouses popular with congressional
delegates.
Parole in the eighteenth century was a military convention that explicitly relied on the
honor code to govern the behavior of prisoners of war.358 Parole was only available to officers
and its terms were premised on the assumption that gentlemen should not be forced to endure the
same prison conditions as common soldiers.359 Officers lodged with local families or in
boarding houses and received liberty to walk around and visit with one another. 360 Thompson,
as a brigadier general, had been allowed to return to his family in Pennsylvania after he swore an
oath that he would not fight until he had been exchanged and granted his freedom.361 To break
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the terms of parole would have drawn censure from both British and American officers and
damaged his reputation.362
The issue of prisoner exchange was difficult because Washington and Congress had
different ideas about how to negotiate with the British. Washington insistently called for
establishing exchange guidelines, but Congress was more reluctant to engage until the British
recognized the independence of the United States.363 Washington also wanted to regain
commanders, such as Thompson, who had been on parole for over two years after surrendering
in the field during the retreat from Canada in the summer of 1776.364 Congress, however,
appreciated receiving British specie for the upkeep of British prisoners of war and was reluctant
to lose this source of reliable revenue.365 While Congress’s reluctance to move forward on
prisoner exchange seemed callous to Washington, who wanted to liberate all American prisoners
of war, the hard reality that many delegates understood was that, when American soldiers were
exchanged, most went home rather than returning to duty. Many American soldiers were
physically incapacitated after living on British prison ships and refused to re-enlist if their
original terms of enlistment had expired. In contrast, British soldiers released by the United
States returned to the field because they served lengthy enlistments.366
In September 1778, Thompson had hoped that he would be exchanged for Benjamin
Franklin’s estranged son the royal governor of New Jersey, but McKean and several other
congressmen blocked that proposal and, instead reclaimed John McKinly, president of Delaware,
from British custody. 367 Thompson wanted to be exchanged for several reasons: he wished to be
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able to command troops again; he wanted to receive pay because, as a paroled officer, it was
difficult for him to receive his salary; and he had been passed over for promotion while a
prisoner of war and he wanted the higher rank to which he felt entitled.368 After receiving the
news that he would have to return to New York City, Thompson decided to vent his frustration
on a specific target, perhaps with the aim of provoking a duel.
The investigation started on November 19, 1778, after McKean submitted to Congress a
memorial that described Thompson’s behavior the previous night in the crowded coffeehouse.
He stated that Thompson’s behavior was “a breach of Privilege, to have a tendency to destroy the
freedom of voting in Congress, and to be a gross insult upon this Honourable Body from one of
their officers, and that in so public a place, thinks it his duty as a Member to communicate it to
Congress.” 369 In his lengthy memorial, McKean repeatedly stressed that throughout the
confrontation, Thompson spoke in a loud tone and seemed visibly upset. In contrast, McKean
asserted he had conducted himself in a calm and civil manner. According to McKean, his own
behavior served as a model of gentility, while Thompson exhibited all the traits of an uncouth
military officer who derided congressional authority. McKean also reported that Thompson had
in a loud and “imperious tone further said, that the Congress were a parcel of damned Rascals,
and that he Mr. McKean was so in particular, which he repeated twice,” a key statement that
McKean knew would upset the delegates. 370 That sort of language was a harsh insult in the
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eighteenth century because it implied that an individual lacked honor and that his conduct was
not governed by any moral restraints.371
Thompson then escalated the drama of that night by asking McKean “if he was a
Gentleman, which Mr. McKean considered to be intended for a challenge, and he then came up
to him in an angry manner and touching his shoulder repeated the question.”372 McKean’s
response to this unmistakable invitation to a duel displayed his belief that Thompson was
violating congressional privilege: “Mr. McKean told him, that he did not think him a gentleman,
that he was his inferior, and behaved like a Bully and a Brute, and that he should make him
repent of his conduct.” 373 Professing to be horrified by Thompson’s behavior, McKean
announced in Congress his intention to make him repent. Other delegates were also appalled,
which was the reason a month-long congressional investigation to determine exactly what
Thompson had said that night. Had a military officer directly impugned the honor of Congress
in front of the people out of doors?
In a memorial that served as a direct rebuttal to McKean’s testimony, Thompson declared
that he had not meant to insult congressional honor. He insisted his altercation with McKean
was a private quarrel and bluntly stated, “as to the Charge of calling the Honorable Mr. McKean
a Rascal and a villain your memorialist readily acknowledges it.”374 Congress did not appreciate
Thompson’s distinction between a private and public quarrel, especially because the dispute
involved a general and a congressman.
The delegates’ investigation into the Thompson-McKean altercation highlights the
importance of words to the eighteenth-century revolutionaries. Their primary concern was a

371

Freeman, Affairs of Honor, xvi.
Thomas McKean’s Memorial to Congress, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 11:226.
373
Ibid., 11:226.
374
William Thompson’s Memorial, November 23, 1778, Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 178, 316.
372

139

determination of whether Thompson had publicly disparaged Congress during the heated
exchange. McKean insisted that Thompson had either said there was a damned set of Rascals in
Congress or that Congress was a damned set of Rascals, two phrases that meant very different
things to irate congressmen. The first phrase cast aspersions on the honor of the delegates
currently serving in Congress by directly stating that there were rascals in Congress. The
meaning of a phrase could turn on a preposition for gentlemen sensitive to nuance.375 If
Thompson had uttered the first phrase, then he would have been the third general in two years
who had directly challenged the authority of Congress. Also, delegates were keenly aware of all
the grumbling about Congress that was common in the army’s camps and in the personal letters
of its officers. The second phrase was acceptable as a common, if crude, complaint about
government and politicians. Though delegates may have resented the implication that Congress
was a damned set of rascals, the sentiment would not have directly challenged their collective
and individual honor.
On November 23, members of Congress questioned thirteen witnesses about the dispute
between Thompson and McKean. The witnesses can be split into three groups: friends of
Thompson; friends of McKean; and casual acquaintances who had witnessed what had almost
been a brawl. All witnesses were first asked to testify if they had heard “any expressions
reflecting upon Congress?”376 The majority of witnesses declared that they had never heard
Thompson mention Congress and that his heated words were only directed at challenging
McKean’s honor. Many witnesses concurred with Thompson’s description of the event, which
emphasized that his insults were designed for a private quarrel with McKean. But McKean, like
Burke and Sergeant, believed that words spoken in debate could not be used to initiate an affair
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of honor. Military officers were stymied by this creation of a loophole in the code of honor,
which challenged their understanding of genteel conduct and led to much resentment.
The witnesses were divided in their testimony between Thompson’s friends, who
emphasized the private quarrel aspect, and McKean’s friends, who heard Thompson say that he
had been “treated in a rascally manner by Congress.” 377 Almost all witnesses agreed that it was
hard to recall the specifics of the argument because it had escalated so rapidly. Colonel Joseph
Deane, in describing the coffeehouse confrontation, recalled how “the House was in Confusion.
I thought the gentlemen would come to blows. Upon which I went up and stept in between them,
Many words passed, but cannot particularly recollect them, my attention was taken up to prevent
their getting together.” 378 Other witnesses tried to avoid repeating the language used by both
gentlemen since it was heated and did not reflect well on either Thompson’s or McKean’s
gentility and dignity. One witness recalled how “I heard him [Thompson] say several times to
Mr. MK. you are no gentleman and touching him on the shoulder ask him are you a gentleman.
Mr MK said not in the sense you mean. I will make your heart ake for this. Genl. T. said, I will
make your bones ake for this.”379 The witness then described the heated words relating to the
issuance of a summons about the Carlisle Affair: “Gen T[hompson] told Mr MKean he had used
him ill, he had sent A summons for him. Mr MK said it was not a summons. Gen. T. said it
was. Mr MK said it was not. G T. said it was. Mr MK said, well produce it. G T. said I have
not got it. M MK said, What have you done with it. Gen T. said I wiped my arse with it.”380
The witnesses’ testimony shows that McKean was not as calm as he had claimed to have been in
his memorial to Congress.
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After all eyewitnesses had presented their testimony on November 23, Thompson gave a
speech in which he described his service in the Continental Army and his frustration over not
being exchanged. He ended his speech by reiterating that his confrontation with McKean was
personal, not political. That night, he said, “his patience” had “deserted him and under those
circumstances he is sensible he expressed himself with some asperity against that gentleman.”381
Thompson then promised that, “whatever his expressions might be or however they might strike
others, he solemnly declares he never meant to abuse or reflect upon the honourable Congress or
any of its Members; And is heartily sorry that under any circumstances any expressions could be
extorted from him which could be construed to give this house offence.”382 What Thompson
failed to understand and acknowledge in his speech was that delegates were worried about any
challenge that was even vaguely connected to words spoken in the congressional chamber.
Private quarrels would not be tolerated, whether the disputes pertained to prisoner exchanges or
to decisions made by Congress.
On December 7 and December 23, four more witnesses testified, an indication of just
how zealous the delegates were in trying to determine what words were spoken at the
coffeehouse. After a day of debate, Congress accepted Thompson’s apology but found him
guilty of a breach of privilege. In this ruling, they sided with Thompson’s version of the story, in
which he stipulated that he had never cast aspersions on congressional honor, but they publicly
denounced his interpretation of the culture of honor. He was not allowed to challenge a
congressman for his actions in deciding prisoner exchanges. Thompson accepted his public
rebuke from Congress, though he could not forget McKean’s role in his public chastisement.
Thompson still believed that his dispute with McKean was a private quarrel and that belief and
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the fact that he had received no satisfaction or apology from McKean; prompted him to publish
an account of his affair of honor in a Pennsylvania newspaper, the Packet. 383 There he asserted
that, “Chief Justice McKean has, in an affair which does not relate to his conduct in Congress,
and which is of a private nature, behaved like a lyar, a rascal, and a coward.”384 McKean then
brought a suit for libel against Thompson and the newspaper editor of the Packet and won
damages in the spring of 1781.385
The war for independence complicated the revolutionaries’ understanding of the culture
of honor and the importance of protecting their reputations. Affairs of honor were technically
illegal in the Continental Army, though officers routinely used challenges to highlight their
social standing and assert their claims to gentility. The code taught gentlemen to be sensitive to
any hint of an insult and this hypersensitivity occasionally made it difficult for congressmen to
ask why things were going wrong or who was at fault. Promotions and pensions were also
linked to honor and calling into question a person’s decision could result in a challenge even
when no insult had been intended. Nevertheless, revolutionaries used the code duello to provide
strict guidelines to determine when it was appropriate to initiate an affair of honor. That
punctilious regard for propriety was intended to ensure that the form of punishment was
commensurate to the offense. While liquor consumption probably fueled a number of
challenges, mediation was built into the structure of a duel and the seconds could usually get the
duelists to offer and accept apologies.
All politicians appreciated that the purpose of congressional privilege was to provide for
freedom of debate, but some radicals and conservatives disagreed over how far that freedom’s
383
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permissible boundaries stretched. Most Continental Army officers adhered to a traditional
interpretation of the culture of honor and senior officers often clashed with delegates over the
limits of free speech, when character and reputation where at stake. Whenever, a general
attempted to initiate an affair of honor with a congressman, he was quickly shown the might of
civil authority in the form of public censure for his conduct. For all the fear of a standing army
espoused in 1775, delegates proved in 1777 and 1778 that they controlled the military, and many
officers grudgingly accepted the civil authority’s power. No pistols at dawn were needed to
prove Congress’s control over the Continental Army.
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CONCLUSION:
The Newburgh Conspiracy
“And you will, by the dignity of your Conduct, afford occasion of Posterity to say, when
speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to Mankind, ‘had this day been wanting,
the World had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of
attaining.”
George Washington, 1783386
Faced with a mutinous officer corps in early March 1783, Washington drafted a strongly
worded speech, intending to nip the incipient rebellion in the bud. He warned his officers that
pamphlets were being circulated in their quarters at Newburgh, New York, “addressed more to
the feelings and passions, than to the reason and judgment of the Army.”387 In the late winter,
officers had begun to grow concerned that they would not get paid after the army disbanded, and
so they had begun to discuss different strategies to pressure Congress into paying their
postbellum pensions.
Historians have argued that a small minority of congressional delegates actively
encouraged the officers to begin grumbling about the inefficiency of the Continental Congress.
These delegates hoped that rumors of a military coup would induce reluctant states, such as
Rhode Island, into giving Congress more power and money through the granting of an impost
duty. 388 The delegates who advocated a strong national government, such as Robert Morris and
Alexander Hamilton, issued dire warnings to their friends in the officer corps, hinting that
Congress was planning to renege on the vote that had granted half-pay pensions for life in
1780. 389 Hamilton and Morris wanted their military friends to declare loudly their unhappiness
with Congress and start a public discussion of drastic measures to scare other delegates into
386
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agreeing with the nationalists. This complicated strategy failed in the end, though it did have the
benefit of gaining officers a commutation of their half-pay pensions into a one-time payment
equal to the amount of their salary for five years.
When Washington strode into the Temple of Virtue, he faced an officer corps, some
members of which seriously contemplated overthrowing the authority of the national
legislature. 390 Washington knew that all of the officers present had read the Newburgh Address,
an anonymous pamphlet, and he wrote a speech to refute the pamphleteer’s logic. Major John
Armstrong Jr., Horatio Gates’s aide-de-camp, wrote the Newburgh Address to urge the army to
take decisive action against civilian ingratitude.391 He proposed two ideas to force Congress into
paying the pensions: “If War continues, remove into the unsettled country…and leave an
ungrateful Country to defend itself,” or, “If Peace takes place, never sheath your Swords Says
he[Armstrong] until you have obtained full and ample justice.”392 In his speech, Washington
mentioned the polite fiction that the Address must have been written by the enemy, “some
Emissary, perhaps from New York.”393 Washington’s speech at Newburgh provided a summary
of his interpretation of the culture of honor and the meaning of the American Revolution.
He began by warning the officers “that the Address is drawn with great Art, and is
designed to answer the most insidious purposes.” The author’s purpose was “calculated to
impress the Mind, with an idea of premeditated injustice in the Sovereign power of the United
390
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States, and to rouse all those resentments which must unavoidably flow from such a belief.” In
his speech, Washington pledged to act as a third-party mediator to resolve the issues between the
angry officers and Congress. He shamed the officers into acting like gentlemen, by recalling his
own sacrifices for the war effort. He declared,
If my conduct heretofore, has not evinced to you, that I have been a faithful friend
to the Army, my declaration of it at this moment would be equally unavailing and
improper. But, as I was among the first, who embarked in the cause of our common
Country; as I have never left your side one moment, but when called from you on public
duty; as I have been the constant companion and witness of your Distresses, and not
among the last to feel, and acknowledge your Merits; as I have ever considered my own
Military reputation as inseperably connected with that of the Army; as my Heart has ever
expanded with joy, when I have heard its praises, and my indignation has arisen, when
the mouth of detraction has been opened against it; it can scarcely be supposed, at this
late stage of the War, that I am indifferent to its interests. But how are they to be
promoted? 394
He counseled patience, arguing that Congress was subject, “like all other large Bodies, where
there is a variety of different Interests to reconcile,” to slow and lengthy deliberations.395
Washington, as a former delegate to the Continental Congress, knew how the committee system
could hold up legislation. He warned that to listen to the Newburgh Address’s suggestions
would “tarnish the reputation of an Army which is celebrated thro’ all Europe, for its fortitude
and patriotism.” 396 Washington deliberately emphasized the loss of public reputation to prevent
the officers from following through on their resentment. If the officers mutinied in March 1783,
Washington worried that their actions would also destroy not only the army’s reputation but his
own, as well.
He ended his speech by using the language of the honor code to shame the officers into
rejecting the Newburgh Address and the idea of a coup d’état. He reiterated his pledge to act as
a mediator between the army and Congress and encouraged the officers to place their “full
394
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confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress; that previous to your dissolution as an
Army they will cause all your Accounts to be fairly liquidated.”397 He then asked the officers as
gentlemen,
in the name of our common Country, as you value your own sacred honor, as you respect
the rights of humanity, and as you regard the Military and National character of America,
to express your utmost horror and detestation of the Man who wishes…to overturn the
liberties of our Country, and who wickedly attempts to open the flood Gates of Civil
discord, and deluge our rising Empire in Blood.398
This strongly worded statement exposed Washington’s barely concealed anger at the proposed
mutiny. His words also revealed his belief that, by invoking the honor code, he could persuade
the officers to value their reputation over financial gain. He promised that if the officers voted
against the Newburgh Address, they would provide “one more distinguished proof of your
unexampled patriotism and patient virtue,” to the world.399
Washington’s appeal to the code of honor and his dramatic gesture of putting on
eyeglasses to read a letter put an end to the Newburgh Conspiracy.400 In the spring of 1783, his
officers accepted his argument and publicly agreed with his interpretation of eighteenth-century
society and politics, that is, that society and its workings were essentially conservative in
character. This meant that honor would still influence how political leaders conducted
themselves in the public sphere and that the new republic would not be free of all deference.
Conservatives in 1783 believed that the culture of honor provided the necessary outlets to handle
the continuing ideological disagreements over the strength and power of the national
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government. While radicals had wanted to create a society modeled on ancient Sparta and
republican Rome, conservatives actively incorporated elements of continuity from the old
colonial social structure into the new independent society to ensure their retention of political
power. The American Revolution exposed many competing theories and philosophies about
government and society but, in 1783, Washington’s speech showed that conservatives were in
charge of the national government and the army and that their beliefs would continue to shape
American society until the constitutional convention.
The eighteenth-century culture of honor acted as “social glue” that helped revolutionaries
win the war for independence and facilitated the operations of a continental congress binding
together thirteen distinct and different colonies. 401 The ideal of honor created a code of genteel
behavior that allowed political elites to arrive in Philadelphia and reference a common set of
behaviors and social norms, which they used to guide debates over establishing an army and
declaring independence. Character and reputation mattered to these gentlemen because they
needed to prove that they possessed the legitimacy to become the leaders of a newly independent
nation. Many congressmen wanted a genteel officer corps to help win the war because
gentlemen officers also adhered to the honor code and were willing to accept the civil authority’s
supremacy over the Continental Army.
Through the battles over promotions, pensions, and congressional privilege,
revolutionaries demonstrated the importance of honor in their everyday lives and decisionmaking. While historians have endlessly debated the influence of the Enlightenment on the
patriots’ political philosophy and system of government, they have not always paid attention to
how the participants described their own actions and motivations. Not every revolutionary
believed in the importance of the honor culture, but they had to acknowledge that the code
401
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influenced their peers’ behavior. Before the advent of organized political parties, gentlemen
used the culture of honor to channel their ideological disagreements through three different
means of conflict resolution: mediation; resignation; or affairs of honor. Third-party mediation
operated through the extensive friendship networks that existed between the Continental Army
and the Continental Congress. These friendship networks suggest that there was never any true
danger that the army would overthrow the national legislature; many officers and politicians had
been friends before the war and remained friends after it. Resignations and affairs of honor
reveal the inherent problems of a political system in which reputations conferred legitimacy on
public leaders. There was accordingly, a heightened sensitivity to any insult, which could have
led to a breakdown of the system. Fortunately, however, mediation was built into every part of
the resignation and dueling process.
In a period of flux, revolutionaries turned to the honor code to prove their legitimacy to
the American public. Politics were based on character and reputation, both of which had to be
carefully maintained. These common social assumptions even informed the oath that delegates
signed at the end of the Declaration of Independence where they mutually pledged “to each other
our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,” highlighting their status as elite gentlemen.
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